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Abstract
The present work focuses on the notions of representation and computation, and the
explanatory role they play in the cognitive sciences. I put forward a deﬂationary view
of representational content, and argue that explanatory internal states in the cognit-
ive sciences are primarily individuated by their computational structure, rather than
by content. In Part I, I survey the mainstream accounts of representation and con-
tent present in the philosophical literature: functional role semantics, informational
semantics, teleosemantics, and structural representation. I also brieﬂy examine some
of the crucial issues that any satisfactory theory of content has to tackle, with special
attention to the problem of indeterminacy of content.
I present and develop, in Part II, a version of the mechanistic view of concrete com-
putation able to account for how cognitive systems compute, and for how to individuate
their computational structures. The account avoids pancomputationalism and triviality
of computation, yielding a robust, objective theory of computation in physical systems.
With this mechanistic view of concrete computation in hand, in Part III I present my
deﬂationary approach to representation, which shifts much of the explanatory burden
in making sense of cognition onto computational structures. I examine interpretational
semantics as a promising precursor of my view. I propose several modiﬁcations to inter-
pretational semantics, producing a theory close to structural representation, but with
marked deﬂationary leanings. On that basis, two deﬂationary paths are examined: con-
tent pragmatism, and mild realism about content. I provide reasons to prefer the latter
approach, though I take both paths to be promising. The resulting deﬂated notion of
representation, wedded to a solid notion of computational structure, is advantageous
insofar as it dissolves metaphysical puzzles related to content-ﬁxation and indetermin-
acy, while preserving a notion of representation robust enough to play an important
explanatory role in the contemporary study of cognition.
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Zusammenfassung
Schwerpunkte dieser Dissertation sind die Begriﬀe von Repräsentation und Komputa-
tion, insbesondere in Bezug auf ihre Erklärungsrolle in den Kognitionswissenschaften.
Ich entwickle eine deﬂationäre Theorie bezüglich des Gehalts von mentalen Repräsenta-
tionen und spreche mich dafür aus, dass die inneren Zustände, die eine Erklärungsrolle
in den Kognitionswissenschaften spielen, eher durch ihre komputationale Struktur be-
stimmt werden als durch ihren Gehalt.
Im ersten Teil meiner Dissertation gebe ich eine Zusammenfassung der bekanntesten
Theorien des repräsentationalen Gehalts in der philosophischen Fachliteratur. Das sind
die inferentielle Semantik, die Informationssemantik, die Teleosemantik, und die struk-
turale Repräsentationstheorie. Außerdem analysiere ich einige der wichtigsten Proble-
me, auf die jede Theorie des repräsentationalen Gehalts eingehen muss, mit besonderem
Fokus auf dem Problem der Unbestimmtheit des Gehalts.
Im zweiten Teil präsentiere und entwickle ich eine Variante einer mechanistischen
Theorie der konkreten Komputation, die in der Lage ist zu erklären, wie Komputation
in kognitiven Systemen möglich ist und wodurch komputationale Strukturen charakte-
risiert werden. Diese Theorie vermeidet das Risiko eines Pankomputationalismus und
einer Trivialisierung der Komputation. Zudem liefert sie eine robuste, objektive Erklä-
rung der Komputation physikalischer Systeme.
Anhand dieser mechanistischen Theorie der konkreten Komputation präsentiere ich
im dritten Teil meine deﬂationäre Theorie der Repräsentation, in der die in den Ko-
gnitionswissenschaften benötigte Erklärungsleistung von komputationalen Strukturen
übernommen wird. Ich beginne mit einer Analyse der interpretationalen Semantik, die
ein vielversprechender Vorgänger meiner Theorie ist. Daraufhin schlage ich diverse Än-
derungen an der interpretationalen Semantik vor, wodurch eine Theorie entsteht, die
ähnlich der strukturalen Repräsentationstheorie ist, aber eine starke deﬂationären Nei-
gung hat.
Auf diesen Grundlagen werden zwei deﬂationäre Vorschläge analysiert: Pragmatis-
mus und milder Realismus über den repräsentationalen Gehalt. Ich gebe Gründe dafür
an, dass der letztgenannte Vorschlag zu bevorzugen ist, obwohl ich glaube, dass beide
Vorschläge aussichtsreich sind. Das resultierende deﬂationäre Konzept der Repräsenta-
tion, kombiniert mit einem robusten Konzept der komputationalen Struktur, hat den
Vorteil, dass es metaphysische Probleme in Bezug auf die Festlegung und Unbestimmt-
heit des repräsentationalen Gehalts löst. Auf diese Weise wird ein robustes Konzept der
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Cognition is to be studied and understood to a signiﬁcant extent by means of the no-
tions of representation and computation. Or, at least, this is the insight that gave
birth to Cognitive Science, a research ﬁeld that has been thriving and expanding for
the past 60 or so years. Areas of psychology, linguistics, artiﬁcial intelligence, philo-
sophy, neuroscience, sociology, and anthropology have embraced the idea, coming to
form the mosaic unity of the study of cognition, to borrow a phrase from Craver (2007).
Alternative proposals, ones that do not see cognition as a representational, computa-
tional phenomenon, have been surely put forward in the past decades, but they have
largely failed to overthrow the representational-computational framework, which dom-
inates research in the ﬁeld to this day. Cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience,
philosophy of cognitive science, psycholinguistics, computational neuroscience, to name
a few: Cognitive Science has directed and spawned several sub-ﬁelds, which, despite
occasional hiccups and threats of crisis (cf. the recent replication crisis in psychology),
have been moving forward and enriching our understanding of cognitive phenomena.
Philosophers, ﬁttingly, have not failed to worry about the conceptual underpinnings
of the whole project. Representation and computation are terms that have become
part of everyday discourse (though the latter much more recently than the former), and
despite a certain intuitive grasp of what those concepts capture, careful perusal reveals
diﬃculties that undermine our certainty  and introduce cracks in the foundations of
Cognitive Science. What states and processes in the world can be fruitfully considered
to be representations? How can physical entities and processes have semantic content,
be about other entities and processes? What is it for a physical system to compute, and
which systems, if any, do so? Are representations and computations facts of the matter
about cognitive systems, or are they just useful concepts that we employ to allow us
better to understand cognitive phenomena? These are all pressing questions, and which
prove recalcitrant to straightforward solutions.
Especially from the 1980s on, philosophers have taken up the task of trying to secure
the sustaining pillars of Cognitive Science by oﬀering answers to these questions (and
some more). Much eﬀort went into projects that attempted to make the notions of
representation and computation precise and scientiﬁcally acceptable. The bulk of this
project went (and goes) to trying to naturalise representation and computation  that
is to say, to explain or reduce those notions in terms of entities and processes that are
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the bread and butter of more basic sciences, such as physics, chemistry, and biology.
This naturalisation project, especially when applied to representation, had initially
seemed both fundamental and solvable1, but soon found itself instead having to wade
sluggishly through murky, hurdle-ridden waters, and produced, after four decades of
focused toil, only partial satisfaction to its tribulations. Rather than ﬁxing the cracks
in the foundations of Cognitive Science, philosophical work has revealed how deep they
actually go. Hope is not lost though, and philosophical work on these issues is ongoing,
albeit, to use again a phrase from Godfrey-Smith, it seems to have lost momentum
with the turn of the century.
My project takes the cue from this nagging feeling of dismay about the prospects of
success of the philosophical naturalisation project, in its attempt to provide the bases
for the multifarious ediﬁce of Cognitive Science. An important part of my claim echoes
Godfrey-Smith's (2006) growing suspicion that we have been looking for the wrong
kind of theory all along. Though my positive approach diﬀers considerably from his,
it shares its guarded optimism. It is not that the cracks in the foundations cannot be
ﬁxed, it is just that we have been using the wrong materials to do it. In particular, I
will suggest that the notion of representation can be deﬂated  its metaphysical and
explanatory importance downsized  in at least two diﬀerent ways, whilst fulﬁlling its
foundational role in Cognitive Science. The success of such deﬂation of representation
will pass through the proposal of a robust notion of computation, able to take an
important share of the explanatory burden on its shoulders.
This work is divided into three parts.
The aim of Part I is to introduce the debate over the role of representation in cog-
nition, focusing particularly on attempts at naturalising the notion. After clarifying
the explanatory roles that the notions of representation and computation play in Cog-
nitive Science, Chapter 1 gives a quick overview of the most inﬂuential theories that
have been proposed to try and naturalise representation. I brieﬂy examine four views:
functional role semantics, causal-informational semantics, teleoinformational semantics,
and teleosemantics. I also present seven traditional objections that have been moved
against those views. These point to problems that a satisfying theory of representation
should try and avoid. I focus especially on problems relating to indeterminacy of con-
tent. One central desideratum for theories of representation is to provide conditions on
content-ﬁxation that yield determinate or fairly determinate representational contents.
Indeterminacy of content risks jeopardising the explanatory purchase of representation,
as well as the possibility of misrepresentation. Given the limited objectives of this
chapter, I will not but oﬀer a rough and ready treatment of those views and issues.
In Chapter 2, I analyse a theory of representation that has a venerable history, but
which has partially lost its place under the philosophical spotlight in the second half
of the last century: structural representation. This theory is generally taken to be a
sophisticated version of resemblance theories of representation, according to which rep-
resentations represent by means of resembling what is represented. A theory on those
1The phrase is Godfrey-Smith's (2006).
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lines, I will later argue in Part III, can provide, suitably modiﬁed in its commitments,
a useful basis for a deﬂationary view of representation. I show that, as it stands, struc-
tural representation has its own indeterminacy problems: the content-ﬁxing resemblance
relation it relies on is too liberal, making representational content wildly non-unique.
After going through some recent attempts to further reﬁne the theory in order to avoid
that unfortunate consequence, I argue that they fall short from suﬃciently curbing per-
nicious liberality, and moreover risk falling into the traditional objections examined in
Chapter 1.
Part II may initially appear as a sudden change of subject. I leave issues about
representation behind for a moment, and focus instead on the notion of concrete com-
putation, that is to say, computation in physical systems (vs. in mathematical theory).
This change of subject is only apparent: providing a robust theory of concrete com-
putation is instrumental for my deﬂationary account of representation, to be presented
and defended in Part III.
Chapter 3 gives a detailed overview of the most inﬂuential theories proposed to nat-
uralise computation, and thus yield an account of concrete computation. I present and
examine the features and shortcomings of the simple mapping view of computation, as
well as of a pragmatic take on it; and then move on to assess Chalmers' (2011) sophist-
icated causal account; concluding the chapter with a treatment of the semantic view of
computation. I argue that these four views display several points of dissatisfaction, and
should be rejected in favour of a ﬁfth: the mechanistic view of concrete computation.
A careful treatment of the mechanistic view of concrete computation is oﬀered in
Chapter 4. I clarify the nature of the overall mechanistic approach to scientiﬁc explan-
ation, turning subsequently to its application to computation. I focus on perhaps the
most worked-out version of the mechanistic view of computation, developed extensively
by Piccinini (2007b, 2008a, 2015). Though I ﬁnd much to agree with in Piccinini's
treatment, I propose to amend his view in two signiﬁcant ways. Firstly, I propose a
better way of seeing the role played by the appeal to mechanisms in the account, thereby
avoiding a dilemma that could otherwise prove fatal to the account. Secondly, I put
forward a more satisfying reply to one of the most powerful objections against non-
semantic views of computation: the argument from the multiplicity of computations.
This amended version of the mechanistic view plays an important role in allowing me to
discharge some of the metaphysical weight normally put on the notion of representation
onto the robust notion of concrete computation instead. A ﬁnal worry has to be put
to rest, though. The mechanistic view hinges on teleological functions of a certain sort:
physical computational systems are mechanisms with a speciﬁc teleological function,
i.e. the function to perform computations. In order to earn its keep, it must be shown
that suitable theories of teleological function are at hand.
Chapter 5 is meant to allay these fears regarding the mechanistic view of concrete
computation by examining several extant accounts of teleological function, and show-
ing that at least some of them are appropriate to fulﬁl the needs of the view. I start
by making clear the crucial role that the appeal to teleological functions plays in the
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mechanistic theory, and thereby the features that these should have if they are suitably
to play that role. Speciﬁcally, teleological functions help make concrete computation
something objective, relatively rare, normative, and compatible with our pretheoretical
intuitions about computing systems. The question is then whether there are theories on
the market that can buy the mechanist all these much wanted goods. I examine several
theories of function, belonging to two main families: dispositional theories, which com-
prise the analytic account, perspectivalism, propensity theories, and goal-based theories;
and selected-eﬀects theories, which include theories that appeal to diﬀerent ranges and
types of selection processes. My assessment of the available options justiﬁes hopefulness
toward the mechanistic view of concrete computation. I argue that at least two types
of theories  goal-based theories and broad selected-eﬀects theories  provide notions
of function capable of doing the job required by the mechanistic view. The mechanistic
view of concrete computation, I argue, proves therefore to be a robust and satisfying
theory  and one able to play the role that my deﬂationary view of representation
requires. Part II closes on this rather positive note.
In Part III, the various open threads come together in the build-up toward the deﬂa-
tionary view of representation I propose. In particular, in this part I rely on the robust
notion of concrete computation provided by the mechanistic view to individuate compu-
tational structure as one of the factors that carries the most load in explaining complex
appropriate behaviour. Ascription of determinate representational content comes on
top of that, and heavily depends on context  explanatory, current, and historical.
The crucial property of cognitive states that plays a primary role in explanation of be-
haviour is then computational structure, with representational content being relegated
to a secondary, albeit ineliminable role. By the lights of this deﬂationary approach,
representational content and representational vehicles may lack many of the character-
istics that they are often believed to have, such as fairly clear boundaries, stability, and
repeatability. This view can be developed in (at least) two ways: pragmatism about
content, and mild reductionism.
Chapter 6 presents and examines a relatively underrated theory of representation:
interpretational semantics. This analysis is the ﬁrst stepping stone leading to the deﬂa-
tionary view of representation I intend to defend. I examine two versions of the view,
put forward by Cummins (1989) and Ramsey (2007). My assessment points out several
shortcomings in the views as they stand, especially with respect to the weak notions
of concrete computation they employ  though Ramsey's version seems to hold some
promise. I also show that those views may run afoul, as the other theories examined
before, of indeterminacy of content problems, leading to pernicious non-uniqueness of
content.
Despite its extant shortcomings, I believe that interpretational semantics has much
to recommend it. In Chapter 7 I show how, by accepting the robust notion of computa-
tion provided by the mechanistic view, interpretational semantics can lay the basis for
a deﬂationary version of structural representation.
Chapter 8 ﬁnally brings my project to a close. It presents and defends two paths to-
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ward deﬂationism about representation and content. The ﬁrst takes its inspiration from
Frances Egan's content pragmatism. I argue that my approach improves on hers insofar
as it employs a better notion of computation, and eschews her appeal to mathematical
content, insisting rather on the importance of computational structure. I also defend
content pragmatism from recent objections, and show that they fail to undermine the
view.
The second path that I develop is non-pragmatist in nature, though it also rejects
the assumptions behind mainstream naturalistic theories of representation and content.
I claim that content should be seen as a real pattern in nature (Dennett 1991)  a
pattern of variable, diverse, and indeterminately long conjunctions of sundry factors,
all brought together and rendered salient by an underlying rationale or perspective:
the adaptation of organisms to their historical environments. While naturalistic, this
version of the deﬂationary framework, in contrast with mainstream theories, denies that
there is a deﬁnite set (or a limited number of sets) of conditions that bestow content on
representational vehicles. The complexity and context-sensitivity of the content pattern
denies such a possibility. By seeing organisms as adapted to their environments, a host of
factors, both occurrent and historical, become salient as helping to explain, case-by-case,
robust successful behaviour in face of changing environmental conditions. An essential
condition for the content pattern to emerge is the presence of suitable computational
structures in the cognitive system. Therefore, computational structure has pride of
place in this version of deﬂationism as well. I argue that this second deﬂationary path
has theoretical virtues that the ﬁrst lacks, and thereby should be preferred.
Before bringing to a halt the long and windy route that brought me to deﬂationism
about representation, I oﬀer some remarks on how the outcomes of my project bear on
current empirical and theoretical issues in the cognitive sciences, with special regard to
the debate on cognitive ontology. I argue that recent evidence, which suggests that the
brain reuses the same neural resources in cognitive tasks of very diﬀerent nature, lends
force to the ideas proposed here. Multi-purpose neural circuits carry out computations
that can be usefully recruited and combined to give rise to the overall computational
processes that enable successful behaviour in diﬀerent cognitive tasks. This gives reasons
to believe that the primary explanatory role in the cognitive sciences, as I urge in this
work, is played by computational structures, with representational content having a
secondary, and perhaps merely pragmatic function to perform.
These considerations will bring this work to its end, and hopefully will have further
substantiated the plausibility, both conceptual and empirical, of the views it defends.
Though I do not expect that it will convert all minds to the cause, my objectives will
have been achieved if, at least, I will have shown that the deﬂationary approach merits
attention and study, and that it can appear as an appealing candidate for providing a
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With the advent of Cognitive Science as a research paradigm in the 1950s, the internal
states of cognitive systems came to be seen as crucial elements for explaining the be-
haviour of organisms. Some of those internal states are taken to inform the cognitive
system about the goings-on in the body and environment of organisms, therefore guid-
ing behaviour that is appropriate to their circumstances. Such internal states may also
interact with each other in sundry ways, allowing a further degree of complexity in the
processes that lead to appropriate behaviour. The positing of internal states that have
these properties and carry out these functions in the economy of the cognitive system
requires that the having of those properties and the carrying out of those functions be
explained in their turn. How can internal states `inform' cognitive systems about what
is going on outside the system itself? How can they guide behaviour? In which ways
do they interact, and how are those interactions governed?
If Cognitive Science is to be a respectable scientiﬁc endeavour, all the answers to
these questions must be scientiﬁcally acceptable  they can involve appeal exclusively
to entities and processes that are, or are plausibly explained by means of, entities and
processes already present in more basic sciences, such as biology, chemistry, and physics.
Moreover, if Cognitive Science is to be informative, the explanations of cognition and
behaviour it oﬀers must themselves not ultimately involve those properties and functions
that it set out to explain, on pain of vicious circularity.
Two notions have been invoked to help make more precise the vaguely expressed
ideas above. Those states internal to the cognitive system that provide information1
about the body and environment, and thus help to guide behaviour, are cognitive rep-
resentations. The processes by which cognitive representations are transformed and
interact with each other are computations  transitions of physical states that respect
computational rules. Representation and computation lie at the foundations of Cog-
nitive Science. They are the fundamental notions grounding the explanatory project of
Cognitive Science, and are, as is to be expected, routinely used in informing empirical
1I am using the term `information' in a non-technical sense.
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hypotheses about cognition, in interpreting experimental data, and in putting forward
theories of cognition.
I will often prefer to talk about the `cognitive sciences', rather than about `Cognitive
Science'. By using the plural expression, I intend more fairly to capture the interdis-
ciplinary nature of the study of cognition, and the variety of diﬀerent approaches and
ﬁelds of research  some of which to some extent at odds with the aims and assump-
tions of Cognitive Science as it was originally conceived  that have been developed to
investigate cognitive phenomena in the course of the almost 70 years since the so-called
Cognitive Revolution. The neurosciences, cognitive psychology, artiﬁcial intelligence,
as well as areas of robotics, anthropology, linguistics, and philosophy are all concerned
with the study of cognition  though often employing radically diﬀerent methods 
and are therefore rightly characterised as composing the cognitive sciences.
There are and there have been frameworks that purport to explain some or all cognit-
ive phenomena without making use of the notions of representation and computation.
These latter approaches, recently covered under the usefully synthetic umbrella-term
`Radical Embodiment', either intend to ground the study of cognition on notions other
than representation and computation, or attempt considerably to diminish the role that
those notions play in explanations of cognitive phenomena. In my terminology, frame-
works such as Radical Embodiment qualify as parts of and contributors to the cognitive
sciences, though they certainly would not want to run under the more exclusive banner
of Cognitive Science.
At any rate, I will have little to say about anti-representational and anti-computa-
tional approaches to cognition. Friends of Radical Embodiment may be right when
they claim that representation (and computation, in some understandings of the notion)
may not be needed for some cognitive feats. However, many cognitive abilities, which
Clark & Toribio (1994) have dubbed `representation-hungry', call for explanations in
representational and computational terms. I will accept, with most of the literature,
that many interesting cognitive phenomena cannot be accounted for if not by bringing
to bear the notions of representation and computation.
In order to even start assessing whether representation and computation are notions
that should rightly lie at the foundations of our understanding of much of cognition, we
must be clear on what those notions are, and what work they are supposed to do. While
most cognitive scientists employ these notions without much forethought  as scientiﬁc
posits without which their hypotheses and interpretations of empirical data would often
not even make sense  philosophers have worried about the naturalistic status, and
explanatory role of representation and computation. Philosophers have been concerned
with providing theories of the nature of representation and computation that are able to
provide notions that fulﬁl the explanatory role they are to play in the cognitive sciences,
whilst appealing only to entities and processes that are scientiﬁcally acceptable  that
are bona ﬁde elements in the scientiﬁc, materialistic worldview. In brief, philosophers
have been interested in naturalising representation and computation. The present work
mostly accepts the framework within which those projects have been carried out, while
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taking issue with some elements.
This chapter and the next will provide the lay of the land in the debate about
naturalising representation, while a closer look at the naturalising computation project
will have to wait for Part II, though I will provide some hints very shortly. The purpose
of this somewhat rough-and-ready sketch is to provide the background against which
my project is meant to stand out.
Here is how I shall proceed. In section 1.1 I brieﬂy clarify the explanatory role of
representation in the cognitive sciences. In section 1.2 I do the same for the notion of
computation. After drawing some distinctions that will be useful throughout this work
in section 1.3, I move on, in section 1.4, to provide a survey of the naturalistic pro-
ject about representation, brieﬂy examining the mainstream theories of representation
and content on oﬀer in the literature: functional role semantics, causal-informational
semantics, teleoinformational semantics, and teleosemantics. In section 1.5 I enumer-
ate traditional problems that theories of content have to face, with particular attention
given to issues relating to indeterminacy of content. Theories of content, if they are
to fulﬁl their aim of providing notions of representation that are scientiﬁcally accept-
able and explanatorily useful, should better ﬁnd ways around those problems, either by
satisfactorily answering them, or keeping them from arising. My analysis of inﬂuential
current theories of content will go on in the next chapter, where I present and analyse
resemblance theories of content, which have fallen out of fashion despite a long history
of adherents. I focus on their most promising version: structural representation.
1.1 Representation: what and why
The notion of representation in the cognitive sciences provides the tools to understand
how cognitive systems can receive, store, and process information about what is going on
in the body and environment. The basic idea is that representations are cognitive states
which are about entities and processes in the world, in a way not too dissimilar to how
(naturalistic) pictures are about what is depicted, words are about what they refer to,
and maps are about the landscapes they map. The intuition is that somehow, by being
about things in the world, representations stand in for what they represent (Godfrey-
Smith 2006). By operating over its own representational states, cognitive systems would
thereby be able to generate behaviour that is appropriate to the circumstances the
organism ﬁnds itself in, and which some of its internal states are about, i.e. stand in
for, or represent.
More precisely, and perhaps less intuitively, representations are minimally those
states that bear semantic properties (Ryder 2009a). Representations have contents 
what they are about  and those contents place conditions on how the world is or
should be, if the representation is, in a loose sense, to be appropriate. The physical
realisations of representational states are representational vehicles: the physical states
that carry representational content. In the case of the brain, for instance, represent-
ational vehicles are, ultimately, states and processes going on in neurons and/or in
populations of neurons.
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Representations can be part of internal states that have a descriptive nature. When
participating in such internal states, representations aim at corresponding, to some level
of accuracy, to how things are, or were, or will be, in the world. In this case, it is the
world that, so to speak, is dictating the terms. A belief with the content that there is a
puﬃn in front of me now attempts to capture how things are in the area of the world
immediately in front of the organism entertaining the belief. The belief has thereby
truth conditions: it is true in case its content accurately describes the state of the world
in front of the belief-entertainer, and false otherwise (for instance, were I to entertain
that belief now, it would be false). Representations may also be part of internal states
that have a directive nature. When participating in such internal states, representations
pose constraints on how the world is to be so as to satisfy their contents. Desires are an
example of directive internal states. The content of my desire that I eat some ice-cream
is satisﬁed only in case the world is transformed in such a way as to bring it about that
I eat some ice-cream. The desire cannot be true or false, but it can be satisﬁed (in case
I eat some ice-cream) or unsatisﬁed (in the unfortunate case I do not).
Representational contents are semantic properties of states, understood in their turn
as correctness conditions; be they truth conditions (as in beliefs), satisfaction conditions
(as in desires), or more generally, accuracy conditions. Intuitively, these correctness
conditions `say', or `mean', how things other than the representational state itself are,
were, will or should be  in this sense, they are about those things: they have aboutness,
as this property of representations is often called.
Beliefs and desires are relatively complicated cognitive states that belong to the cat-
egory of propositional attitudes. Simpler cognitive states might though share some of
their properties. In this work I will have little to nothing to say about propositional atti-
tudes, as my focus is on the notion of representation relevant for simpler cognitive states,
short of beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes. Propositional attitudes and
the kinds of representations that are involved in them have largely monopolised the
attention of philosophers of mind.
My aim in the present work is to investigate notions of representation that are useful
for the cognitive sciences  my project therefore belongs to the philosophy of the cognit-
ive sciences more than to the philosophy of mind. The kinds of internal states that much
of the cognitive sciences are concerned with fall short of full-ﬂedged beliefs and desires.
They are rather states that play a role in the nuts and bolts of cognition, informing
the workings of subsystems of the cognitive system, such as sensorimotor processing,
spatial navigation, linguistic processing, and automatic recognition and categorisation.
In contrast to propositional attitudes, such cognitive states do not belong to the whole
person, and are not accessible to consciousness: they are subpersonal states.
Cognitive scientists routinely use the notion of representation (and of computation)
in their hypotheses and explanations about how such subpersonal processes work. We
see claims about cells in cortex area V1 representing edges in the visual scene, cells
in the entorhinal cortex-hippocampus system representing spatial locations, regions of
the brain processing parse trees and storing word meaning. I will be concerned in the
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foregoing with notions of representation that can be useful for those explanatory pur-
poses, though some issues that have exercised philosophers interested in propositional
attitudes will surface here and there, since some of the puzzles regarding representation
and computation are to be found in the treatment of personal and subpersonal states
alike.
`Representation' (and `computation') are terms that live many diﬀerent lives, playing
diﬀerent explanatory roles and capturing diﬀerent phenomena in the various ﬁelds of
research in which they are employed. In the sciences of the mind, I take it that it
is of vital importance to distinguish those two diﬀerent scientiﬁc and philosophical
questions. To avoid confusion, I use the expression `representational content' to refer
to the contents of subpersonal states, to which I normally refer as `cognitive states',
while I reserve the expression `intentional content' to capture the content of personal
states, such as propositional attitudes, which I call `intentional states'2. Though it is
often assumed that theories of intentional states and intentional content will also apply
with some tweaking to cognitive states and representational content, I will try and keep
the two issues separate. Given that the explananda are diﬀerent, we should expect the
explanantia to be distinct, or, at any rate, we should not assume that they are not. My
interests in this work will be limited to cognitive states and representational content,
and my treatment of these issues may or may not shed light on intentional states and
intentional content.
Four (or ﬁve) questions about the nature of mental representation (in general, i.e.
cognitive and intentional) drive much of the contemporary philosophical work on this
topic: a) are representations objective features of the world; and what is their explan-
atory status in the cognitive sciences?; b) what makes so that some states function as
representations (what Ramsey 2007 has called `the job description challenge')?; c) how
do representations get their contents?; d) what format do representations have (e.g.
language-like, pictorial, local, distributed, etc.)?
Though distinct, these questions are closely related. Part of what makes a state into
a representation is the fact that it has content  thereby answers to c) bear on answers
to b). It is to be expected, in addition, that answers to b) and d) will strongly bear on
each other: the format of representations is relevant for understanding how they play a
representational role in the cognitive system. The format of representations may also
inform the way representations get their contents: for instance, by having a pictorial
format, representations may have their contents ﬁxed by what they pictorially resemble.
Finally, answers to a) inform answers to b) and c). Depending on the ontological status
that representations have, as well as their explanatory role in the cognitive sciences,
the acceptable factors contributing to making them into representations, and bestowing
content on them, vary.
My aim in this work is to explore issues regarding especially a) and c): the ontological
status of representations, their explanatory role, and the ways they get their contents. I
will not focus directly on b) and d), though given the close relationships between those
2A similar distinction can be found in Cummins (1989), Coelho Mollo (2015).
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four questions, my treatment of the former bear to some extent on possible answers to
the latter. A further issue that will play a central role in the foregoing is the question
of whether explanations in the cognitive sciences should primarily involve appeal to
representational contents, as is generally believed, or to some other property. This
discussion will have to wait for Part III.
I will more carefully present and examine approaches to the ontological and explan-
atory status of representations, and the way they get their contents in section 1.3 and
section 1.4. But before moving to that, let me ﬁrst spend a few anticipatory words on
the nature and role of computation in the cognitive sciences.
1.2 Computation: what and why
In the cognitive sciences, the notion of representation often comes hand-in-hand with
that of computation. The reasons for this pairing are not diﬃcult to understand: rep-
resentations give us only part of the story about how cognitive processes are able to
lead to appropriate behaviour. They help explain how come states internal to the cog-
nitive system are able to be informative of circumstances outside. However, we still
need tools to understand how representations get transformed, how they lead to other
representations in appropriate ways, and how they inﬂuence the organisms' eﬀectors so
as to lead to adequate behaviour. If behaviour is to be successful, transitions of repres-
entational states in the cognitive system must be regimented: they must make so that
the interaction and sequentiality of tokened internal states follow some rule  be it of
association, probability, plausibility, or rationality  that respects the representational
content of those states and is appropriate to the behavioural task at hand.
Computation comes into the picture to play two fundamental roles: help explain how
representational states transition and interact in a regimented way with other represent-
ational and non-representational internal states  whatever that regimentation might
be, i.e. whatever the rule governing the transitions  and help explain how transitions
and interactions between internal states take place in a way that respects their repres-
entational content  semantic properties not being themselves candidates for causal
eﬃcacy. These two roles are closely related. Let us brieﬂy tackle how computation is
supposed to carry them out.
Computation is roughly a process that leads from inputs to outputs according to
well-deﬁned transition rules. Inputs to a computational system are transformed accord-
ing to rules sensitive to some of their properties, as well as, in some cases, to the internal
state of the system itself, yielding outputs that depend on the inputs, internal states,
and the rules applied. A pocket calculator, for instance, takes inputs in the form of
button presses and, depending on which buttons are pressed, leads to an output in the
form of a visual pattern on a screen. This is only one, and one of the least interesting,
descriptions of what the pocket calculator does. At a representational level of descrip-
tion, what the device does is to take numbers and arithmetical operations as input (e.g.
3+7), transform those numerical values according to the arithmetical operation, and
thus generate the appropriate output, the result of the calculation. What makes it so
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that the calculator generates the correct result given the inputs is the fact that it trans-
forms the representational vehicles (e.g. the patterns of electric activation that stand
for the numbers 3 and 7) in a way that respects the rules of arithmetic, thus generating
as output other representational vehicles that represent the result of the calculation.
The pocket calculator, as any other computational system, is not directly sensitive,
in its operation, to the semantic properties, the content, of the internal states it traﬃcs
in3. The state-transition rules it follows are sensitive, rather, to some speciﬁc types of
physical properties of those internal states, which constitute the syntax of the system
(in opposition to its semantics). What is most interesting for our purposes, though,
is that by organising the syntax of a computational system in an appropriate way,
the state-transitions can be such that they mirror what goes on in another domain 
the computational transitions are such that they correspond to the transformations of
elements in the other domain. In case the other domain is a set of true propositions
about the world, for instance, the computational transitions will preserve truth, leading
to other true propositions about the world. Thereby internal states and processes
become interpretable as standing in for entities and processes in the world (inclusive of
the abstract `world' of mathematics and logic)  they function as representations, and
those internal states as representational vehicles. As Haugeland (1981, p. 44) famously
put it, if you take care of the syntax, the semantics will take care of itself.
In sum, the central insight is that the notion of computation sheds light on how state-
transitions in physical systems, though sensitive only to some of the physical properties
of their internal states, can nonetheless respect semantic constraints. Computation
gives us a way of understanding how to mechanise cognitive processes, including repres-
entational ones, in a way that is compatible with scientiﬁc materialism. To once again
borrow eﬀective terminology from Haugeland (1981, 1985), the notion of computation
helps us to see how syntactic engines, i.e. systems governed by rules sensitive only to
physical properties, can also be semantic engines, i.e. systems whose internal states
represent, and whose state-transitions respect semantic constraints.
We see therefore how come the notion of computation comes to compose, with that
of representation, the pillars of the cognitive sciences. Similar puzzles, however, arise for
computation as they do for representation. We need to give an account of computation
that is able to explain how computations take place in the physical world; and which
is able suitably to distinguish computational processes from non-computational ones
in such a way as to do justice to the practices of computer and cognitive scientists,
as well as to the explanatory role of the notion in those sciences. We need, in other
words, adequately to naturalise computation, that is, to explain in purely scientiﬁcally-
acceptable terms what computations are, and how they are instantiated in concrete
physical systems  giving a theory of computation in physical systems, or concrete
computation. That will be the mission undertaken by Part II.
With a suitable account of concrete computation, cognition becomes amenable to
causal explanation. If cognitive systems, inclusive of their representational properties,
3This, as many of the introductory remarks in this section, have been disputed in the literature.
See, for a treatment of this issue, Rescorla (2012a).
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can be understood as computational systems; and if computations and computational
systems can ﬁnd, courtesy of a theory of concrete computation, their place in the sci-
entiﬁc worldview; we can explain cognition by means of computational operations over
internal states, some of which representational vehicles, in a scientiﬁcally-acceptable
fashion. This is the bet underlying most of the cognitive sciences: that naturalistic
notions of computation and representation will provide the grounds to a materialistic,
scientiﬁc, causal explanation of how cognitive systems work, casting away the mystery
that surrounds cognition.
1.3 Some useful distinctions
The distinctions between representational and intentional content, and between cognit-
ive and intentional states introduced above are not the only ones that I invite the reader
to keep in mind throughout this work. A couple of other distinctions will frequently be
at centre stage in my discussion; to keep any future confusion or puzzlement safely at
bay, it is best to spend some words to clarify them from the get-go.
A contrast that will play an important role in what is to come is that between
views that insist that representation, content, and computation are objective, obser-
ver- or mind-independent notions; and views that in contrast have it that some of
those notions, or all of them, play a mostly pragmatic role, being dependent on our
explanatory purposes, as well as on their heuristic value  i.e. their capacity to allow
us better to understand events and processes in the world due to their capacity to
simplify, make salient, or more synthetically and intuitively to describe phenomena. I
will refer to the former  somewhat idiosyncratically  as objectivist views; whilst I
will call the latter pragmatist views4. One may be an objectivist about one or more of
those notions, and a pragmatist about the others. A position that I will put forward in
section 8.1 is objectivist about concrete computation, while pragmatist about cognitive
representation and representational content5.
For an objectivist about representations, contents, and/or concrete computations,
such notions earn their explanatory keep because they are fruitful scientiﬁc posits, and
their positing is justiﬁed by their capturing some observer- or mind-independent feature
of the world  i.e. independent of their being interpreted or understood by sentient
beings, as well as the latter's explanatory purposes and practices6. Even though those
notions are normally posited in the course of attempts to explain cognitive phenomena,
their explanatory value is supposed to hinge on their corresponding, to some degree
of accuracy, to features that cognitive systems possess, and would possess even in the
4Keep in mind that the foregoing distinction is not equivalent to the realism/anti-realism dispute.
I will try and keep my treatment at a safe distance from the latter debate. Note moreover that my
usage of the term `pragmatist' does not refer to so-called neo-pragmatist theories of representation
and content (e.g. Haugeland 1990, Cash 2009). Such views, which are not widely shared or discussed
despite their considerable interest, will unfortunately also not be tackled in this work.
5Egan (2014b, 2015) also defends a view on these lines.
6Of course, those notions are not independent of sentient beings and their cognitive states insofar
as they are meant to help explain exactly what cognitive states are, and how they work. But this is
not the kind of mind-independence that is at issue here.
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absence of any sentient being having cognitive states about those features, as well as
the explanatory purposes and practices in which those notions are employed.
In contrast, for a pragmatist about representations, contents, and/or concrete com-
putations, these notions depend on conceptual apparatus that we as cognitive scientists
or users of folk psychology impose on the world, and which are not committed to their
being faithful to its nature and organisation. This view of pragmatism is in line with
proposals by Blackburn (2010) and Egan (2014b). As Blackburn (2010, p. 2) puts it,
pragmatism about a notion or discourse involves three tenets:
1. you oﬀer an explanation of what we are up to in going in for this discourse,
2. the explanation eschews any use of the referring expressions of the discourse ... or
any semantic or ontological attempt to `interpret' the discourse in a domain...
3. the explanation proceeds by talking in diﬀerent terms of what is done by so talking
... [giving a story] about how this mode of talking and thinking and practising
came about, and the functions it serves.
In the kind of pragmatism we are here concerned with, it is the functions a certain
notion serves in our explanatory practices that are of particular relevance. Represent-
ations, contents, computations may be ascribed to systems as part of our explanatory
practices in order to simplify explanations, to allow us more easily to grasp interesting
connexions, or merely because regarding some systems as representing or performing
computations proves to be heuristically useful in helping us make sense of the goings-on
in cognitive systems. In such pragmatist views, the positing of representations, contents,
computations is done with an eye to the fruitfulness and heuristic value for us to use
those notions, rather than to capturing faithfully some observer-independent feature of
the world. According to pragmatists, in other words, it may well be that the notions
of representation, content, or computation do not capture anything that cognitive sys-
tems possess independently of the explanatory interests and practices that brings us to
use them in our everyday or scientiﬁc understanding of the world. To echo once again
Blackburn (2010, p. 12), when we employ such notions we can see ourselves as having
enriched our inferential practices of our dealings with the world, without having licensed
the philosopher to enrich our conception of the world with which we are dealing7.
The foregoing distinction between objective and pragmatic views is though not nu-
anced enough to do justice to the rich debate on the nature and role of representation
and content. A further level of complexity is introduced once we bring to bear consider-
ations on their explanatory status in the cognitive sciences. Three traditional positions
on this regard are often held to exhaust the conceptual landscape: robust reductionism,
primitivism, and eliminativism. The two former are safely on the objectivist side of the
divide, while the latter admits a double reading.
7Pragmatism thus characterised does not exhaust the alternatives to objectivism, as the following
discussion will show. One interesting non-objectivist approach that I will not examine in this work is
ﬁctionalism, carefully explored by Sprevak (2013).
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Roughly, robust reductionists hold that representations and representational con-
tents are objective features of cognitive systems, which can be given reductive explan-
ations in purely naturalistic and non-representational terms (e.g. Fodor 1975, Dretske
1981, Millikan 1984). On this view, some inner states of cognitive systems have rep-
resentational content due to their standing in some special natural relation to what
they represent. Those special natural relations bestow fairly determinate contents on
cognitive states and processes; and representations are taken as structures in the cog-
nitive system whose boundaries are relatively clearly deﬁnable, are stable, repeatable
(i.e. participate in the same way in diﬀerent cognitive processes, and have the same
content), and often composable (i.e. that can be systematically combined with other
representations to yield more complex representations).
Primitivists, in their turn, hold that the notions of representation and content play
a crucial role in the successful and fruitful cognitive sciences, and this suﬃces for taking
them as objective features of cognitive systems (e.g. Burge 2010). They are scientiﬁc
primitives, which need not be themselves further explained, or naturalised. Primitivists
take representation to be a scientiﬁc posit in no need of naturalisation, as much as
fundamental entities posited in physics do not call for naturalisation, insofar as they
are part of a successful and fruitful science.
Eliminativists, ﬁnally, believe that our best cognitive sciences will do away with
appeal to representation and content, producing instead explanations at a purely func-
tional or neurophysiological level. Eliminativists hold that propositional attitudes and
intentional content are probable candidates for elimination from future cognitive science
(e.g. Churchland 1981, Stich 1983), while more radical eliminativists have claimed that
even representational content will be eliminated (e.g. Van Gelder 1995, Hutto & Myin
2013). The question of how to give a naturalistic reduction of representation thereby
does not exercise the eliminativist, though they must show that equally satisfying ex-
planations of cognitive phenomena can be provided without appeal to representations.
Eliminativism can be read as an attack on the objectivist view of representation
and content, or on the pragmatist view, or on both, depending on how strongly the
eliminativist claim is interpreted. The claim may be that the notions of representa-
tion and intentional (or, more radically, also representational) content do not capture
objective features possessed by cognitive systems. This claim is compatible with a prag-
matist view, for we may want to keep talking of representations and contents, at least
in some domains of our worldly practices, due to their heuristic value in helping us to
comprehend the workings of cognitive systems or of fellow sentient beings8. But the
eliminativist, I believe, should be read as making a stronger claim: the notions of rep-
resentation and (intentional) content not only do not capture anything objective about
cognitive systems, but they are not even explanatorily useful in the cognitive sciences.
It is due to their putative explanatory uselessness  or even worse, their power of mis-
leading research  that they should be eliminated from the cognitive sciences. That is
8Among moderate eliminativists, the Churchlands seem to endorse a version of such a view. Pro-
positional attitudes, by their lights, can still be usefully ascribed to people and perhaps animals in our
everyday, non-scientiﬁc dealings with the world.
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to say, the eliminativist denies the pragmatist view as well.
In contrast to mainstream lore, it will be the burden of this work to show that
there are other stable, interesting, and even attractive positions in addition to the three
presented above. In chapter 8, I will show that there are at least two further plausible
views on the nature and explanatory role of representation and content in the cognitive
sciences, one on each side of the objectivist/pragmatist divide.
From one side, one may argue that representation and content should be seen as
ineliminable parts of cognitive science, contra the eliminativist; but nonetheless reject
the claim that those notions capture anything objective in cognitive systems  contra
reductionists and primitivists  content being rather part of an explanatory gloss de-
pendent on pragmatic considerations. This view, content pragmatism, has been held
most prominently by Egan (1999, 2009, 2010, 2014b). It is pragmatist about represent-
ation and content, but not eliminativist.
On the objectivist side, one may agree with robust reductionists and primitivists
that representation and content are objective features of cognitive systems, but deny
that representational vehicles have the properties that robust reductionists believe they
do, such as stability, repeatability, compositionality, relatively clear boundaries, and
fairly determinate content; as well as deny that there is a relatively bounded set of
natural relations that determine content. Moreover, one can reject both the primitivist
claim that no naturalisation of the notions of representation and content is required,
and the terms set by the robust reductionist as to how such an account will have
to look like. Such a mild reductionist view, inspired by Dennett (1987a, 1991), has
it that representation and content capture fundamentally variable, context-sensitive,
and disjunctive features of cognitive systems, for which no straightforward naturalistic
reduction is possible. In other words, one may be an objectivist about representation
and content, though a non-robustly reductionist one.
In summary, views about computation, representation, and content can be distin-
guished in light of whether they take those notions to capture objective, observer-
independent features of the world (objectivism); or, on the contrary, regard them as
notions that depend fundamentally on our explanatory practices and aims, on what we
ﬁnd useful in making sense of the world given our cognitive endowment and interests, re-
gardless of whether they capture observer-independent features (pragmatism). Theories
of representation and content, in their turn, can be further distinguished in terms of the
explanatory status they bestow on those notions in the cognitive sciences. I have brieﬂy
presented three mainstream views on this regard: robust reductionism, primitivism,
and eliminativism. Though they are often taken to exhaust the conceptual possibilities,
I will argue that this is not so. Alternative views, such as content pragmatism and mild
reductionism, are cogent and worth of investigation.
Treatment of these alternative positions will have to wait for chapter 8. However,
I invite the reader to bear in mind that pretty much everything that follows is meant
to work as grounds and motivation for exploring and helping develop such alternative
views. Let us then begin the slow build up toward Part III. We shall start with a
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brief overview of the robust reductionist project, which has had pride of place in the
literature on representation for the past four decades or so.
1.4 Naturalising content: the project
Robust reductionism has plausibly been for the past decades the mainstream view of
the nature of representation. Philosophers, especially from the 1980's on, have put
forward, examined, criticised, and tweaked theories of representation and content that
attempt to ground these notions on a constrained set of purely naturalistic relations
between representational vehicles, and entities and processes external to the cognitive
system. This project, which spun a vast and rich literature, came to be known as
`naturalising intentionality'. Given the terminology I am employing in this work, I will
prefer the expression `naturalising content'. Theorists interested in this naturalistic
endeavour often did not limit themselves to the contents of intentional states, but also
tackled issues relating to the representational content of cognitive states  though
frequently treatment of the latter was seen as little more than a means to get to the
more complicated case of intentional states, and even the foregoing distinction was only
occasionally acknowledged.
The naturalising content project has been only cursorily interested in issues relating
to the format of representations, and what makes them function as representations,
though it has had eﬀects on those debates. The focus of the endeavour has been that
of explaining, exclusively by means of scientiﬁcally-acceptable, naturalistic, objective
relations, how representations get their contents, i.e. how physical states of cognitive
systems come to bear semantic properties9. The guiding idea is to reduce content, or
semantics, or aboutness, to naturalistic factors and relations. Paraphrasing Fodor's
(1987) apt phrase, if there is content, it must be really something else. Such reduction
must be non-circular. As Fodor (1984, p. 232) puts it, what the robust reductionist
wants to get with their naturalising project is ... at a minimum ... something of the
form `R represents S ' is true iﬀ C where the vocabulary in which condition C is couched
contains neither intentional nor semantical expressions.
A satisfying naturalistic theory of content must respect further constraints: it must
provide an account of representation that is relevant for the cognitive sciences; and which
is able to play the required explanatory role. Particularly important consequences of
these further requirements is that the contents bestowed on representations must be
fairly determinate  excessively vague or disjunctive contents jeopardise the explanat-
ory role of representation  and that the theory must make space for the possibility
of misrepresentation, i.e. cases in which there is representational error. The latter
requirement is normally taken to be essential for a satisfying theory of content10. As
we have seen in section 1.1, what deﬁnes content is some form of correctness condi-
tions, broadly understood. This very characterisation tinges the notion with a kind of
9See Ryder (2009b) for a thorough review.
10Though the essentiality claim has been denied by some. See Cummins (1996), Perlman (2000),
Isaac (2012).
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normativity. There is something it is for a representation to be true or false, satisﬁed
or else, accurate or inaccurate, etc. Thereby theories of content must make space for
the possibility of misrepresentation, on pain of failing to be theories of content.
The possibility of misrepresentation is germane for the explanatory purchase of the
notion of representation in explaining behaviour. As much as we want to explain com-
plex successful behaviour by means of correct representation, we also want to explain
failures in behaviour by means of incorrect representation. The problem of misrepres-
entation is closely connected with the quest to provide a theory that bestows fairly
determinate contents on representational vehicles. For if contents are too indeterminate
or disjunctive, it is mysterious how they can be wrong  or right. Unsurprisingly, a
large part of the eﬀorts carried out by philosophers invested in the naturalising content
project has been dedicated to ﬁguring out how to account for misrepresentation. This is
far from a trivial puzzle: for such an account to be had, we need to extract the required
sort of normativity out of the raw materials that the natural, objective world makes
available.
A further desideratum sometimes proposed is that the notions of representation and
content that fall out from naturalistic theories not be too liberal  that is to say, that
they do not make too many things be representations. Most accounts on oﬀer would
run afoul of excessive liberality: too many states, cognitive and non-cognitive, end up
counting as representations (and thus as being contentful), putatively jeopardising the
distinctive explanatory role of the concept in the cognitive sciences11.
In this section, I will brieﬂy present the four main candidate naturalistic theories of
content, all of which have seen the light of day in the 1980s, and all of which belong
to the robust reductionist camp: functional role semantics; two inﬂuential types of
informational semantics, namely causal-informational semantics and teleoinformational
semantics; and teleosemantics. The next section will present some of the traditional
objections, especially for what regards the problem of indeterminacy of content, that
have been moved against these views.
Please bear in mind that my treatment of this complex debate will be rough and
sketchy: my aim is just to provide an overview of the theoretical background against
which my positive proposal, developed in Parts II and III, is to be developed. The next
chapter, in its turn, will be concerned with a theory that has been a sort of underdog
in this debate: structural representation.
Before we move on, one note: though the naturalising content project is normally
associated with robust reductionist views of representation, it is not the case that only
robust reductionism is concerned with providing naturalistic conditions for determining
the contents of representations. As we will see in Part III, a mild reductionist view also
aims at providing such conditions, though in a way importantly diﬀerent from robust
reductionism.
11See Ramsey (2007), Burge (2010), Morgan (2014).
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1.4.1 Functional Role Semantics
Functional role semantics, also known as inferential and conceptual role semantics, has
had some currency in the 1980s (see, e.g., Harman 1982, Block 1986), and though it
has somewhat fallen out of favour as a general theory of representation and content
since, it still has proponents (Churchland 1998, 2012). According to functional role
semantics, the causal role that a certain state plays in the economy of the cognitive
system or beyond is what determines its content. Causal role is normally understood
as inferential or conceptual  that is to say, it is the role a state has in licensing, and
being the outcome of, inferences from and to other states in the system. Cognitive
states appropriately cause or are caused by the tokening of other states to which they
are inferentially connected.
Functional role semantics has internalist and externalist versions. Internalist, or
short-armed views, have it that only the functional roles internal to the cognitive sys-
tem count as content-determining, while externalist, or long-armed views, include causal
connexions to the environment. Internalist views of functional role semantics are nor-
mally meant to be part of a more complex theory of content that also includes an
external, often causal-informational, factor  leading to two-factor theories of con-
tent (Block 1986). Theories of this type tend to share the advantages, as well as the
problems, that come with the appeal to each of the factors.
1.4.2 Informational Semantics
Informational semantics, put forward by Dretske (1981) and further developed in dif-
ferent ways by many others (e.g. Fodor 1987, Dretske 1988), bases representation on
indication, or information-transmission. Roughly, the idea is that a state r is a can-
didate for being a representation if it carries information about some other state t.
According to Dretske, a state r carries information about another state t if its having
a certain property F raises to 1 the probability of t having a certain property G, given
certain background conditions, which Dretske calls `channel conditions'. Put in other
terms, r being F is a natural sign for t being G, as a tree stump having a certain
number of rings signals  or carries information about  how old the tree is. There is
a correlation between the two states, the former covaries with the latter. In Dretske's
terminology, the former state indicates the latter.
The limitation to natural signs is meant to rule out signs that depend on interpret-
ation or intention, such as words and traﬃc signs. These nonnatural signs, or symbols,
carry information about states of aﬀairs only by passing through interpretive systems,
and do not depend, in opposition to the tree rings, simply on a natural relation between
sign and signiﬁed. Informational semantics purports to explain representation by re-
course to natural signs and signiﬁeds. The assumption, which is at the basis of the
naturalising content project, is that there is something in nature (not merely in the
minds that struggle to comprehend nature), some objective, observer-independent fact
or set of facts, that forms the basis of one thing's meaning or indicating something
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about another12.
The natural relations that ground indication are normally causal relations13. Signs
normally indicate  or carry information about  what caused them. For this reason,
informational semantics is regarded as a type of causal theory of content. However,
there need be no direct causal connexion between indicator and what it indicates, for
instance if both are generated by a common cause. As a theory of representation, in-
formational semantics needs to account for how representational content gets ﬁxed, and
for how misrepresentation is possible. Indicators carry information about many diﬀer-
ent states of aﬀairs, thus having non-unique informational contents; while a theory of
representational and intentional content aims at fairly determinate contents. Indication
moreover does not leave space for misrepresentation, for there is no misindication 
there is no sense in which a state can incorrectly carry information about something14.
More is needed if informational semantics is to become a full-ﬂedged theory of repres-
entational content. Dretske has formulated two variations of the view, one purely based
on causal-informational relations (Dretske 1981), another including teleological factors
(Dretske 1986, 1988). Let us take a brief look at each in turn.
Causal-informational Semantics
In his early work on informational semantics, Dretske (1981) tried to give a complete the-
ory of representation that relied exclusively on causal-informational relations between
indicators and what they indicate15. In order to do justice to the determinacy of repres-
entational content vis-à-vis the multiplicity of informational content that each indicator
bears, Dretske introduced the notion of digitalisation. There is no need (nor space)
to look at the details, but the basic idea is that during learning the cognitive system
selects, from the multiple informational contents carried by a certain indicator state,
one piece of information (the most speciﬁc one), and that piece of information is the
representational (or intentional) content of the state. In this way, the non-uniqueness
of informational content can be arguably curbed in its transition to representationhood,
partly eﬀected by means of the process of digitalisation.
The most speciﬁc piece of information carried by an indicator state can never be
false, given the deﬁnition of what it is for a state to carry information. To account
for the possibility of misrepresentation further factors must be brought in. For Dretske
(1981), the additional factor supposed to play the larger role in making space for mis-
representation is a circumscribed learning period, during which the content of cognitive
(and intentional) states gets ﬁxed. During the learning period, the conditions for cor-
12Dretske (1988, p. 58.)
13Dretske (1988, p. 56.)
14See Dretske (1988, p. 56), Fodor (1984, p. 239.)
15Another purely causal-informational theory was developed by Fodor (1987, 2008), who tries to
provide a logical condition to distinguish correct from incorrect tokenings of a representation, thus
making space for misrepresentation, while remaining faithful to a purely causal-informational view 
the asymmetric dependency theory. Fodor's theory is purely formal: rather than a full picture of how
there comes to be misrepresentation, it is a formal requirement on any theory of error  it remains
silent on the mechanisms behind the relevant dependencies. The proposal has been subjected to several
objections (Cummins 1989, 1996, Prinz 2000, Dunlop 2004, Rupert 2008).
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rect indication are optimal: channel conditions are appropriate, there is the guidance of
some sort of teacher, feedback is adequate, etc. When the learning period ends, repres-
entational (or intentional) content gets ﬁxed once and for all. All subsequent tokenings
of the now fully representational state not generated by its content count as misrep-
resentations. Misrepresentation takes place when a representation, whose content was
ﬁxed during the learning period, happens subsequently to be tokened when there are
no causal-informational relations in place with its content.
Teleoinformational Semantics
In his more mature version of informational semantics, Dretske (1986, 1988) turned to
teleology16. Instead of a learning period that ﬁxes representational content, Dretske
has recourse to functions indicators have been recruited for during the individual de-
velopment of the cognitive system. During development, a kind of associative learning
takes place which selects indicators that carry information about some state of aﬀairs
O in the world and endows them with the function of providing information about O.
This selection, or recruitment, depends on the successful use of the indicator in guiding
behaviour towards O.
Behavioural responses are associated with indicators that carry information about
the stimulus condition in which that kind of response brings forth rewarding outcomes.
By means of associative reinforcement these indicators are gradually recruited by the
system as causes of appropriate behaviour. The indicator becomes a representation of
the state of aﬀairs O in which the use of that indicator in guiding behaviour leads to
success  the indicator is recruited as a representation of those conditions that make
the behaviour appropriate  while all the other states of aﬀairs that it indicates are
excluded from its representational content. Misrepresentations are those occurrences in
which representations are tokened by something that is not what they have ontogenet-
ically acquired the function to represent.
Basing representational content on a notion of teleological function  i.e. on the
purpose, or end, of systems  has the advantage of providing a naturalistic means of
accounting for the normativity of content. Systems that have functions can go wrong:
they can fail to perform their functions. Teleological theories of content generally rely
on evolutionary history and/or learning to account for how there can be such things
as teleological functions in the world17. Theories of content that rely on teleology
are perhaps the most promising robust reductionist approaches to representation and
content on oﬀer. In Dretske's version of teleoinformational semantics, learning plays a
central role. Other theories give pride of place to natural selection, as is the case of
Millikan's version of teleosemantics, to which we now turn.
16Other inﬂuential teleoinformational theories have more recently been put forward by Shea (2007),
Neander (2013).
17I survey theories of teleological function in section 5.3.
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1.4.3 Teleosemantics
Teleosemantics has been most forcefully put forward by Millikan (1984, 1989a, 2004).
The guiding idea is to rely on teleology, and in particular teleological functions arisen
from evolutionary processes, to account for representation and content  abandoning
the Dretskean idea that information-carrying is at the basis of representationhood.
As Neander (2013, p. 22) points out, while informational semantics focuses on the
causes of representations (or what they carry information about), teleosemantics focuses
on the eﬀects that representations have. The burden shifts from what produces a
representation to how it is used (or diﬀerently put, from the representation producer
to the representation consumer  whereby the label `consumer-based teleosemantics'
applied to Millikan's view).
According to teleosemantics, what determines the content of a representation is the
use that is made of it by a consumer system. That use explains the persistence of the
consumer system in the phylogeny, i.e. its having been selected by evolution for doing
the speciﬁc thing it does18. This history of selection is what bestows teleological function
on such systems. It is because a representation was used often enough in a certain
way  leading often enough to behaviour that was adaptive  that the consumer
system that used it in that way got selected, and thereby persisted in organisms across
generations. The content of a representation consists in the conditions that led the
consumer system to function adaptively by means of using the representation. Put
diﬀerently, the contents of a representation are the conditions that make it so that the
way it aﬀects the consumer allows the consumer to perform its teleological function, i.e.
that leads to behaviour that is adaptive, and that speciﬁcally explains the persistence
of the consumer system in the phylogeny.
There are several variations on the basic insight of teleosemantics, giving rise to
diﬀerent theories of content which share the reliance on teleological function as playing
a central role in the ﬁxation of representational content. The quite modest aims of this
overview do not call for a closer examination of such theories.
1.5 Naturalising content: the obstacles
The mainstream robust reductionist theories of content that we have brieﬂy examined
above have attracted as many detractors as they have adherents. Critics have pointed
out several shortcomings of the proposed naturalistic reductions of representational
(and intentional) content. Many of the objections moved belong to two distinct lines of
criticism.
One line accuses the mainstream theories of representational content of being too
liberal: they ascribe representational content to too many things in the world, failing
therefore to account for, or at least considerably watering down, the peculiarly psy-
chological interest of the notion19. However, when it comes to subpersonal states and
18Somewhat analogous formulations can be given for ontogenetic learning-based selection.
19See, for this kind of criticism, Burge (2010), Morgan (2014), as well as chapter 8.
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representational content, it is doubtful that this line of objection has much traction.
Even if representational content may be ascribed to non-cognitive states and processes
as well as to more peculiarly cognitive ones, further argument must be oﬀered to show
that this jeopardises the explanatory role of the notion in the cognitive sciences. At
least when it comes to subpersonal states and their representational content, it is not
obvious that there is a principled distinction between the nature of the processes and
interactions at play in cognitive systems, and outside them. On the contrary, I take it
to be plausible that there will not be a real distinction here. It is likely that there will
be one such distinction when it comes to intentional states and intentional content, phe-
nomena arguably proprietary to psychology. Theories of representational content need
not thereby worry about casting the representational net widely, capturing cognitive
and non-cognitive systems alike.
A second type of diﬃculty for robust reductionist views of content is more relevant
for our purposes, and has largely dominated the literature on mental representation:
the naturalistic reductions they oﬀer may fail to yield determinate contents, making
misrepresentation problematic, and jeopardising the explanatory role of the notion in
the cognitive sciences. Indeterminacy objections are supposed to show that theories of
content end up bestowing disjunctive contents on representations. Instead of determ-
inate, unique or fairly unique contents, representations would have as their contents a
disjunction of sundry states-of-aﬀairs  instead of representing X, as we would want,
representations would end up representing X or Y or Z or ... having thereby non-unique,
or indeterminate, contents.
Indeterminacy of content objections are sometimes taken to exhaust what Fodor
(1984) has called `the disjunction problem'. The disjunction problem arguably shows
that causal-informational theories of content make no space for misrepresentation at
all, yielding indeterminately disjunctive contents. Indeterminacy problems need not all
be so severe: theories of content may yield limitedly disjunctive contents, introducing
considerable vagueness as to which cases count as instances of misrepresentation. In this
sense, the disjunction problem is a particularly severe kind of indeterminacy problem.
I will stick to the expression `indeterminacy problems' to cover all objections from
indeterminacy of content, regardless of their degree of severity.
In this section, I will brieﬂy review traditional arguments that have been moved
against the mainstream theories of content presented above. These arguments have
spawned a rich and variegated debate, which led to considerable reﬁnements of the the-
ories of content they attack, as well as of the attacks themselves. I cannot here but
scratch the surface of such debate. For my purposes, at any rate, a detailed treatment
is not needed. My aim is just to point to issues and questions that theories of con-
tent, including the ones I put forward in Part III, have to tackle, either by providing
convincing answers to them, or by keeping them from arising.
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1.5.1 Holism
In functional role semantics the causal-inferential role played by internal states in the
economy of the cognitive system, i.e. their abstract `position' in a network of internal
states, helps determine their contents. Content-ﬁxation is thereby dependent on the
whole set of cognitive states and their relations, making functional role semantics a
holistic theory. Holism is problematic for a theory of representation and content, for
it makes sameness of content virtually impossible across diﬀerent cognitive systems
(or across the same cognitive system in diﬀerent times, provided there was learning in
between)20. If contents are determined by the whole network of cognitive states, and
given that any two cognitive systems are extremely likely to be diﬀerent in the number
and functional role of at least some of their states, it follows that two cognitive systems
(or two time-slices of the same system) will never share contents  which, beside being
implausible, jeopardises the possibility of communication and the stability of content.
One line of reply to the problem of holism is to insist that only parts of the network
of internal states ﬁx the content of a given cognitive state (molecularism). However, it
is diﬃcult to give a principled means to distinguish between the content-determining
and the non-content-determining parts of the network of causal-inferential relations,
in particular without helping oneself to the controversial analytic-synthetic distinction.
Another line of reply has been to concede that any two cognitive systems will never
share ﬁne-grained content, but that for all purposes what matters is content similarity,
rather than identity (Churchland 1998). It is controversial whether there are principled
ways to measure content similarity, and how much similarity is needed to allow sharing
of intentional states 21.
1.5.2 Causal explanation
One desideratum for theories of representation and content is that they make it so
that representation and content can play a role in the causal explanation of successful
and unsuccessful behaviour. The determination of content and representational status
should ground the causal relevance of representations to the explanation of behaviour.
In other words, representations lead to the behaviours they do due in part to their
contents, rather than having the contents they do due to the causal consequences they
lead to. Functional role semantics seems ill-equipped to deal with this desideratum. By
its lights, it is the causal powers of vehicles that help bestow content on them, making
causal explanation of behaviour in terms of content circular.
1.5.3 The problem of error
The normativity of representational content requires that theories of content make space
for the possibility of representational error, or misrepresentation. Fodor (1984) argues
that causal-informational theories, such as Dretske's (1981), are ill-equipped to respect
20See Fodor & Lepore (1992).
21For criticism of such a strategy, see Fodor & Lepore (1999).
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that requirement. Suppose that a representation R carries digitalised information, and
thereby represents X, say penguins. Suppose further that occasionally instances of
Y, say puﬃns in a dark night, also cause tokenings of R. Tokenings of R generated
by puﬃns-in-a-dark-night are what Fodor calls `wild tokenings'. Wild tokenings are
the primary cases that causal-informational theories would want to rule as instances of
misrepresentation  a representation that has as its content X, by some error or failure,
perhaps due to less than optimal channel conditions, comes to be caused by something
else, therefore misrepresenting how things are in the world (e.g. representing a puﬃn
as a penguin).
However, causal-informational relations by themselves cannot make space for mis-
representation: there is no misinformation, as we have seen, and there is no (non-
intentionally-laden) sense in which a cause generates its eﬀect by mistake. If puﬃns-in-
a-dark-night can cause tokenings of R, it follows that they stand in appropriate causal-
informational relations to R as much as penguins, and are therefore to be included in its
content  R would in consequence have as its content penguin or puﬃn-in-a-dark-night
or Z, where Z stands for the disjunction of all other states-of-aﬀairs that can cause R.
Causal-informational theories, unassisted, cannot thereby make space for misrepresent-
ation, for everything that may cause a tokening of the representation will have to be
included in its content, leading to wildly disjunctive contents  all tokenings, even
wild ones, will count as cases of correct representation22. No misrepresentation is hence
possible.
Dretske's (1981) attempt to circumvent this issue is unsatisfying. He appeals to a
learning period, during which channel conditions are optimal (thus putatively avoiding
wild tokenings), and content is ﬁxed once and for all. After the learning period is over,
wild tokenings would be cases of misrepresentation: what causes the tokening of the
representation is not its content, i.e. the type of cause that tokened the representation
during the learning period.
Fodor (1984) exposes three fatal ﬂaws with the foregoing. First, there is no principled
way of ﬁxing the boundaries of the learning period  cognitive systems are in constant
interaction with their environment, and learning takes place during the whole lifetime23.
Second, even granting that the notion of a circumscribed learning period is sensible,
the account excludes, or is at least silent on, representations that are innate, that is
to say, that are not learned. Third, the solution does not take into account relevant
counterfactuals. Since Y, a wild cause, is suﬃcient to token R, were it to have been
present during the learning period, it would have caused R. In that case, the content of R
would have been disjunctive, i.e. X or Y or Z. Thus, when the relevant counterfactuals
are taken into account, the appeal to a learning period fails to solve the problem of error:
every wild tokening still counts as a case of correct representation, and misrepresentation
22A similar worry applies to long-armed versions of functional role semantics.
23A related worry regards the assumption that channel conditions are optimal during the learning
period. It seems impossible to specify what the optimal channel conditions are without already pre-
supposing the contents of representations. For instance, the channel conditions that are optimal for
visual perception are not the ones that are optimal for auditory perception.
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is impossible24.
Causal-informational theories need therefore to appeal to other supplementing factors
in order to curb indeterminacy of content, and make space for misrepresentation25. The
problem of error is the ﬁrst indeterminacy problem presented here, the other three follow
in the next three subsections.
1.5.4 The distality problem
An issue that arises for all the popular theories of content presented above is the distal-
ity problem (cf. Dretske 1986). Normally there are many processes and states that
establish the connexion between cognitive systems and their environments, some of
which are content-ﬁxing. But most of those intermediate states and processes, it is
held, should not be part of the content of representational states. A representation
of a visually perceived distal object, for instance, should not have among its contents
the patterns of light impinging on the retina that are part of the causal chain leading
from the distal object to the cognitive system. Theories of content should have the
means to exclude these intermediate states and processes from appearing in the con-
tents of representations of distal objects. Otherwise, representational content becomes
indeterminate: representations would represent the distal object as well as all the in-
termediate states and processes that connect the distal object to the cognitive system
 including lower-level representational states inside the system.
Solutions to this problem have been proposed (e.g. Dretske 1986), but it is unclear
whether and to what extent they succeed. It is often held that teleosemantics is able
to solve the distality problem, though this has been put into doubt on the grounds
that consumer systems have been selected in part because they respond adaptively
to the intermediate states and processes that link the distal object to the cognitive
system, since these perforce mediate the relationship between world and cognitive states
(Neander 2012).
1.5.5 Functional indeterminacy
One of the most common and most widely discussed problems with theories of content
that rely on teleological considerations is functional indeterminacy. The worry is that
teleological functions have themselves a degree of indeterminacy which infects the rep-
resentational contents they are supposed to help bestow on cognitive states. A related
observation points out that teleological functions are not ﬁne-grained enough to allow
the bestowal of determinate contents. From these types of functional indeterminacy it
would follow that theories of content that rely on teleology end up with indeterminate
representational contents.
24This third objection only applies to causal-informational theories, such as Dretske's, that appeal
to dispositions, rather than actual history. If it is the dispositions to token representations during the
learning period that are relevant, rather than actual tokenings, counterfactual considerations become
relevant. A causal-informational theory that appeals instead to actual history has been put forward by
Prinz (2002). See Artiga (2014) for critical discussion.
25More recent, probabilistic causal-informational theories hold some promise on this regard (cf. Usher
2001, Eliasmith 2005).
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Some authors (e.g. Cummins 1989, Fodor 1990) have pressed the point that there is
indeterminacy between conservative and liberal interpretations of the teleological func-
tions responsible for determining content in teleoinformational and teleological theories.
Famously, the question `does the representation that brings the frog to snap its tongue
and successfully capture a nutritious ﬂy represent ﬂy, food, or moving dark spot?'
may not have a straightforward answer.
Dedicated neural circuitry in frogs generates snapping of their tongues when it de-
tects small moving dark spots in their visual ﬁelds. Given that in frogs' usual habitat
small moving dark spots happen to be edible insects, this circuitry has been plausibly
selected by evolution given its adaptive value. All three contents mentioned above, `ﬂy',
`food', and `moving dark spot' would have been appropriate to guide successful beha-
viour, given the environments where frogs live and thrive. It is not clear, in consequence,
which the determinate conditions are that allow consumer systems in the frog, such as
its stomach, to fulﬁl their teleological functions: is it presence of ﬂies, food, or moving
dark spots (or something else yet)? And, pushing further, what are the teleological
functions of consumer systems, such as the frog's stomach? Is it to digest ﬂies, food,
or nutritious moving dark spots?26 Teleology arguably lacks the means of picking one
of these conditions as bestowing representational content in exclusion of the others,
yielding thereby indeterminate representational contents.
1.5.6 Quinean indeterminacy
The ﬁnal of the four indeterminacy problems I will present here stems from the fam-
ous problem of indeterminacy of translation formulated by Willard van Orman Quine.
Though Quine's point was aimed at problems surrounding linguistic translation and in-
terpretation, similar issues arise for theories of representational content. Brieﬂy, theories
of content do not seem equipped to distinguish diﬀerent, but co-extensional contents.
For instance, how to determine whether a certain representation represents `rabbit',
`rabbit time-slice', or `undetached rabbit parts'? Since such contents are co-extensional
in all possible cases, there are seemingly no natural relations that can allow theories of
content to ﬁx one of the co-extensional contents as the determinate content of a repres-
entation (Gates 1996). As a consequence, such theories can at best bestow disjunctive
co-extensional contents to cognitive representations.
Quinean indeterminacy is a very general problem, which may undermine the notion
of causal explanation itself by making the causal relata of any causal relation indeterm-
inate between co-extensional properties. Given the fact that it is not speciﬁc to theories
of content  in contrast to the indeterminacy problems presented above  Quinean
indeterminacy is of secondary importance in this debate.
1.5.7 Cummins and Burge against teleosemantics
Cummins (1996), and more recently Burge (2010) purport to undermine the idea that
26An analogous problem applies to producer-based teleosemantics: the teleological functions of rep-
resentation producers are indeterminate between (at least) these three conditions.
39
teleology, be it dependent on individual learning or natural selection, can be relevant for
ﬁxing representational content. They argue that the success on which biological notions
of function hinge is behavioural success, and not semantic, or representational success.
The success conditions that lead to `recruitment' or adaptive success are not conditions
on correct representation. Inaccurate representations may lead to behavioural success,
and they may even be better in assuring such success than accurate representations.
The latter may often be too cognitively expensive and slow to generate, hindering
behavioural success rather than promoting it.
Behavioural success and representational success, even though they may coincide in
some (or even most) cases, cannot be equated. Hence we cannot use behavioural success
to ground representational success. Acquired functions of representational mechanisms,
based as they are on behavioural success, cannot provide conditions on correct repres-
entation. The mechanisms may fulﬁl their function and lead to behavioural success,
but this does not say anything about whether the representations tokened are correct
or else: they may be wrong, but `good enough'. As Burge (2010, p. 302, n. 18) puts
it, one cannot assimilate issues of accuracy and inaccuracy to issues of practical use ...
functioning to be accurate is not in itself a biological function, at any level ... Biological
functioning is not a semantical matter ... It is a practical matter, a matter of ﬁtness for
procreation.
Teleological considerations  so the argument goes  cannot be used, contra tele-
osemantics, to ground a theory of representational content. Teleology is not suitable for
the task because what generates appropriate behaviour need not represent the world
correctly27. Teleological approaches to content would run together two types of cor-
rectness, behavioural and representational, that are independent of one another, and
though they may coincide in some cases, they need not so do.
1.6 Representation and the challenge of indeterminacy:
new paths
Theories of content, if they are to be satisfactory, must have the tools appropriately to
deal with the worries brieﬂy examined above. Mainstream theories have gone through
considerable reﬁnements in order to try and meet those objections. It is not my aim
to assess whether these improvements adequately address the worries. Rather than
examining the prospects of existing theories, my objective in the foregoing is putting
forward a new, substantially diﬀerent account of representational content. A theory in
which most of the above problems do not arise, or are easily and without much ado
dealt with, requiring the addition of no epicycles. A theory, importantly, that is able to
yield a notion of representation and content able to play the required explanatory role
in the cognitive sciences.
My claim will be that a deﬂationary theory of content is just such a theory. The
search for more robust theories of representation may turn out to be unnecessary for the
27See also Cummins (1996, p. 57).
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project of securing the foundations of the sciences of the mind, avoiding metaphysical
quagmires that can bog down more metaphysically-laden theories. I will take pains
to show in coming chapters, and especially in Part III, that such a deﬂationary, and
explanatorily adequate theory of representation can be had.
Before turning to the positive side of this work, it is worthwhile to examine an
old robust reductionist theory of content that has been somewhat neglected in recent
philosophical work. Despite its many shortcomings, I will later on show that such theory,
structural representation, paves the way for a deﬂationary view of representation and
content that has much to recommend it. This will bring this brief overview of existing




An intuitive idea about what representations are and how they work has it that rep-
resentations resemble what they represent. It is by resembling their contents that rep-
resentations are able to convey information about the world to the cognitive system 
representations would be something not very distant from a copy, more or less accur-
ate, of what is represented. By inspecting the representation, the cognitive system, or
subsystems thereof, would be able to inform its behaviour in light of external circum-
stances. By having an internal copy of the world, the cognitive system is able to use it
as a stand-in, a surrogate, to the world itself.
Since Antiquity, this intuitive idea has furnished the insight motivating many philo-
sophical attempts to make sense of how representations work. The idea that repres-
entations take on, in some sense, the form of what they represent can be found in
the works of thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Hume1. Resemblance theories of
representation, despite their historical popularity, have fallen out of favour during the
20th century, leading to their almost complete abandonment. An important role in the
movement away from resemblance theories was played by Nelson Goodman's attack on
such theories2. Goodman (1976) pointed out that resemblance has logical properties
that representation lacks, the former being thus inadequate to ground a theory of the
latter. In fact, while resemblance is a reﬂexive, symmetrical, and transitive relation,
representation does not generally feature these relational properties  a representation
does not represent itself, what is represented does not represent the representation, and
if A represents B, and B represents C, it does not follow that A represents C.
Despite the apparently fatal blow against resemblance theories inﬂicted by Good-
man, work on sophisticated versions of such theories have proceeded alongside the main-
stream debates, which saw informational and teleosemantic theories take centre stage
(Swoyer 1991, Gallistel 1990, Cummins 1996, O'Brien & Opie 2004, Bartels 2006, Isaac
2012, Shea 2014). I will refer to a subset of these reﬁned theories of content, which
follow on the footsteps of traditional resemblance theories, as theories of structural
representation.
1See Cummins (1989) for a brief, and rather impressionistic overview.
2See also Suárez (2003).
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2.1 What is Structural Representation?
Structural representation is usually cashed out as a resemblance theory of content (Cum-
mins 1996, O'Brien & Opie 2004)3. Resemblance theories of content claim that a rep-
resentation R represents an entity/event/state-of-aﬀairs4 O if R resembles O in certain
ways and to a certain extent. Diﬀerent resemblance theories ﬁll up the details diﬀer-
ently. The basic idea behind the structural representation view, or as Cummins (1996,
p. 93) calls it, the Picture Theory of Representation, is that representations represent
by virtue of sharing relational structure with what they represent.
A way in which two entities can share relational structure is by means of structural
resemblance. At its most general, as O'Brien & Opie (2004, p. 15) put it, one system
structurally resembles another when the physical relations among the objects that com-
prise the ﬁrst preserve some aspects of the relational organisation of the objects that
comprise the second. This sharing of relational structure, which can be quite abstract,
allows representations to work as models, as stand-ins for what they represent. Such
representations thereby make possible surrogative processing: one can operate on the
representation, on the model, in order to draw conclusions about the things modelled.
Structural representations can be cognitive or non-cognitive. Maps, scale models,
computational models, and many other non-cognitive representations qualify as struc-
tural representations, and are characterised partly by their ability of allowing surrogative
processing. Such representations need not be static; quite on the contrary, the more
interesting cases are those of dynamical representations. Dynamical models are such
that the changes that the model undergoes or can undergo mirror the changes that what
is represented undergoes or can undergo. A model of our solar system is a case in point.
By changing the position of the globe that stands for a planet in the model, the relative
positions of the other globes, which stand for the other planets, change accordingly.
The relations between the globes represent the relations between planets of the solar
system across diﬀerent conditions.
Structural representation enables us to reason directly about a representa-
tion in order to draw conclusions about the things that it represents. By
examining the behaviour of a scale model of an aircraft in a wind tunnel, we
can draw conclusions about a newly designed wing's response to wind shear,
rather than trying it out on a Boeing 747 over Denver. By using numbers to
represent the lengths of physical objects, we can represent facts about the
objects numerically, perform calculations of various sorts, then translate the
results back into a conclusion about the original objects. In such cases we
use one sort of thing as a surrogate in our thinking about another, and so I
shall call this surrogative reasoning. (Swoyer 1991, p. 449)
The story for cognitive representations is analogous. By sharing structure with what
3Though it need not be, since there may be structural correspondences between entities that are
not based on similarity relations.
4For reasons of economy, I will drop this tripartite characterisation and use the term `entity' to
cover all three cases.
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they represent, cognitive representations can be used by the cognitive system as models
of the world. Possibly, such models, as in some non-cognitive cases, are dynamical,
rather than static: transformations over the representational vehicles of a structured
collection of representations mirror transformations that take place in what is repres-
ented. Representational vehicles represent elements of the represented domain, and
the relations between those vehicles represent the relations between elements in the
represented domain (Shea 2014).
At least in the case of cognitive representations, the insistence on the sharing of
relational structure is crucial. The appeal to relational structure is a more precise and
plausible way of cashing out the idea that representations take on, in some way, the
form of what is represented. Relational structures are somewhat abstract, and can be
implemented in diﬀerent physical substrata. The relational organisation of elements in
a structure is a second-order property, as it abstracts away from the physical properties
of the elements themselves. For this reason, structural resemblance is a type of second-
order resemblance.
A more precise deﬁnition of second-order resemblance has been put forward by
O'Brien & Opie (2004, p. 11): given sets of objects V, O, and sets of relations RV, RO
deﬁned on the members of V and O, respectively,
there is a second-order resemblance between two systems SV = (V, RV)
and SO = (O, RO) if, for at least some objects in V and some relations in
RV, there is a one-to-one mapping from V to O and a one-to-one mapping
from RV to RO such that when a relation in RV holds of objects of V, the
corresponding relation in RO holds of the corresponding objects in O.
From this deﬁnition it follows that second-order resemblance is widespread  many
systems, be they entities or parts of entities, stand in second-order resemblance rela-
tions to many other systems. The deﬁnition puts no constraints on how to individuate
systems, and requires only that some objects and relations in a system map onto ob-
jects and relations in the other. How these are chosen is left open. Moreover, there are
no constraints on which kinds of objects and relations are at issue: the former may be
concrete or abstract, the latter spatial, inferential, structural or causal (O'Brien & Opie
2004).
We lack a clear way of deﬁning what counts as bona ﬁde objects (and systems)5.
For instance, if inﬁltration spots on a ceiling are to count as objects of the system
surface-of-ceiling, it is trivial to ﬁnd a partial second-order resemblance based on, e.g.,
spatial relations between the spots and points on a city map. It is plausible that any
two systems can be found to be in a second-order resemblance to each other, albeit
the resemblance in most cases will be limited to small parts of the two systems and be
somewhat ad hoc. The liberality of second-order resemblance underscores the main ﬂaw
of theories of content that use it as the content-ﬁxing relation: wild non-uniqueness of
content, a type of indeterminacy problem. I will come back to the issue of liberality
and non-uniqueness of content in section 2.2.
5See Morgan (2014, p. 233) for an analogous point.
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The notion of second-order resemblance is important because a theory of cognitive
and intentional representation based on sharing ﬁrst-order properties clearly does not get
oﬀ the ground. For, rather obviously, the physical properties of neurons and assemblies
of neurons do not resemble most of the properties that entities represented feature,
such as their colours, textures, rigidity, shapes, and so on. My neurons are certainly
not black, or smelly, and though they, just like penguins, cannot ﬂy, they surely, in
opposition to penguins, cannot swim. That does not preclude, of course, that neurons
may represent penguins. From what we know from neurophysiology, moreover, this is a
reassuring outcome: the physiological substratum that realises cognitive states, abilities
and processes, among which representations, does not allow ﬁrst-order resemblance in
most cases, and even in the cases in which that kind of resemblance is possible (e.g.
spatial relations between neurons mirroring spatial relations in the world), it is far from
plausible.
Neurons operate in terms of excitatory and inhibitory relationships to each other,
which are normally very complex. There is no conceptual obstacle  though there
may be empirical ones  to the claim that neurons and assemblies of neurons might
instantiate, through their excitatory and inhibitory connexions to each other, their
patterns of activation, or some more complex property, aspects of the relational structure
of entities in the world. Being a highly abstract relation, the sharing of relational
structure is compatible with brain states standing in second-order resemblance relations
to entities in the world. Due to its abstract nature, basing representation on second-
order resemblance puts almost no constraints on the sorts of vehicles that can represent
 the representation must only have a rich enough relational structure to mirror the
relational structure of what is represented. Second-order resemblance is therefore a good
candidate for the kind of relationship between representation and represented that can
provide a plausible naturalistic resemblance theory of representation.
2.1.1 Structural resemblance and intrinsic properties
At the core of the notion of structural resemblance lies the idea that the structure which
appears on one side of the resemblance relation is intrinsic to the system SV, inasmuch
as the relations in RV are dependent on the physical properties of the elements in V.
In other words, it is the intrinsic physical organisation of the system (or subsystem)
that constitutes the relational structure that is shared with the second system. When
inserted into the context of a theory of structural representation, the basic insight is that
the intrinsic relational structure of a collection of representational vehicles  i.e. the
physical relations between the vehicles  forms one of the relata of the (partly) content-
determining resemblance relation to things in the world. Such a relational structure is
intrinsic to the collection of vehicles inasmuch it is independent of any use to which
such a collection may be put by the cognitive system.
Paradigmatic non-cognitive examples of structural representation are cartographic
maps. In the case of cartographic maps, we have physical relations  distance between
points  mirroring or resembling spatial relations between things in the world. Put
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diﬀerently, when SV is a map, the objects in V, namely points on the map, stand in
spatial relations to each other which correspond to how (at least some) objects in O
stand in spatial relations to each other. In the case of maps, spatial structure stands on
both sides of the relation, but this need not be so. As Galileo's application of geometry
to physics shows, spatial properties and relations of (abstract) geometrical ﬁgures can
mirror relations between intervals of time, and the speed and acceleration of macroscopic
moving bodies.
Structural representation requires that representations be part of structures. Even
if the system of representational vehicles can be seen as composed of collections of basic
unstructured representations, the latter can only be taken as representations derivat-
ively, for they are so only insofar as they contribute to the structure of the whole system
of vehicles, having no representational status when separated from such a system. As
Cummins (1996, pp. 96-7) puts it, using somewhat diﬀerent vocabulary:
According to PTR [Picture Theory of Representation], there is no such thing
as an unstructured representation, except in [a] derived sense ... an unstruc-
tured element [a vehicle] in a representing structure R [the collection of
vehicles] may be said to represent its counterpart in a represented structure
C. We must be careful, then, not to think of the objects, relations, and
states of aﬀairs in R as independent semantic constituents of R.
The idea behind structural resemblance is that it is physical relations between the
representational vehicles in a representational structure that help establish the content-
ﬁxing second-order resemblance to things in the world. These physical relations are
properties possessed by the representational structures independently of any use that
the cognitive system may make of them  in this sense, they are intrinsic properties of
the structured collections of representational vehicles. These intrinsic properties allow
the vehicles to be individuated non-representationally  their physical relations are
in place regardless of any representational use they may be put to by the cognitive
system. It is those intrinsic properties that partially explain why those vehicles work as
representations, since it is their physical relations that are supposed to ground structural
resemblance.
Structural resemblance and structural representation oﬀer a non-circular way of
accounting for how physical structures in the cognitive system are able to play the role
of representations. Their intrinsic relational structure helps explain how they come to
stand in the relevant structural resemblance relation to things in the world, thus coming
to represent them  and being able to be used as representations by the cognitive
system.
This feature of structural resemblance, and thereby of structural representation sets
it apart from related theories of representation that also appeal to second-order resemb-
lance relations. Gallistel (1990), for instance, embraces second-order resemblance as the
content-ﬁxing relation, but proposes that it is partly the use that is made of the rep-
resentational vehicles by the cognitive system that determines their relevant relational
structure. By his lights, the relational structure of representational vehicles  one of
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the relata in the content-ﬁxing resemblance relation  is not intrinsic to the collection
of vehicles; that is to say, it is not independent of the use to which those vehicles are
put. In consequence, the relational structure of the vehicles cannot be the grounds for
their being processed as they are, for their being suitably used as representations 
making the appeal to second-order resemblance lose much of its explanatory power in
accounting for successful behaviour.
In comparison to other theories of representation and content, structural repres-
entation as I have here presented it features a crucial advantage: it allows systems of
representational vehicles to be partly deﬁned by their intrinsic properties, providing a
way to explain why those vehicles can be appropriately used as representations. It is
because vehicles stand in the right physical relations to each other that the elements
of cognitive structures stand in the content-ﬁxing relation to things in the world. This
explains, in a way that is independent of the representational use the vehicles are put
to by the cognitive system, how they can suitably work as representations  as models
or stand-ins for things in the world.
2.2 Structural Representation
and non-uniqueness of content
Theories of content that rely mostly or exclusively on forms of second-order resemblance
have to confront a diﬃcult problem: resemblance relations are widespread and uncon-
strained. Basing content ﬁxation on a liberal relation such as second-order resemblance
makes representational content (wildly) non-unique. Given that second-order resemb-
lance relations are common, structures stand in such relations to many diﬀerent entities
in the world. If second-order resemblance is at the basis of content-ﬁxation, it follows
that every representation represents many diﬀerent entities in the world  representa-
tional content is wildly non-unique. Second-order resemblance theories of content thus
risk falling prey to their own type of indeterminacy problem.
The so-called logical objections against resemblance theories of representation, moved
by Goodman (1976), are a special case of this wider problem, to which structural repres-
entation is vulnerable. To see how damaging the problem is to structural representation,
let us take as grounding content ﬁxation a particularly strict form of sharing of relational
structure: isomorphism. Though in the literature on structural representation  and
on mapping-based theories of representation more generally  diﬀerent types of morph-
ism have been proposed as characterisations of (part of) the relevant representational
relation, one of the most commonly appealed to is isomorphism 6.
Two structures V and O are isomorphic in a relation-preserving way if there is a
one-to-one mapping such that every element of V corresponds to an element of O ;
every element of O corresponds to an element of V ; every relation between elements
of V corresponds to a relation between elements of O ; and every relation between ele-
ments of O corresponds to a relation between elements of V. That is to say that the
6See, for instance, Cummins (1996), Millikan (2000, 2004), Waskan (2006), Ramsey (2007).
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two structures completely share their relational structure, and their domains have the
same cardinality. Second-order resemblance is here in its strongest form. Theories of
representation that wish to employ relation-preserving isomorphisms to ground repres-
entational content have it that, for a structure to represent another, every element and
every relation in the represented domain have a corresponding element and relation in
the representing structure, and vice versa7. Most proponents of structural represent-
ation regard isomorphism as too strong a relation for grounding content-ﬁxation, and
settle for weaker forms of morphism8.
Goodman's logical objections to resemblance theories apply to relation-preserving
isomophism-based theories as well, as Suárez (2003) points out. Relation-preserving
isomorphisms feature logical properties that are not shared by the representational
relation. Isomorphism, as a mapping relation between two structures, is (a) reﬂexive,
(b) symmetric, and (c) transitive. That is to say: (a) every structure is isomorphic to
itself; (b) if a structure V is isomorphic to a structure O, structure O is also isomorphic
to structure V ; (c) if a structure V is isomorphic to a structure O, and structure O is
isomorphic to structure U, then V is isomorphic to U. These properties follow from the
deﬁnition of isomorphism. Any structure is structurally identical to itself; if a structure
is structurally identical to another one, the latter will also be identical to the former;
and analogously for transitiveness.
The representational relation does not generally seem to have any of these logical
properties: (a) a representation R does not represent itself; (b) if R represents S, S
need not represent R; (c) if R represents S, and S represents E, R need not represent
E. These objections would show that isomorphism by itself cannot be at the basis of
content ﬁxation: other factors have to be invoked so as to block reﬂexiveness, symmetry
and transitiveness. Otherwise, representations would have overly non-unique contents
 e.g. a worldly state-of-aﬀairs, themselves, etc.
More generally, isomorphism is too liberal a relation. Even relation-preserving iso-
morphism, which introduces a further dimension of complexity  i.e. there must be
correspondence between relations among elements of the two structures  is too easy
to come by, at least when it is left unconstrained. There is an isomorphism between
any two sets of elements with the same cardinality. For if the sets have the same car-
dinality, a one-to-one mapping from elements of one to the elements of the other can
be established. More importantly, as McLendon (1955) and Shea (2013b) point out,
following the original insight by Newman (1928), unless the nature of the relational
structure to be preserved in the mapping between two structures is constrained, there is
always a relation-preserving isomorphism between two structures with the same number
of elements.
To illustrate this point, McLendon (1955) uses the following example. Suppose that
one ﬁnds twelve cars in a parking lot; each naturally standing in spatial relations to
7Cummins (1996, p. 96) brings this idea to its extreme, claiming that the representational relation
is just the relation of isomorphism.
8See, for instance, Swoyer (1991), O'Brien & Opie (2004), Waskan (2006), Bartels (2006), Shagrir
(2012c).
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each other. Suppose further that in coming home, one scatters twelve toy blocks on
the ﬂoor. Given that the cardinality of the set of cars and that of the toy blocks is the
same, there is an isomorphism between the two sets. More interestingly, there is at least
one isomorphism between the two sets which preserves relational structure. For each
spatial relation, whatever it may be, between cars in the parking lot can be made to
correspond to a spatial relation, whatever it may be, between the toy blocks scattered
on the ﬂoor (McLendon 1955, p. 90). For a theory of structural representation, it
follows that any cognitive structure will stand in a relation-preserving isomorphism to
any structure in the world that has the same number of elements. Cognitive structures
would in consequence represent an indeterminate number of entities in the world, if
standing in such a mapping relation is all that is needed to ﬁx representational content.
Yet more damningly, McLendon (1955) presses on, without a principled way of
individuating the elements of structures, the latter can always be decomposed such
as to have a certain cardinality. Therefore, any two structures in the world can be
so decomposed as to have the same number of elements. There would thereby be
a relation-preserving isomorphism between any two structures. It follows from these
considerations that any two structures in the world stand in a strict type of second-order
resemblance relation to each other, namely isomorphism. Transposing these results to
structural representation leads to triviality: any cognitive structure will stand in a
content-ﬁxing relation to any structure in the world, making representational content
so widespread and non-unique as to lose any explanatory value. As Ramsey (2007, p.
93) puts it, understating somewhat the problem, if relation-preserving isomorphism is
to ground the representational relation all by itself, then representational content will
be indeterminate, any representation will be potentially about a wide array of things.
This general argument for the liberality of relation-preserving isomorphism blocks
one line of reply to Goodman's and Suárez's logical objections against resemblance
theories of representation. While isomorphism is a reﬂexive, symmetric, and transitive
mapping relation, weaker forms of relation-preserving mappings are not. For instance,
Bartels (2006) appeals to a weakened form of homomorphism as the basis for the content-
ﬁxing relation. Homomorphism is a some-some mapping between sets and, as such,
can take place between structures with diﬀerent numbers of elements. Importantly,
homomorphisms are neither symmetric nor transitive, though they are reﬂexive. On
this account, a structure V represents a structure O when it respects two conditions:
(a) every relation in V has a corresponding relation in O ; (b) some relations in O have
a corresponding relation in V. One may even weaken further the required relation and
stick to the general notion of second-order resemblance, as O'Brien & Opie (2004) do.
The fatal shortcoming of this line of reply to the logical objections is clear. Though
they deal with some of the issues raised by Goodman (1976) and Suárez (2003) by
appealing to second-order resemblance relations that lack some logical properties that
representations also lack, in so doing they fall into the clutches of the general argument
above. For the second-order resemblance relations they appeal to are less strict than
isomorphism, and as such, are even more widespread, and easier to come by  there
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is not even the requirement that the two structures have the same cardinality. The
triviality that follows for theories of content based on relation-preserving isomorphism
a fortiori also applies to theories based on less demanding second-order resemblance
relations.
In sum, structural representation, being based on overly liberal content-ﬁxing rela-
tions  i.e. structural resemblance  suﬀers from a crucial defect: it makes represent-
ational content wildly non-unique, trivialising the import of the notion, and with it its
explanatory value in the cognitive sciences. More generally, theories of representation
that rely exclusively on second-order resemblance for content-ﬁxation, such as the ones
defended by Cummins (1996), O'Brien & Opie (2004), seem doomed.
At any rate, with structural representation we seem to have hit on a venerable,
intuitive, and powerful idea about how representations work: they model the relational
structure of things in the world, thereby standing in for those things in the operations
of the cognitive system, allowing surrogative reasoning. This insight should not be
dismissed lightly, for despite the failures of theories purely based on it, other paths to
develop it into more satisfying theories of content are open. One such a path, deﬂa-
tionary in nature, will be the aim and theme of the bulk of this thesis. But before we
move on to that, let us ﬁrst brieﬂy tackle sophisticated recent attempts to enrich struc-
tural representation with further content-determining factors so as to try and dodge
indeterminacy problems.
2.3 Structural Representation: new hopes
Recently, some theorists have tried to remain faithful to the basic insight of second-order
resemblance theories of content, while avoiding the wild non-uniqueness of representa-
tional content that follows from it (Bartels 2006, Ramsey 2007, Isaac 2012, Shea 2014).
Their attempt is to curb non-uniqueness of content by adding further constraints on
the factors that bestow representational content on cognitive structures. There are
three main mutually non-exclusive strategies that can be followed9: a) add constraints
on which cognitive structures are candidates for representational status; b) add con-
straints on which structures in the world are candidates for appearing in the contents
of representations; c) narrow down the candidate content-ﬁxing relation.
Let us brieﬂy take a look at some of the forms these three liberality-curbing strategies
may take.
It may be required that cognitive structures, if they are to be candidates for repres-
entational status, be in some way natural and non-trivial (Isaac 2012, Shea 2014): they
must be non-arbitrary structures that are individuated by our best sciences of the mind
and brain. Only structures that play a role in scientiﬁc explanation gain the status
of relevant structures over which structural similarity can take place. This constraint
keeps ad hoc and arbitrarily constructed groups of entities and relations in the cognitive
system from being candidates for representational status, insofar as they are not legit-
9See Shea (2014).
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imate, explanatorily useful groupings of entities for our best sciences  e.g. random
selections of neurons and glia cells across diﬀerent areas of the cortex.
Moreover, the elements and relations that characterise the cognitive structure must
be such that they can be exploited by the cognitive system that is to say, the cognitive
system must be sensitive to them, and be able to use them in further processing (Shea
2014). Cognitive structures that stand in second-order resemblance relations to things
in the world by means of properties that cannot be used in cognitive processing 
simply because the system is not sensitive to those relations, such as neurons' colours
 are thereby excluded from being candidates for representational status.
Constraints can also be imposed on the entities in the world that are candidates
for being representational contents. Such entities may be required, for instance, to be
in some way salient or signiﬁcant for the organism (Shea 2014). Thereby, there might
exist second-order resemblance relations between appropriate cognitive structures and
entities in the world, but such relations will not help bestow representational status and
content on those structures if the worldly entities at hand are not of the kind that can
be salient or signiﬁcant to a certain type of organism.
Finally, theorists have imposed further requirements on the structural resemblance
relations that help bestow representational content on cognitive structures. Isaac (2012),
and in a diﬀerent way Bartels (2006)10, propose that only those structural resemblance
relations that have been generated by causal mechanisms linking the worldly entities
represented to the representational vehicles count as content-bestowing  they add a
causal component to the content-ﬁxing relation. Not every second-order resemblance
between appropriate cognitive structures and appropriate entities in the world bestow
content on the former, but there must be some sort of causal relation between the two
 causal relation that leads to the structural resemblance taking place.
In addition, Isaac (2012) requires that the representation be causally downstream
from the entity represented. In sum, there must be a causal chain from the entity
represented to the representation, and that causal chain is responsible for the existence
of the structural resemblance relation between representational vehicle and content. A
non-cognitive example is a footstep in the mud: the footstep represents the foot insofar
as there is a structural resemblance relation between the two, and that relation has been
established by a causal chain leading from the foot to the footstep, namely the pressing
of the foot in the soft matter of the mud.
Another requirement on the content-ﬁxing relation may be that the relations between
the elements of the representational vehicle that mirror the relations between elements
of the domain represented be projectable. This constraint helps to ensure that the
relation-preserving structural resemblance between representational vehicle and entity
represented is robust, reusable, and systematic  and not a chancy one-oﬀ coincidence.
This preserves the stability of representations and their contents, as well as their use-
10Bartels (2006) appeals to causal relations only in order to pin down what representations are
applied to  what he calls actual representation  while he embraces liberality for what he calls
potential representations, which he equates with representational content. Therefore, Bartels ultimately
accepts that content is wildly non-unique, but tries to save the explanatory value of representation by
constraining representational application. A similar strategy is followed by Cummins (1996).
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fulness for the organism in its dealings with the environment. Moreover, it avoids that
randomly occurring structural resemblances between cognitive structures and entities
in the world be counted as cases of representation.
Finally, some theorists have appealed to the use a cognitive structure is put to in
order to pin down its determinate, unique representational content (Ramsey 2007, Shea
2014)11. The underlying idea is that an appropriate cognitive structure, standing in
the appropriate structural resemblance relation to an appropriate entity in the world,
is a representation of the latter only if the cognitive system employs it as such in
the organism's interactions with the environment. For a cognitive structure to be a
representation of a certain entity, in other words, the former must be used or exploited
by the cognitive system as a representation of the latter, informing further processing
and behaviour toward it. Adding use to the picture narrows down considerably the
liberality of second-order resemblance, since only when cognitive structures are actually
used by the cognitive system due to their standing in second-order resemblance relations
to entities in the world do they gain representational status and content.
In sum, there are several mutually consistent strategies that can be employed in
trying to save structural representation from the liberality of structural resemblance,
thus keeping at bay, at least to some extent, the non-uniqueness of representational
content that follows. There are though reasons to be at least moderately sceptical
about whether these strategies suﬃce to make structural representation a satisfactory
theory of content.
Firstly, it is not clear that the proposed constraints, even when combined, are able
to avoid some degree of pernicious liberality of representation and non-uniqueness of
content. For instance, the appeal to exploitability is certainly not enough, since one
and the same exploitable cognitive structure can be used as a representation of anything
that it structurally resembles. On the other hand, strengthening the requirement so as
to include only actually exploited cognitive structures risks closing the doors to the
explanatorily useful notion of unexploited content (Cummins et al. 2010/2006).
Secondly, some of the constraints can be diﬃcult to justify in a principled way.
For instance, being part of the current explanatory practices of our best sciences is a
criterion that cannot be easily cashed out, given the variety of scientiﬁc approaches
and the ways in which they carve cognitive systems; and it seems moreover to be too
depend on current knowledge and practices to be able to help ground a general theory
of cognitive representation. Similarly, the appeal to projectability enmeshes debates
about representation with complex and disputed issues in general philosophy of science.
Thirdly, there is a risk that the factors added to structural resemblance will intro-
duce further indeterminacy problems in the account. For instance, the appeal to causal
relations made by Isaac (2012), while considerably limiting the non-uniqueness of con-
tent stemming from exclusive reliance on resemblance relations, launches the resulting
account into the throes of the problem of error and the distality problem. Moreover,
as Isaac (2012, p. 701) admits, his theory of structural representation does not make
11I will come back to Ramsey's view with more care in section 6.3.
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space for misrepresentation: every cognitive structure standing in a causally-generated
structural resemblance relation to the world represents correctly whatever entities in
the world caused that resemblance relation to take place. As for causal-informational
semantics, no straightforward account of the normativity of content is on hand.
Similar worries infect theories of structural representation that appeal to the use
to which representations are put by the cognitive system. How to distinguish correct
from incorrect uses? If, as it seems more plausible, this is to be eﬀected by having
recourse to some form of teleology, issues of functional indeterminacy become press-
ing. Moreover, the Cummins/Burge argument against equating representational and
behavioural success may also apply.
In short, though the prospects for theories of representational content that rely on
forms of second-order resemblance are not as bleak as the non-uniqueness of content
problem might initially suggest, the proposed ﬁxes risk to close one hole in the hose
while opening new ones elsewhere. The further factors appealed to in curbing liberality
and non-uniqueness of content open up other indeterminacy issues typical of mainstream
theories of content, such as causal-informational semantics and teleosemantics.
2.4 Looking elsewhere:
a deﬂationary approach to representation
After this brief overview of the main options in the debate about representation and
content, as well as of the main challenges they face, it is time to move to my own take on
these issues. My deﬂationary proposal, I take, is an useful addition to this debate, one
that suggests that a diﬀerent path can be treaded in accounting for representation in the
cognitive sciences. A path that sees representation and content as less metaphysically-
loaded notions; and as a more ﬂexible, context-sensitive, and ﬂuid aﬀair than what the
mainstream proposals would have wanted. This approach may also help dissolve some
of the traditional issues that have exercised theorists interested in representation and
content, in particular indeterminacy problems.
The hunt for a satisfying deﬂationary theory of representation and content for the
cognitive sciences has in Part II its prelude, whilst Part III will see its development
and (hopefully) happy epilogue. My strategy will be to focus ﬁrst on representation's
sister foundational notion in the cognitive sciences  computation. I claim that a
non-trivial, non-liberal, robust notion of concrete computation, developed in Part II,
provides the grounds for unloading part of the explanatory burden normally placed over
the notion of representation, opening thus the doors to deﬂating the latter. Structural
representation, after remaining behind the curtains for the whole Part II, will make a
momentous reappearance, though in a diﬀerent guise, in Part III. I aim to show how,
suitably deﬂated and freed from robust reductionist scruples, structural representation
provides an important share of the story about the nature and role of representation
and content in the cognitive sciences.









That representation came to play, since the beginning, a foundational role in the growing
and now maturing cognitive sciences is not surprising, or revolutionary. The idea that
cognition involves representation is an old one, and its roots can be traced back at least
to Plato. The birth and blossoming of the cognitive sciences as a structured research
ﬁeld owed its keep primarily to the `perfectly stunning idea'1 that cognition worked in a
fashion fundamentally similar to that of the then dawning computers, whose existence
was made possible by mathematical developments in the ﬁrst half of the last century,
and which saw the likes of Turing, Church, and Von Neumann as protagonists. Under-
lying cognitive phenomena, the proposal was and is, are computational processes that
`manipulate'  transition between or transform  representational states according to
rules.
Taking the cognitive system to be a computational system has several advantages.
Theorists studying cognition can use models and tools developed by the mathematical
theory of computation. Moreover, the availability of computers provides a ready way to
try and test hypotheses on how a cognitive task can be solved by computational means.
But most importantly, appeal to computation promises to give a way of understanding
how appropriate and rational behaviour is possible in physical systems.
The rules that determine the behaviour of a computational system can explain how
the transitions between representational states come to be adequate to the task at hand.
By employing the right rules, computational systems can solve any computable problem.
If the cognitive system is computational, we have a ready way to understand how goings-
on in the brain can lead the organism to adequate behaviour towards the body and the
environment: the cognitive system is making use of the suitable set of rules, or the right
`programme' for the situation at hand. The brain can thus be seen as the hardware
in which the computations carried out by the cognitive system are implemented, in
analogy to the silicon chips that implement the computations and programmes that
govern the behaviour of modern electronic computers. Thence the famous idea that the
mind is the software of the brain, i.e. the computations implemented, and programmes
stored, in the brain.
1The expression is Jerry Fodor's, referring to an idea he traces back to Alan Turing  and which
had precursors, such as Hobbes.
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Furthermore, appeal to computation dispels the mystery of how cognition is possible
in physical systems. By means of a theory of computational implementation, the com-
putations that govern adequate behaviour can be explained in purely physical terms by
showing how the relevant computational processes are realised by the biochemical ma-
chinery of the brain. An underlying causal story can thus be told of how the cognitive
system is able to sport complex adequate behaviour in its day-to-day interactions with
the world.
Finally, placing computation at the foundations of the cognitive sciences ties nicely
with its foundational colleague, the notion of representation. At least in the philosoph-
ical literature on cognitive science, computation is widely seen as essentially involving
the manipulation of states endowed with representational content, so much so that Pic-
cinini (2008a) and Sprevak (2010) dub it `the received view about computation'2. The
idea, expressed synthetically in Fodor's famous slogan  `No computation without rep-
resentation!'  is that computation only takes place when there is traﬃcking in states
with content. On this common understanding, representation, computation, and cogni-
tion are intimately tied together: taking computation essentially to involve contentful
states builds a straightforward bridge between that notion and the other two, being
thus particularly ﬁt for the purposes of the cognitive sciences.
However, as for the notion of representation, several conceptual issues need to be
addressed if computation is to play its foundational role in the cognitive sciences appro-
priately. While in mathematics the notion is abstract, and independent of any physical
substrate, the needs of cognitive science require an account of concrete computation,
or computation realised in physical systems. In particular, two questions need to be
answered: what makes something into a computation?; what conditions must hold true
of a physical system so that it performs computations?
The former question is about computational individuation, while the second is a
question about computational implementation. The two are closely related: if a certain
property Z plays a role in individuating a computation, then any physical system that
implements that computation must also have property Z. If it failed to do so, it could not
count as performing that computation, or perhaps any computation at all. Therefore,
issues of individuation and implementation are closely knit together when it comes to
concrete computation.
Satisfactory answers to these questions are crucial to ensure ﬁrm conceptual grounds
for the cognitive sciences, at least for what regards one of its sustaining pillars. As
Sprevak (2012) points out, a good theory of concrete computation should meet at least
the following three desiderata3.
First, (i) it should clarify the notion of concrete computation, often treated as an
2Interestingly, there is controversy even for what regards what the most common view is. Shagrir
(1999), for instance, holds that the standard view of computation is the non-semantic one. I believe
that this disagreement stems from the scientiﬁc ﬁeld one examines when making such claims. The
semantic view is more common in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, while the non-semantic
view in computer science. See O'Brien (2011) for similar considerations.
3Piccinini (2007b), Fresco (2014), Piccinini (2015) propose six desiderata. For my purposes here,
these three (plus one) will suﬃce.
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explanatory primitive. Second, (ii) it should help vindicate the specialness of computa-
tional explanation by driving a wedge between systems that actually implement compu-
tations, and systems that do not. Third, (iii) it should provide an account of concrete
computation in which facts about physical systems implementing computations are ob-
jective features of the world, independent of the intentions and beliefs of observers. The
objectivity of concrete computation is particularly crucial for its foundational role in the
cognitive sciences. As Ladyman (2009) points out, ascribing computational processes
to the cognitive system only helps naturalising cognitive phenomena if performing com-
putations is a natural fact, independent of the ways human beings represent the world.
As a fourth desideratum, I add normativity: theories of concrete computation should
do justice to the normative aspect of computation, i.e. that there be something it is for
a computation to be correctly or incorrectly performed  that there can be instances
of miscomputation4.
Several theories of concrete computation have been oﬀered, and I will brieﬂy ex-
amine some of them in the following sections. As O'Brien (2011) notes, such theories
fall on two opposing sides of a fracture5. On each side a diﬀerent criterion for com-
putational individuation is proposed. The ﬁrst one, `the received view' already hinted
at above, has it that computation essentially involves representation, and that com-
putations are at least partially individuated by their semantic properties. This line is
generally dubbed `the semantic view'. On the opposing side there are those who argue
that computation need not involve contentful states, and that computations are indi-
viduated non-semantically  the `non-semantic view' of computational individuation.
Each side of the fracture features its own advantages and shortcomings, and it is the
aim of this and the following chapters to bring them forward and provide an overview
of the conceptual space for theories of concrete computation.
I will start with non-semantic proposals. First, I will present and examine the
simplest account of concrete computation, the mapping account. I will then examine
its chief problem: it makes computation trivial, leading to unlimited pancomputation-
alism. There are three main strategies to cope with the triviality objections against
the mapping account: accept that concrete computation is trivial, and recommend the
ejection of computation from the foundations of cognitive science (or of any other sci-
ence, for that matter); accept triviality, but try and save the explanatory purchase of
the notion; or supplement the view with further constraints so as to block triviality
arguments.
In this chapter, I will explore these three strategies. In section 3.1, I present the
simple mapping account, and the trivialisation problems that follow from it. After that,
I will, in section 3.2, examine a pragmatist version of the simple mapping account
that accepts triviality, while nevertheless trying to defend the explanatory value of
computation to the cognitive sciences. Finally, section 3.3 examines the advantages
and shortcomings of two sophisticated families of views of concrete computation. In
section 3.3.1, I analyse a reﬁned non-semantic view, based on causal mapping, put
4See Fresco & Primiero (2013), Piccinini (2015).
5An exception to this may be Rescorla (2012b).
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forward most forcefully by Chalmers (2011). In its turn, section 3.3.2 presents and
assesses the main arguments in favour of adding a semantic factor to theories of concrete
computation. I will argue that most of those arguments fail, but one  the argument
from the multiplicity of computations  spells trouble for non-semantic views. The
following chapter will put forward a theory of non-semantic concrete computation, the
mechanistic one, that, I argue, has the tools to avoid that argument.
3.1 Mapping accounts
and the Putnam-Searle triviality objections
Mapping accounts claim that a physical system implements a computation when there
is a mapping between the formal structure of the computation and the physical states
and processes of the physical system. Given an abstract computational description,
a physical system implements it if its states and state-transitions as determined by
a physical description mirror the states and state-transitions deﬁned by the abstract
computational description6. This view is associated with Putnam (1988).
This intuitive deﬁnition of the view invites an intuitive objection. Take any complex
physical system, such as a wall or a pail of water. Take any computational description,
such as the one specifying the programme LYX, the word editor used to write these
pages. The wall, or the pail of water, are composed of a prodigious number of atoms
and subatomic particles in diﬀerent types of interaction, transitioning from physical
state to physical state as time passes. It seems very likely that at least one of the
patterns of state-transitions taking place in the wall or in the pail of water mirrors
the state-transitions speciﬁed by the programme LYX, at least within a certain time
interval. It would follow that the wall, or the pail of water implement the programme
LYX as much as my laptop computer.
Searle (1992), developing insights by Ian Hinckfuss, claims that, given the enorm-
ous amount of patterns of microphysical transitions that take place in any complex
enough system, it is extremely likely that a mapping can be found between at least one
of such patterns and the states, and state-transitions speciﬁed by any computational
description. Therefore, according to Searle, computation is trivial insofar as any phys-
ical system complex enough implements any computation: the mapping view leads to
unlimited pancomputationalism7.
If concrete computation is trivial, cognitive science is in deep trouble. For it follows
that appealing to computation in explaining cognition is vacuous. Any complex system,
Searle's triviality argument purports to show, performs computations; not only designed
computers and cognitive systems. Taking the cognitive system to perform computations
does not set it apart from any other complex system in the universe, including walls
and rocks. Moreover, the brain itself, as a complex system in its own right, implements
every computation. The basic idea underlying cognitive science, i.e. that we can ex-
6As Piccinini (2015, p. 17) points out, it is more precise to talk of `microphysical states', insofar as
computational descriptions are also physical.
7Piccinini (2015).
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plain cognitive processing and complex behaviour by means of ﬁnding out the speciﬁc
computations implemented by the cognitive system, would founder.
Searle's intuitive argument applies to the rough characterisation of mapping-based
computational implementation provided above. It is worthwhile to ﬂesh out the pic-
ture more carefully. In order to provide a detailed picture, mapping views have to
deﬁne the two structures that enter into the mapping relation. One is the structure
of the implementing system given by the physical description, consisting of its physical
states and state-transitions. The other is the formal structure of the computation as
determined by its computational description. This brings to the fore the importance
of computational formalism in mapping accounts. Diﬀerent computational formalisms
lead to diﬀerent descriptions of the abstract structure of a computation. Therefore, they
characterise diﬀerently one of the two relata of the mapping relation that establishes
computational implementation. The appropriate formalism should be chosen according
to how adequately it ﬁts the needs of computational theorising in the cognitive sciences
(Chalmers 1996).
Putnam focuses on ﬁnite-state automata (FSAs). An FSA is an abstract compu-
tational formalism deﬁned by the states an automaton can be in (only one at any
particular moment of time), and a table of state-transitions. Inputs and outputs can
also be added to the formalism. Any FSA can be only in a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent
states. An FSA can thus be speciﬁed by providing the set of its internal states {S1,...,
Sn}, the set of input {I1,..., In} and output {O1,..., On} states, as well as rules that
specify the state-transitions from each pair of internal state and input state to each pair
of internal state and output state, Si , Ii S j ,Oj. Examples of implemented FSAs are
automated coﬀee distributors and lift controllers.
Given the FSA formalism, it is possible to deﬁne the mapping account of concrete
computation more fully. A physical system implements an FSA if and only if
there is a mapping M from states of the physical system onto states of the
FSA, and from inputs and outputs of the physical system onto inputs and
outputs of the FSA, such that: for every state-transition (S, I )  (S', O)
of the FSA, if the physical system is in state P and receives input I* such
that M (P) = S and M (I* ) = I, then it transitions to state P' and emits
output O* such that M (P' ) = S' and M (O* ) = O.8
Putnam (1988) shows, however, that the FSA-based mapping account of computational
implementation leads to triviality of concrete computation. The strongest result comes
from analysing inputless FSAs, that is, ﬁnite-state automata without input or output.
These automata transition between internal states following rules of the form Si  S j .
Putnam proves that any arbitrary open physical system implements any inputless FSA.
The only assumption required for his proof to go through is that the physical system
have non-cyclical behaviour, that is, that it always be in diﬀerent internal states at
diﬀerent moments in time9.
8Adapted from Godfrey-Smith (2009b).
9Chrisley (1995) argues against this assumption. Most theorists, in contrast, accept that the as-
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Here is a simpliﬁed exposition of the proof. Take any open system T in a speciﬁc
time interval, say from 12.00 to 12.07. Group as belonging to state Si of T the section
of the trajectory in state-space of the total physical state of the system during each
minute from 12.00 to 12.07. Hence, in that time interval the system will transition
between states S1, S2, ..., S7. Now take an inputless FSA that undergoes the following
transitions in that same interval, ABABABA. Deﬁne physical states a,










S6, and map a into A and b into
B10. The physical system undergoes the same state-transitions as the FSA in that time
interval. Therefore, according to the mapping account, it implements that FSA during
that time interval. The proof generalises to any (non-cyclical) open physical system,
and any inputless FSA. Therefore, any physical system implements any inputless FSA,
making concrete computation trivial, and leading to unlimited pancomputationalism.
A similar, though weaker result, applies to FSAs with inputs and outputs. An
analogous proof shows that any physical system that has inputs and outputs mappable
to the abstract inputs and outputs of an FSA will implement it. So, provided there
is a mapping between the inputs and outputs of the physical system, and the inputs
and outputs of the computational description, a physical system will implement every
FSA with the same input-output function. The mapping of the input-output function
is open to two interpretations: a weak, and a strong one.11.
The weak interpretation requires only that there be a mapping between the inputs
and outputs of the physical system, and those of the FSA, without placing constraints
on the physical nature of the inputs and outputs of the former. On this reading,
the triviality of implementing FSAs with input and output is as strong as that of
implementing inputless FSAs. The appropriate inputs and outputs in the physical
system can be appropriately picked out from an arbitrarily chosen boundary using the
same disjunctive strategy as above. Finding physical systems with (weak) input-output
functions mappable into the input-output function of an FSA is again a trivial business.
The strong interpretation requires that the mappable inputs and outputs be of a
speciﬁc physical type. The implementation of the LYX word editor must take key strokes
as input, and display characters on a screen as output. A weaker triviality result applies
to this strong interpretation. Any physical system with the appropriate strong input-
output behaviour implements every FSA with that input-output behaviour. This means
that any physical system that implements the LYX word editor likely also implements
LibreOﬃce Writer, and Microsoft Word12.
In sum, even in the case of FSAs with inputs and outputs pernicious triviality
of concrete computation follows. All that matters for implementation, in this case, is
having the right inputs and outputs. The internal computational structure of a system is
irrelevant. In the case of cognitive science, Putnam (1988) points out, computationalism
and behaviourism become indistinguishable.
sumption is plausible at least for macroscopic open physical systems, as do I.
10Chalmers (1996) adds this step to Putnam's proof for more precision.
11Sprevak (2012, pp. 120-1).
12Without regimentation, this would be true at least to a large extent.
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In face of these results, three lines of reaction are available: (a) accept that com-
putation is trivial and devoid of explanatory power (Putnam and Searle, at least for
what regards cognitive science); (b) accept that computation is trivial, but defend that
nonetheless it has explanatory purchase (Egan 2012, Schweizer 2014, 2016); (c) take
the triviality arguments as a demonstration that the simple mapping account of con-
crete computation13 presented above is wrong or incomplete, and provide corrections
or additional conditions for computational implementation (almost everyone else).
Line (a) is particularly unattractive. It is to withdraw prematurely from a game
with quite high stakes. It fails to do justice to eﬀorts in computer science and electronic
engineering  conceiving and building computers is far from a trivial matter  and it
shakes the foundations of those sciences as well as of cognitive science. It becomes sense-
less to talk of diﬀerent computational systems having diﬀerent computational powers,
since nearly any physical system computes nearly anything. The unlimited pancompu-
tationalism that the simple mapping account leads to  every complex system performs
every computation (or almost)  puts in danger the objective status of computation.
If everything computes nearly everything, it would seem, nothing really computes any-
thing  talk of systems performing computations is just vacuous.
Taking line (a) does not aﬀect the mathematical theory of computation, for whose
abstract objects the problem of implementation does not arise. But it deals a fatal blow
to those scientiﬁc ﬁelds that see claims about physical systems performing computations
as meaningful and explanatorily powerful. Line (a) recommends ejecting the notion
of computation from any valuable explanation of the behaviour of physical systems.
However, given how much is to be lost, how many promising scientiﬁc ﬁelds would
have to be rethought, it is too untimely a retreat. Rather, (a) should stay as the
last (apocalyptic) resort, the position to take when all other possibilities have been
exhausted, and every hope is lost.
In the next section, I will analyse (b). In the following section, I will turn to (c),
which will introduce the semantic vs. non-semantic divide between theories of concrete
computation, and lead the way to my main focus in this part: present and defend the
mechanistic view, a task for the next two chapters.
3.2 A pragmatic take on implementation
There may be a way to save the explanatory power of concrete computation, at least
for what regards the cognitive sciences, while at the same time accepting that computa-
tional implementation is trivial. Something along the lines of this position is upheld by
Egan (1999, 2009, 2012), Schweizer (2014, 2016), Matthews & Dresner (2016) and also
contemplated by Chrisley (1995)14, while Searle (1992) may be seen as taking some steps
in this direction before veering toward a diﬀerent path. The view involves appealing to
13The baptism is due to Godfrey-Smith (2009b).
14Chrisley (1995) does not hold this position, as he believes the Putnam-Searle triviality objections
to be wrong-headed. In any case, he argues that even if the objections should go through, they would
not suﬃce to deprive appeal to computation of its explanatory powers.
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our scientiﬁc practices.
Research in the cognitive sciences normally takes as its starting point a cognitive
capacity sported by an organism. The cognitive capacity is the target of the explana-
tion, it is given, assumed from the get-go. By means of theorising and experimenting,
cognitive scientists investigate how the cognitive system enables the feat. Computa-
tional cognitive science proceeds by trying to ﬁnd out the computations performed by
the system that explain the capacity.
Take, for instance, the ability of desert ants to go back to their home colony in a
nearly straight line. The capacity is particularly striking given the windy path they
generally take when foraging outside the nest, and the fact that they do not rely on
landmarks15. A computational cognitive scientist interested in understanding how this
sophisticated behaviour is made possible will look for a computational procedure, an
algorithm, that would allow the ant's brain to calculate the straight trajectory, perhaps
by integrating information on heading and average speed during the foraging journey
(path integration).
Suppose that the cognitive scientist individuates a neural circuit in the ant's brain
that implements that algorithm, i.e. the states and state-transitions of the circuit map
onto the steps of the algorithm. They would then have come up with a satisfying com-
putational explanation for the path integration capacity of the desert ant. Even though
the ant's brain implements nearly every computation (courtesy of the triviality argu-
ments), the computations that explain its navigational ability are the ones individuated
by the scientist. Out of the indeterminate number of computations implemented by the
ant's brain, that particular one explains the cognitive capacity under investigation.
As should be clear, this is too fast. Given the triviality of implementation, cognitive
scientists would not have needed to look inside the brain of the ant to ﬁnd a circuit
that implemented the hypothesised algorithm. That the ant's brain implements that
algorithm, as well as an indeterminate number of others that eﬀect path integration,
is obvious. After all, as a complex system, it implements nearly every algorithm! It
seems that we ended up with the discouraging conclusion drawn by Putnam and Searle.
From the triviality of concrete computation follows that computational explanation in
the cognitive sciences is senseless.
However, appeal to scientiﬁc practice introduces further constraints on what im-
plementations are explanatory. First, we know from the outset what the input-output
function is. This limits the possible implementations of the computation to those phys-
ical systems that have mappable input-output functions. This limitation, if interpreted
weakly, is of little consolation, as we have seen above. Every physical subsystem of the
ant's brain with the same input-output function implements the algorithm. And it is
trivial to pick out groupings of `boundary' physical states that appropriately map onto
that function. If, on the other hand, the input-output mapping is taken strongly, we
15Gallistel (1990). It is controversial whether this behaviour counts as cognitive. As is well known,
there is no principled boundary between cognitive and non-cognitive, as we still lack any consensus on
the `mark of the cognitive' (or on the existence of such a thing, to start with). See Adams (2010). At
any rate, this point is immaterial to my purposes here.
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do make some headway. The inputs must come from speciﬁc sensory systems and the
outputs must consist in activities of the motor system of the animal16.
Second, and consequently, we know, or we can ﬁnd out, which sensory systems
convey the information needed to feed the steps of the algorithm. The circuit that im-
plements the algorithm has to be causally connected both with the sensory channels that
pick up and transmit information about heading and speed, and with the eﬀectors that
make the ant move. All implementations of the algorithm that are not appropriately
causally connected to the relevant transducers and eﬀectors cannot explain how the ant
manages to get back to the colony in an approximately straight line. This puts a strong
constraint on which circuits are implementing the explanatorily relevant algorithm17.
Third, science tells us what the relevant causal level is, thus ruling out arbitrary
groupings of physical states. One of the main reasons for the success of the Putnam-
Searle triviality arguments stems from the lack of constraints on how to carve up and
group the implementing physical states and processes18. If any grouping of microphys-
ical states of a physical system counts as a candidate for implementation, triviality
ensues. Indeed, Putnam's proof depends on a grouping of maximal physical states
based on arbitrary temporal intervals.
Cognitive science individuates, to some approximation, the causal level that is rel-
evant for its explanatory purposes. The causal goings-on of relevance are the ones
involving sensory transducers, neurons, groups of neurons, and motor eﬀectors. The
behaviour of sub-atomic particles, atoms and so on, is not relevant to cognitive ex-
planation19. Moreover, groupings of physical states that ignore boundaries between the
entities posited by the cognitive sciences, e.g. that group together as belonging to one
state arbitrary parts of diﬀerent neurons and glia, are ruled out.
In sum, appeal to the practices and theoretical posits of cognitive science signiﬁc-
antly limits the computational implementations relevant to its explanatory projects.
Even though the cognitive system, as any complex system, performs nearly every com-
putation, the implemented computations that explain the target cognitive capacities
are severely constrained. I will refer to this view, with some terminological hesitation,
as `limited pragmatism'.
Is limited pragmatism about computational implementation suitable to save the
explanatory role of computation in cognitive science? There are, I take, two main
reasons for scepticism.
Firstly, it is unclear whether the view is able, by having recourse to scientiﬁc practice,
to single out the one concrete computation performed by the cognitive system that
does the explanatory job. Recall the weaker triviality argument that applied to FSAs
with strongly interpreted inputs and outputs. It seems that that pernicious result
applies to the foregoing account: even appealing to the practices and posits of cognitive
16See Schweizer (2014).
17See Egan (1999, 2012), Schweizer (2014).
18Scheutz (2012).
19See Egan (2012, pp. 46-7), who presses a similar argument based on the cognitive exploitability of
properties: only macro-properties can be cognitively exploited in processes that perform computations
relevant for accomplishing cognitive tasks.
64
science, we are still left with little more than constraints on the appropriate inputs and
outputs. It follows that the cognitive system implements every algorithm with the same
inputs and outputs. Cognitive science would hence not be able to distinguish diﬀerent
computational structures at play in bringing about cognition, collapsing, as Putnam
warned, into behaviourism.
There may be a way out of this objection, even though, I believe, it is going partially
to depend on empirical considerations. For the pragmatist has an additional card in
their sleeve, as we have seen above  the explanatorily relevant causal level of the
system is approximately ﬁxed. The answer to the problem lies on whether the physical
goings-on in the neural circuits which stand in the appropriate causal relations to inputs
and outputs could be mapped onto diﬀerent algorithms, as the simple mapping account
of implementation would want; and on whether those diﬀerent algorithms would be
explanatory of the cognitive capacity under investigation.
Ladyman (2009), Sprevak (2010), and Shagrir (1999, 2001, 2012a,b) argue that the
same causal structure of a system can implement two syntactic structures at the same
time. A fortiori, this would mean that any circuit individuated by the foregoing view,
even if unique, would perform at least two diﬀerent computations. I will leave discussion
of Sprevak's and Shagrir's argument to section 3.3.2 and section 4.4, but suﬃce it to
say for now that their argument does not directly impinge on the foregoing account.
They would need to show not only that the same neural circuit performs two diﬀerent
computations, but also that both computations are equally explanatory of the cognitive
behaviour under investigation20. They would have to be computations of two algorithms
appropriate to the same cognitive task. Shagrir's argument does not show that21.
A second problem regards the fact that limited pragmatism involves adding an
observer-dependent factor into the account of implementation. Concrete computation
is objective, but trivial. Explanatory computations, the ones of use to cognitive science,
are, on the other hand, dependent on the interests and practices of cognitive scientists
themselves. Mind-dependent properties infect the account to some extent. Concrete
computation keeps its explanatory power despite its triviality, but the explanatory pur-
chase of the notion is rescued by appeal to intentions and subjective goals. The latter
play a considerable role in determining which concrete computation, out of the indeﬁn-
ite number of them that each physical system implements, is explanatorily relevant in
each case.
There is a risk, therefore, that the account will lead to vicious circularity when com-
putation is seen as one of the foundations of the cognitive sciences: we want to explain
cognition partially by means of concrete computation, but we use cognitive states to
help determine which concrete computations are explanatory. The explanandum seems
20See Fresco (2015).
21Nor does it intend to do so. His target is rather non-semantic views of concrete computation,
especially when conjoined with the claim that performing certain types of computations is suﬃcient
for having a mind (computational suﬃciency thesis). I will come back to this argument in the next
chapter, as it threatens the mechanistic view of computation with computational indeterminacy, as it
does the causal mapping view. The latter, though, is happy to bite the bullet from the get-go, as we
will see below.
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to be explaining the explanans, as well as the other way around.
One way to tackle such an accusation is claiming that, after all, the objectivity
of concrete computation is preserved, though it be a vacuous notion. The appeal to
interest-relative properties only comes in when one concrete computation, out of the
inﬁnite ones, is selected as explanatory of a capacity of interest to our scientiﬁc endeav-
ours. If computation is interest-relative in the limited sense that explanations pick out
one computation from the various ones performed by the system, based on the aims
and targets of theorists, nothing detracts from its objectivity22. It is unclear, however,
whether this would help save the foundational role of computation in the cognitive
sciences. For computation, though objective, would still be a trivial matter. Unfortu-
nately, I cannot discuss this strategy in any detail here, as it would require touching
on some fundamental issues in general philosophy of science regarding the nature of ex-
planation, and the relationships between instrumentalism and realism about scientiﬁc
posits.
A second way to tackle the point is to accept that computation cannot play any
foundational role in cognitive science, but maintain nonetheless that computation is a
useful scientiﬁc notion. This strategy involves going full-out pragmatist, and holding
that computation is always observer-dependent. This is stronger than the claim we have
been analysing so far, namely that computation is observer-independent but trivial, and
that pragmatic considerations come in to pick out explanatory computations from those
that are not. On the foregoing, in contrast, computation is not objective to start with.
In consequence, computation cannot lie at the foundations of cognitive science because
it would lead to the vicious circle above. I will call this view `full pragmatism'.
Searle's (1992) trivialisation arguments are supposed to support the view that the
notion of computation is observer-dependent, a view also endorsed by Schweizer (2014).
Whether a system is computing and what it is computing, for Searle, depends on ob-
servers interested in ascribing speciﬁc computations to systems. Schweizer (2014) oﬀers
a more thorough and well-argued defense of full pragmatism. He argues that prag-
matic constraints help distinguish cases in which seeing physical systems as performing
computations is scientiﬁcally useful and fruitful from cases in which it is not. Such
constraints are moreover not rigid and unchangeable, but are rather dependent on the
context  diﬀerent explanatory and practical contexts will motivate the employment
of pragmatic constraints which may play no role in other contexts23.
We talk about physical systems performing computations because in some cases this
is useful for our purposes, be them in explanation or in engineering. The overwhelming
majority of possible computational interpretations that follow from the simple mapping
account are useless and uninteresting. These are not in competition with the few, if
any, computational interpretations that advance our understanding of the workings of
physical systems, of how to predict their behaviour, as well as of how to regiment
22See Chrisley (1995). Moreover, if conjoined with an ontic view of explanation, the view could
arguably fully shed its interest-relative, pragmatist, commitments, and embrace objectivism about
explanatory computation. I just point at this possibility, which I will not investigate here.
23Schweizer (2016).
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physical systems to causally behave in the ways that we want. Therefore, the fact that
any complex enough physical system can be interpreted as performing any computation
is irrelevant, for very few computational interpretations turn out to be scientiﬁcally and
practically useful, and in line with what are considered to be good explanations.
Computers are those physical systems whose computationally relevant states we
can discriminate, and that are able to carry out algorithms we are interested in over
many diﬀerent input values. Further pragmatic constraints on physical systems that
can be helpfully seen as computers, according to Schweizer (2014), include: automati-
city, reliability, versatility, and predictive power. The latter constraint rules out, as
pragmatically irrelevant, those implementations that are arrived at only ex post facto,
as in the case of Searle's wall, or the pail of water. There is no predictive power gained
in assigning computations to those physical systems  quite on the contrary, it is only
after observing their development during an interval of time that a computational in-
terpretation can be oﬀered, thereby adding nothing to our capacity of predicting how
the systems will behave next, and rendering them useless as devices for performing
computations.
Note that the pragmatic constraints that Schweizer proposes are in principle compat-
ible with limited pragmatism, that is, a theory in which the objectivity of computation
is preserved, but pragmatic constraints come in only in order to tell apart the explanat-
ory computations from the non-explanatory ones. However, Schweizer clearly wants to
subscribe to the full pragmatist view when he claims that he supports the conclusion
that realising or implementing an abstract computational procedure is not an intrinsic
property of physical systems, but rather is based on a purely observer-dependent act of
ascription24. It is arguable whether Schweizer's arguments provide any reason to prefer
full pragmatism to limited pragmatism. On the contrary, given that limited pragmatism
preserves the observer-independent nature of concrete computations, while at the same
time having the same consequences regarding the explanatory purchase of computation
as full pragmatism, I believe that it is superior to the latter.
It is moreover diﬃcult to assess whether computational explanation, by full prag-
matist lights, would have any purchase, and whether the notion of computation would be
able to play a foundational role in the cognitive sciences25. Again, the issue depends on
one's own overall stand on realism, anti-realism, and instrumentalism about scientiﬁc
posits, and their explanatory power. I will not go into these problems here, but in-
stead I will assume, with, I take, most of the literature, that only observer-independent
entities and processes are genuinely explanatory for most of the ﬁelds composing cognit-
ive science. This stance naturally rules out Searle's and Schweizer's observer-relative,
fully pragmatic notion of computation from playing any robust explanatory role in such
ﬁelds; while it leaves unscathed the limitedly pragmatic view which insists that concrete
24Schweizer (2014).
25Churchland et al. (1990), who take this path and accept the observer-relativity of concrete com-
putation, defend that it is explanatorily valuable nonetheless. On the other hand, Ramsey (2007, pp.
100-2) claims that deeming computation to be observer-relative undermines the appeal of the notion in
computer and cognitive science. For Searle, the observer-relativity of computation supports the latter
view, and is meant to be an objection to computationalism in the cognitive sciences.
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computation is an observer-independent, though trivial, feature of the world.
It is worth keeping in mind that, if the robust, non-trivial theories of concrete com-
putation that I will examine below should fail, there is still an arguably satisfying way
to justify the use of the notion of concrete computation in our scientiﬁc and engineer-
ing practices; a fallback position that avoids most of the shortcomings that plague a
pure simple mapping account: limited pragmatism. Such a view may involve embracing
the triviality of concrete computation, while at the same time insisting that pragmatic
considerations preserve its explanatory power in cognitive and computer science.
3.3 No computation without representation?
Most of the theorists interested in concrete computation have opted for strategy (c),
namely complementing the simple mapping account with further constraints so as to
block trivialisation arguments, and save the explanatory power (and the objectivity) of
concrete computation. These constraints can be divided into two general categories.
The ﬁrst category comprises constraints that have to do with semantic properties.
Theories that make use of such properties  semantic theories  add to theories of
concrete computation the requirement that computational states be representational26.
For proponents of this view, computations are individuated partly by their semantic
properties, and thereby in order to implement a computation the implementing sys-
tem must have the adequate semantic properties  computation essentially involves
representation.
The second category comprises constraints that do not involve semantic properties.
Theories of concrete computation that appeal exclusively to non-semantic properties are
variegated, insofar as diﬀerent non-semantic considerations may be brought to bear in
determining the computational nature of physical systems. The further factors appealed
to include counterfactual support27, dispositional properties28, causal organisation29,
and functional properties30. In what follows, I will focus especially on the latter two.
Most semantic theories incorporate some of the further constraints put forward by
non-semantic theories31. They then add the further requirement that a system that
respects those constraints must also have states with representational content to count
as computational. In their turn, non-semantic theories do not rule out the possibility
26Defenders of the semantic view include: Fodor (1975), Peacocke (1994, 1999), Grush (2001), Shagrir
(2001, 2006, 2012a,b), O'Brien & Opie (2009), O'Brien (2011), Ladyman (2009), Sprevak (2010). Egan
(2010, 2014b) does not appeal to external content, but she belongs to this category inasmuch as she
appeals to mathematical contents in order to individuate computations. Churchland et al. (1990)
also embrace the view that computation essentially involves representation; however, they claim that
concrete computation is observer-relative insofar as it depends on interpreting systems as manipulating
representations. Rescorla (2012b, 2013, 2014b), on his turn, defends a middle ground view: concrete
computation, according to him, is sometimes individuated by means of semantic properties, while in
other cases it does not essentially involve representation.
27Maudlin (1989), Copeland (1996), Dresner (2010), Rescorla (2014b).
28Klein (2008).
29Chalmers (1996, 2011), Chrisley (1995), Scheutz (1999, 2001).
30Piccinini (2007b, 2008a, 2015), Fresco (2014, 2015), Milkowski (2012, 2013).
31An exception is, for instance, Ladyman (2009), who conjoins the simple mapping view with a
representational requirement.
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that computations may be carried out over representations; their claim is merely that
even in that case computations are not individuated by their semantic properties 
computations do not involve representation essentially.
The debate between non-semantic and semantic accounts of concrete computation
revolves mainly around issues such as the following:
 which family of theories, if any, does justice to how computational explanation
works in computer and cognitive science?
 which family of theories, if any, provides a non-trivial account of concrete compu-
tation?
 which family of theories is able suitably to capture the domain of computational
systems, including the right systems and excluding the wrong ones32?
To illustrate the debate, I will brieﬂy examine one of the most inﬂuential non-semantic
theories of concrete computation: Chalmers' causal topology view. I will then pit it
against four core families of arguments for the semantic view. I will argue that three of
them fail, while one does put non-semantic views in dire straits. Assessment of how fatal
this is for non-semantic theories will have to wait for the next chapter, in which I will
present and defend my version of a recent type of non-semantic theory, the mechanistic
view.
3.3.1 Chalmers' causal mapping theory
In a series of papers, David Chalmers (1995, 1996, 2011, 2012) has defended a soph-
isticated causal mapping account of concrete computation. Causal mapping theories
complement the simple mapping view with constraints on the causal structure of the
implementing physical system.
A natural rejoinder to the Putnam-Searle trivialisation objections is to point out
that the state-transitions taken into consideration do not support counterfactuals33.
Putnam's triviality arguments employ only material conditionals in describing state-
transitions, which have no modal force. However, a theory of concrete computation is
concerned not only with occurring state-transitions, but also with non-occurring ones.
The state-transitions must support counterfactuals of the form `if T were to enter
physical state a then it would transition to physical state b'34. The proof presented in
section 3.1 does not go through if we have these stronger state-transition conditionals
in mind. For the arbitrary system to which the computational description is mapped is
open, and vulnerable to all sorts of external interference. Any interference, even of an
atomic particle, would change the overall physical state of the system and its behaviour.
Putnam's proposed mapping is silent on these alternative trajectories in state-space of




34Copeland (1996), Rescorla (2014a).
35Chalmers (1996).
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Most theories that take route (c) add factors that support counterfactuals, such as
dispositions, causality, functional role. Chalmers' view is based on causal organisation.
A physical system implements a certain computation when its causal transitions mirror
the state-transitions of the formal description, i.e. when its causal structure mirrors
the formal structure of the computation36. In other words, a computation is simply an
abstract speciﬁcation of causal organisation37.
There are worries that at least for what regards inputless FSAs the appeal to caus-
ality is not enough to avoid trivialisation arguments38. The same worries apply to
FSAs with weak inputs and outputs, while FSAs with strong inputs and outputs are
arguably not liable to triviality arguments39. At any rate, Chalmers (1996, 2011) ar-
gues that the FSA is not adequate as a computational formalism for cognitive science.
As we have seen, FSAs have monadic states  there is no structure to their internal
states. The formalism is implausible as a computational description of computers and
cognitive systems, systems that have considerable internal complexity relevant to their
computational capacities.
Chalmers suggests that Combinatorial-State Automata, or CSAs, are the appropri-
ate computational formalism for computer and cognitive science40. Contrary to FSAs,
at any point in time CSAs are in a structured combinatorial state described by a vector
[S1, ..., Sn]. Each Si is a separate component of the automaton, and it can be in one of
a ﬁnite number of states. The states of the components are thus substates of the whole
automaton. State-transitions are described as going from vectors of inputs and internal
states to vectors of internal states and outputs, [I1, ..., Ik], [S1, ..., Sk]  [S'1, ..., S'k],
[O1, ..., Ol]. CSAs have complex internal structure, and are thereby in a better position
accurately to describe complex systems such as computers and brains.
Brieﬂy, for a physical system to implement a CSA there must be a decomposition of
it into independent elements41 in substates whose causally-mediated state-transitions
map onto the substates and state-transitions of the elements determined by the CSA
description42. The recourse to internal structure makes the requirements on the im-
plementing physical system much more demanding than in the case of FSAs. Causal,
counterfactual-supporting state-transitions must be appropriate for all the substates of
the physical system so that they can count as implementing a CSA. It does not suﬃce
that a system be suﬃciently complex in order to implement a computation, as per the
36Chalmers (1995, 2011).
37Chalmers (1995, p. 396), Chalmers (2011, p. 331.).
38See Chalmers (1996), Sprevak (2012).
39Chalmers (2012, pp. 236-7.)
40In his (2012), Chalmers endorses Milkowski's (2011) suggestion of replacing CSAs with Abstract-
State Machines, or ASMs. Nothing of moment for our limited purposes follows from this, so I will
ignore this recent change of mind.
41As Sprevak (2012, p. 138) points out, this requirement plays an important role in avoiding trivi-
alisation arguments insofar as it keeps CSAs from being reducible to FSAs. Chalmers cashes it out as
a matter of spatial distinctness, which is admittedly problematic, given that it rules out from the ac-
count computational systems that use spatially overlapping components to perform computations. The
account lacks a satisfying way of determining what counts as an independent element in the physical
system, as we will see below.
42For a formal characterisation see Chalmers (1995, p. 394), Chalmers (1996, p. 325), Chalmers
(2011, p. 329.)
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simple mapping account. The implementing system must have the right complexity.
The causal goings-on inside the system must mirror in a ﬁne-grained way the detailed
computational description of a CSA. The causal mapping view based on the CSA form-
alism puts triviality worries to rest: few systems will have the required ﬁne-grained
causal structure required for implementing a CSA.
However, even though concrete computation is in most interesting cases not trivial,
pancomputationalism still ensues, albeit of a limited sort. On this view, every phys-
ical system implements at least one computation, described by a single state FSA. As
the causal complexity of a system increases, it implements more and more complex
computations, as well as the simpler ones. But it is not true, as it is for the simple
mapping account, that every physical system implements every computation. Rather,
complex computations described by CSAs are implemented by few systems. Therefore,
computational implementation is not a trivial matter, and appeal to computation is not
vacuous  while claiming that a system implements a simple FSA may be trivial, to
say that a physical system implements a complex enough computation, on the other
hand, is to make a substantial claim.
Chalmers' causal mapping view of concrete computation avoids unlimited pancom-
putationalism and embraces in its stead limited pancomputationalism43. While it is
not true that every system implements every computation, as the Putnam-Searle trivi-
ality arguments would want, every physical system performs at least one computation.
However, whether a physical system implements a complex computation is far from
trivial.
In this sophisticated causal mapping theory, computational descriptions capture the
abstract causal organisation of a system, what Chalmers (2011) calls its `causal topo-
logy'. It is abstract insofar as it leaves behind the physical nature of the elements in
the system, focusing exclusively on their causal relations. Two systems made out of
radically diﬀerent components, such as empty beer tins and silicon chips, can have the
same abstract causal structure  the same causal topology  as long as the structures
of causal relations between their elements are the same. Computational descriptions
capture this similarity: two such systems implement the same computation. Computa-
tional explanation is causal explanation that abstracts away from the physical details of
the system under investigation. In some cases, such as that of computers and perhaps
cognitive systems, this is a relevant, if not the most relevant, type of explanation.
Chalmers' view is promising in that it signiﬁcantly improves on the simple mapping
view of computation in ways that do not endanger its naturalistic status. Nonetheless,
it has been the target of various serious criticisms44. I will only examine some of the
shortcomings of the view, the ones that strike me as most cogent.
First, as for the simple mapping account, no constraints are placed on how to select
and group the states of the physical system to be mapped onto the computational de-
scription. The only requirement is that the substates of the physical system be values
43As does Scheutz's (1999) causal mapping account.
44See articles in the Journal of Cognitive Science, from vol. 12, issue 4, to vol. 13, issue 3, for
comments and Chalmers' reply. See also Scheutz (2001), Shagrir (2012b), Rescorla (2013).
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of independent, separate components of the system, understood as spatially distinct45.
Though Chalmers occasionally ﬂirts with appeals to naturalness in order to block po-
tential trivialisation arguments that may exploit arbitrary groupings of physical states,
as he himself admits these appeals are rather vague and obscure. At any rate, he claims
that there is some inevitability in the appeal to naturalness in understanding the notion
of implementation46. This move is tantamount to accepting an obscure notion at the
basis of the account  a notion, furthermore, that is supposed to play an important role
in blocking the triviality objections that were the main motivation for complementing
the simple mapping account to start with. Therefore, desideratum (i) on theories of im-
plementation, i.e. that the notion of concrete computation be clariﬁed, is endangered.
If alternative theories of concrete computation are available that do not have recourse
to vague appeals to naturalness (or to other similarly obscure notions), they should be
preferred to the foregoing causal mapping account.
These considerations also lead to a related worry. No constraint on the relevant
causal levels is proposed. A complex physical system will thus perform several compu-
tations at the same time  from the more complex to the simpler ones  and will do
so for each of its causal levels, from the atomic to the molecular to the macroscopic. Ac-
cording to the foregoing theory, any complex system will perform a signiﬁcant amount
of diﬀerent computations at the same time. How to choose which one to attribute to
the system47?
Chalmers accepts that any complex physical system performs multiple computations
at the same time, and admits that this may lead to some interest-relativity of computa-
tion. A physical system has many diﬀerent causal structures, corresponding to diﬀerent
ways of grouping states of the system into state-types48, and each of these structures
implements diﬀerent computations. Which causal level to focus on, and which compu-
tation performed at that level to attribute to the system will depend on the explanatory
interests brought to bear from case to case49. This is to some extent analogous to the
move recommended by the pragmatist, but with a crucial diﬀerence: the pragmatist
accepted the triviality of computation, while Chalmers does not. While the pragmatist
had to appeal to explanatory interests in order to save attribution of computational
states and processes from being vacuous, the appeal to explanatory interests in the
foregoing theory is doing much less work. The claim that a physical system performs
a (complex) computation (or several) is not trivial as it was in the simple mapping
account.
Nevertheless, we still get the counterintuitive result that a complex enough physical
system implements a large number of computations  rocks, walls, and pails of water
included. Consider once again the rich causal goings-on inside a wall. In the macro-
45Which is in itself problematic. See footnote (41).
46Chalmers (2012, p. 237.)
47Piccinini (2015, pp. 22-3.)
48Chalmers (2012, p. 230.)
49Scheutz (2001) proposes a somewhat diﬀerent solution to the problem: he claims that concrete
computation is relative to a given physical theory which determines beforehand the appropriate group-
ings of states. This move, however, when applied to concrete computation in the cognitive sciences
introduces worries similar to the ones examined in section 3.2.
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scopic level, it will likely implement only simple computations at particular intervals of
time, such as one-state FSAs. On the molecular level the implemented computations
will be more complex, and arguably even more so at the atomic level. Therefore, on
Chalmers' causal mapping view, we should objectively attribute complex computations
to relatively simple physical systems. This, as well as the limited pancomputationalism
that characterises the view, is at odds with desideratum (ii) on theories of concrete
computation: the account does not narrow down the domain of computational systems,
setting them apart from non-computational systems.
It must be said that this is no decisive reason to reject the causal mapping view.
By embracing pancomputationalism, proponents of the theory are indeed repudiating
(ii). However, alternative accounts that respect that plausible desideratum should be
preferred. As Piccinini (2015, p. 55) notes, our sciences generally assume that there
is a diﬀerence between systems that are computational, and systems that are not 
computer science, for instance, is dedicated to the study of very special systems, not
rocks, walls, and pails of water. A less revisionary view of computation would therefore
be superior to the foregoing, ceteris paribus.
The failure of Chalmers' theory of implementation to respect desideratum (ii) might
have yet another source: the view arguably does not diﬀerentiate between causal and
computational explanation50. As we have seen, computational explanation, on the
foregoing, is nothing more than an abstract form of causal explanation, one in which
the physical details are left behind, and only the structure of causal relations between
elements is brought to the fore. The causal mapping account denies the distinctiveness
of computational explanation  computational explanations are available whenever
causal explanations are.
This is true only to some extent, however. Even though every system performs
computations, only in some cases computational explanations provide appropriate ex-
planations of the behaviour of physical systems. Computational explanations are suit-
able for explaining the behaviour of physical systems for which the physical details are
not relevant. Computational explanations of digestion are not cogent  even though
the digestive system performs computations  because to explain digestion we cannot
abstract away from the physical nature of the elements instantiating the causal struc-
ture51. Digestion only takes place when speciﬁc types of material participate in the
process. A description of its causal topology does not explain how food gets digested.
Therefore computational explanation is, at least to some extent, distinct from causal
explanation. The latter may be appropriate whenever the former is, but the converse
is not true.
The account also has trouble handling desideratum (iv), namely the normativity of
computation. With its strong reliance on causal processes, which are not normative, it
seems that the view lacks the tools necessary to make sense of the notion of miscompu-
tation. What we would generally consider a malfunctioning computer is, by the causal
theorist lights, simply performing a diﬀerent computation than the one we had expec-
50Piccinini (2008a, 2015), Ladyman (2009).
51Chalmers (2011, p. 332.)
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ted. Therefore, it looks like normativity can enter the picture only in a non-naturalistic
way, i.e. by means of the intentions and expectations of human beings who impose that
certain computations be seen as `correct'  and deviant ones as miscomputations.
In sum, Chalmers' causal mapping account of concrete computation is markedly
superior to the simple mapping account. It avoids trivialisation of concrete computa-
tion, as well as vacuity of computational ascription, without having recourse to interest-
relative considerations, as did the pragmatist. Hence it satisﬁes desideratum (iii), which
the pragmatic view endangers. However, the view has problems with the other three
desiderata. Though it avoids unlimited pancomputationalism, it makes every physical
system into a computational system, ﬂouting (ii). Furthermore, the appeal to vague
naturalness considerations52, even though limited, jeopardises (i). Finally, it lacks the
tools to account for the normativity of computation in naturalistic terms. Therefore,
despite the progress made in comparison to the simple mapping account and the prag-
matic view, the reﬁned causal mapping view of concrete computation exhibits several
reasons for dissatisfaction. Let us turn, for now, to the opposite side of the fracture
and see whether appeal to semantic properties can provide a more satisfying account of
concrete computation.
3.3.2 The semantic view of computation
Proponents of the semantic view of concrete computation claim that computation essen-
tially involves representation: to compute is to manipulate states endowed with some
form of content. In the dialogue with defenders of non-semantic theories, four main
strands of argument in favour of the semantic view can be identiﬁed:
Descriptive accuracy the semantic view is more truthful to the practices of computer
and cognitive scientists, both historically and currently.
Explanatory adequacy the semantic view oﬀers an account of concrete computation
that is more suitable to the purposes of computer and cognitive science than
non-semantic views.
No pancomputationalism the semantic view avoids both unlimited and limited pan-
computationalism, as it denies that all physical systems are computational. Only
systems that represent can be computational.
No multiplicity of computations the semantic view provides the tools to curb mul-
tiplicity of simultaneously implemented computations, and ascribes unique com-
putational descriptions to the systems of interest.
I will brieﬂy examine each of these argumentative strands.
52There is also an appeal to `normal background conditions' in order to block trivialisation, which is
similarly problematic. See Chalmers (2012, p. 235.)
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Arguments from descriptive accuracy
Arguments that hinge on descriptive accuracy considerations are moved by, among
others, Peacocke (1994), Sprevak (2010), Rescorla (2012b, 2013)53. The claim is that
computer and cognitive scientists understand computation as essentially involving rep-
resentation. Therefore the semantic view is superior to the non-semantic one insofar
as it is not revisionary about the conceptions and practices of these scientiﬁc ﬁelds. In
the case of computer science, it is often claimed that Turing's original notion of compu-
tation is essentially representational54. Moreover, register machines and implemented
programmes, it is argued, also require positing states endowed with representational
content55. Analogously, computational explanation in the cognitive sciences is seen as
having recourse to representation.
The matter is extremely controversial: proponents of non-semantic views ﬂatly deny
that computer and cognitive science work with a notion of concrete computation that
essentially involves semantic properties56. The dispute is particularly complex to as-
sess, given that non-semantic views deny only that computation necessarily involves
representation, while being open to representation playing an important role in many
cases. So examples in which computer and cognitive scientists employ or seem to em-
ploy representational talk in their endeavours is not enough to tip the balance toward
the semantic side, as they are compatible with the claims of both sides.
Furthermore, it is diﬃcult to aﬃrm, when perusing the scientiﬁc literature, whether
the notion of representation is playing a constitutive role in characterising concrete
computation, or is taken to be accidental, or even merely metaphorical, or heuristic  a
way for us to understand and keep track of what is going in the computational system.
Interpretation of the founding fathers of computational theory as using a semantic
vs. a non-semantic view of computational individuation is fraught with these same
diﬃculties. Finally, the predominance from the early days of the semantic view as
the default framework in the cognitive sciences cannot be taken to be an argument
in its favour. Its detractors may reject the case for the better descriptive accuracy of
the semantic view by arguing that it was simply the assumed, unquestioned paradigm.
Critical scrutiny may show that appeal to contentful states is doing no essential work,
at least for what regards individuating computational processes and states.
Therefore, I take the argument from descriptive accuracy to be at best inconclusive.
Arguments from explanatory adequacy
Advocates of the semantic view often invoke the putative superiority of their account
over non-semantic theories with respect to its explanatory adequacy both in computer
and cognitive science57. Sprevak (2010) claims that non-semantic views cannot accom-
53In the case of Rescorla, who does not subscribe to neither non-semantic nor semantic views of
computation, this line of argument is used to attack non-semantic views.
54Peacocke (1994, p. 320), Peacocke (1999, pp. 197-8), Sprevak (2010, p. 268).
55Rescorla (2012b, 2014b).
56For instance, see Chalmers (2011, p. 334), Piccinini (2008a, pp. 211ﬀ.), Rescorla (2014b, p. 1298),
Piccinini (2015, pp. 125-6).
57See Peacocke (1994, 1999), Sprevak (2010), O'Brien (2011).
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modate the possibility of two very diﬀerent systems performing input-output equivalent
computations. Imagine, Sprevak suggests, one system that takes two Roman numerals,
and outputs another Roman numeral; and another system that takes two Arabic nu-
merals, and outputs another Arabic numeral58. Suppose further that both systems are
computing the addition function. Since the two systems are working with diﬀerent in-
puts, outputs and, importantly, diﬀerent mathematical notation, the physical goings-on
will substantially diﬀer in their performance of the addition function.
Sprevak claims that the only way to see the two systems as computing the same
function is by characterising inputs and outputs in terms of what they represent. There
may be nothing else that the inputs and outputs of the two systems have in common,
nothing non-semantic that could reveal the two systems as being input-output equival-
ent, i.e. as computing the same function59. The semantic view is the only one able to
capture this important similarity between the two systems. Therefore, Sprevak claims,
it should be preferred over non-semantic views, which make such similarity invisible.
While Sprevak places the weight of the argument on the non-semantic diﬀerences
between the inputs and outputs of the two systems, and on the exclusive capacity of
the semantic view to capture their similarity, I think that the diﬀerence in notation is
also important. Such a diﬀerence motivates the rejoinder from the proponent of non-
semantic views. Given the diﬀerence in notation, the two systems will have to go through
diﬀerent causal processes in order correctly to compute addition. The algorithms em-
ployed over Roman and Arabic numerals will be diﬀerent, the state-transitions will be
distinct. It seems thereby that the two systems are performing diﬀerent computations,
even though they are both computing addition60. Furthermore, the non-semanticist ar-
gues, it is the ﬁner-grained level that matters for computer science  it is at this level
that algorithms and computational processes are precisely characterised. On knowing
only that a system computes addition, we still ignore how it does so. And the `how'
question is the one of most interest to computer scientists.
The semanticist can fall back to the view that their account is more appropriate
to the explanatory purposes of the cognitive sciences61. The argument is nicely formu-
lated by Peacocke (1994, p. 304): It looks for all the world as if much theorising in
psychology attempts to explain particular intentional, content-involving properties of
a subject [...] Yet oﬀering computational explanations of these intentional properties
would just involve a mistake of principle, if the non-semantic view of computation is
correct. The point is intuitive enough: cognitive science is interested in explaining
representational capacities of organisms; thereby non-semantic computational explana-
58Take the numerals as mere physical shapes, deprived of representational content.
59Piccinini (2008a, p. 223) dubs this line of argumentation `argument from the identity of computed
functions'.
60See Piccinini (2008a, pp. 223-225) for another argument against this line of attack. Piccinini argues
that while the semantically-individuated computed functions will be the same, at a ﬁner-grained, string-
theoretic level the computed functions are diﬀerent  in the former, the systems are IO-equivalent; in
the latter, they are not. According to Piccinini, it is the latter that is of interest to computer scientists,
and, moreover, it must be presupposed in order to allow the former, semantic understanding.
61See Peacocke (1994, 1999). Piccinini (2008a) calls this line of defense `argument from the identity
of mental states'.
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tion, with its silence on representational properties, seems ill-suited to that aim. The
acceptance of externalism about content, a rather common view, provides an additional,
related argument: cognitive science is interested in explaining representational capacit-
ies of organisms; representational capacities are externally-individuated; non-semantic
computational explanation is putatively internalist62; therefore the non-semantic view
is ill-suited for the purposes of cognitive science.
It is easy to see that the argument is wrong-headed63. It assumes that in order to
explain a certain property the explanans must also feature that property. But this is
clearly absurd. The explanation of why certain substances have the property of liquid-
ity under certain conditions makes no reference to liquid molecules, nor the explanation
of how certain substances have certain colours under certain conditions makes refer-
ence to coloured molecules, or coloured neurons. In the ﬁrst example, the property
is (weakly) emergent, while in the second, it can be seen as both (weakly) emergent
and relational64. There are plenty of other cases in the sciences in which the explanans
does not possess the property that is (part of) the explanandum. There is no reason
to believe that semantic properties are an exception. Indeed, theories that naturalise
content try exactly to explain semantic properties in non-semantic terms65.
Despite the failure of the argument above, a case can still be made that the semantic
view of concrete computation meets the explanatory needs of the cognitive sciences bet-
ter than its competitors. As Sprevak's example of the two addition machines shows, ap-
peal to representation captures commonalities that are invisible to non-semantic views.
Therefore, the former allows generalisations that the latter does not66. The semantic
view can put in the same category a diversity of systems with diﬀerent architectures,
algorithms, and notations by underlining how they all compute the same function. This
kind of generalisation seems particularly appropriate for cognitive science, since in many
cases fruitful explanations of behaviour abstract away from the speciﬁc algorithms im-
plemented, as well as the causal and functional properties of cognitive systems. Ants
and desert rats are both capable of path integration, even though they might not imple-
ment the same ﬁne-grained computations. The semantic view captures the similarity of
the two organisms  they both compute the direct path from a certain location back
home  while non-semantic views miss it. This sort of similarity is especially interest-
ing for (some branches) of the cognitive sciences. Consequently, we should embrace a
view of concrete computation sensitive to it.
I think that this line of argument from explanatory adequacy is particularly prom-
ising. The appeal to generalisations that only semantic individuation of states provides
is cogent, insofar as such generalisations are the bread-and-butter of cognitive science.
62This premise is particularly problematic, as some non-semantic views of computational explanation
have recourse to functional considerations that are not internalistic. See chapter 4.
63See Egan (1995, 1999), Piccinini (2008a).
64Depending, of course, on one's favourite metaphysics of colour.
65The counter-argument I am oﬀering in this paragraph is stronger than it need be to secure the
rejection of the semanticist argument. It suﬃces to counter, as Egan and Piccinini point out, that the
fact that the explanandum is individuated in a certain way (i.e., semantically) does not entail that the
explanans must be similarly individuated.
66See Peacocke (1999), Rescorla (2013).
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Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether these are computational generalisations,
rather than something else. If, as I believe to be correct, computational explanations
bring light not only to what the system is doing, but also to how it is doing it, the
generalisations above, though useful, are not of the right ﬁne-grainedness to count as
computational67. This does not expel such generalisations from cognitive science, but
rather makes clear that computational explanation does not exhaust its explanatory
tools. Representational explanation can also be fruitful, as it nicely captures some in-
teresting generalisations. Nonetheless, it misses the causal and functional details that
are the focus of computational explanation. Both forms of explanation are of cent-
ral importance to the cognitive sciences, and are not incompatible. At any rate, the
`argument from appropriate generalisations' fails to undermine non-semantic views of
concrete computation  it merely points to the fact that computational explanation is
one useful form of explanation, but not the only one: representational explanation also
has a role to play.
Analogous considerations can be made about the role of representation in com-
puter science. Advocates of the semantic view point out that the non-semantic view
would entail that much discourse in computer science  which routinely involves ap-
peal to semantic properties  is either wrong or misleading, thus failing with respect
to descriptive accuracy. The non-semanticist, I believe, can accept a role for semantic
properties in computer science, but resist the semanticist claim that those properties
are involved in the individuation of computations. Representational explanation can
be fruitful not only in cognitive science, but also in computer science. However, for
the reasons adduced above, it should be kept distinct from computational explanation
proper.
Arguments from explanatory adequacy, both for what regards computer science and
cognitive science, are hence problematic at best. They fail to provide a good motivation
to choose the semantic view of concrete computation over non-semantic views. What
is more, when applied to computer science, the attack seems to backﬁre.
Arguments from pancomputationalism
As we have seen in section 3.1 and section 3.3.1, non-semantic views of concrete compu-
tation struggle with pancomputationalism, the claim that everything is a computational
system. Simple mapping accounts lead to unlimited pancomputationalism  every sys-
tem performs every computation  and causal mapping accounts, such as Chalmers',
result in limited pancomputationalism  every system performs at least one compu-
tation. The former is extremely problematic, though it arguably may not be fatal to
computational explanation under a pragmatist approach. The latter is also problem-
atic, insofar as it makes everything into a computational system. Furthermore, causal
mapping views appeal to obscure notions such as `naturalness' and `normal conditions'
to keep at bay the risk of being themselves trivialised.
The semantic view seems to have a quick and easy solution to the non-semanti-
67See Piccinini (2008a), Chalmers (2012).
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cist's predicament. Only systems endowed with semantic properties compute, whereby
pancomputationalism is avoided68. Rocks, walls, pails of water do not represent and
are not, therefore, candidates for being computational systems. The semantic view
of concrete computation would thus triumph where the non-semanticists foundered:
it is able to drive a wedge between computational and non-computational systems,
vindicating desideratum (ii).
This is of course not only quick, but too quick. First, we need a notion of rep-
resentation that is less liberal than the non-semanticist's notion of computation. If
everything represents, then everything  by the semanticist's lights  computes. Pan-
computationalism is back, accompanied by panrepresentationalism. The defender of
the semantic view, if they want to appeal to the `no-pancomputationalism' argument,
must thus reject overly liberal notions of representation, such as some versions of inter-
pretational semantics, pure indicator theories, or theories that rely on liberal functional
considerations 69. Proponents of the semantic view must rely on stronger, non-liberal
theories of representation if they want to avoid pancomputationalism.
The problem of liberality that applies to the main theories of representation in the
literature, as we saw in Part I, becomes relevant here. Ramsey (2007) and Morgan
(2014) cast doubt on the adequacy of mainstream theories of representation (and their
application to cognitive science) insofar as they fail to distinguish representations from
mere causal mediators. If representation is equated with the latter, as seems the case
in much philosophy and cognitive science, representation, beside losing its explanatory
distinctiveness, becomes widespread. Some form of panrepresentationalism follows and
consequently, the semantic view of concrete computation falls prey to pancomputation-
alism as well.
The problems with the notion of representation point to a general shortcoming of the
semantic view. For it appeals to a as yet poorly understood notion in order to ground
an account of concrete computation. As such, it introduces considerable obscurity at
the heart of the theory, ﬂouting desideratum (i). Moreover, it makes the success of the
view depend on the success of a theory of representation. Finally, the semantic view
closes oﬀ, on pain of circularity, one potential route for accounting for representation,
namely, grounding it in the notion of computation70.
Grush (2001) recognises the problems with the appeal to representation in explaining
concrete computation, and claims that some mainstream theories of content available,
i.e. informational semantics and teleosemantics, are `unworkable'71. There may be,
of course, other candidates72. At any rate, anything resembling a consensus on an
adequate naturalistic theory of representation for the cognitive sciences is as yet, after
68See Peacocke (1994), Grush (2001), Ladyman (2009), Rescorla (2013).
69See Ramsey (2007).
70As we will see in Part III, this limitation is particularly troublesome insofar as there are good
reasons to hold that this is a particularly promising approach to understanding representation.
71See Piccinini (2015, sec. 3.2) for an argument that four inﬂuential theories of representation, i.e.
conceptual role semantics, interpretational semantics, informational semantics, and teleosemantics, are
all unsuitable for underpinning a semantic view of concrete computation. He argues that they all must
presuppose non-semantic criteria for computational individuation on pain of crippling shortcomings.
72Such as Grush's own theory of representation, developed in his (2004).
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several decades of philosophical eﬀorts, not in the horizon.
These general considerations are not decisive reasons to abandon the semantic view,
though. Rescorla (2013, p. 693) argues that we do not need to wait for a successful
naturalistic reduction of semantic properties in order to use them in informing our
scientiﬁc theories and practices  the explanatory fruitfulness of appealing to those
properties suﬃces to justify their deployment in scientiﬁc theorising. Even though
I agree with Rescorla on this point, it remains true that the obscurity of semantic
properties does undermine the semantic view of concrete computation, and makes it
less desirable when compared to non-semantic accounts, if any, that meet the four
desiderata above.
In sum, the solution to pancomputationalism proposed by the semantic view is
quick and easy only in the surface. A suitably non-liberal theory of representation
need be provided. This points to a general shortcoming of the semantic view: using
representation to explain computation seems to be a bad move inasmuch as the notion
of representation seems to be even more problematic than that of concrete computation.
This is not a knock-down argument against semantic views, as it may well turn out that
computation essentially involves semantic properties, representation thereby being as
important a notion for an account of concrete computation as it is to cognitive science.
However, all things equal, non-semantic views would have the upper hand if they manage
to appropriately explain computation without appeal to representation.
Arguments from multiplicity of computation
To conclude this brief examination of arguments for the semantic view of concrete
computation  and against non-semantic views thereof  I will examine the line that
I take to be the most promising defense of the semantic view, and the strongest threat
to non-semantic views. The idea behind the argument is straighforward. Non-semantic
views lead to multiplicity of computation, i.e. computational systems perform more
than one computation at the same time. However, in both computer and cognitive
science, we want to focus on speciﬁc computations that are explanatory of the behaviour
of systems. Therefore, we need semantic properties to narrow down adequately the
computations that systems perform.
Sprevak (2010) oﬀers an illustration of the problem confronting non-semantic views73.
Consider a logic gate that takes two inputs, and produces one output. The inputs and
outputs can be either voltage 0V, or voltage 5V. Suppose that the logic gate outputs 5V
if and only if the two inputs are 5V, and 0V otherwise. As Sprevak points out, there is
no way to decide whether the logic gate is computing the logical function AND or the
logical function OR. It all depends on which voltage is taken to mean `1' or `true', and
which voltage is taken to mean `0' or `false'. If 5V = 1, we have an AND-gate, if 5V = 0,
we have an OR-gate. It seems to follow that unless semantic properties are brought to
bear  i.e. what each voltage represents  it is impossible to distinguish AND- from
OR-gates. The distinction is crucial to computer science, as complex computational
73See also Ladyman (2009).
80
devices are built from large quantities of logic gates wired together in speciﬁc ways so
as to compute complex logical functions. Any account of concrete computation that
fails to do justice to these `basic distinctions' is hence in trouble.
Shagrir (1999, 2001, 2012a,b) has put forward a related argument74. By taking phys-
ical systems implementing logic gates to be tri-stable rather than bi-stable we also reach
the conclusion that the same system implements diﬀerent logic gates. Computational
systems are built in such a way as to respond to voltage intervals, rather than precise
voltages. This is motivated by the noise intrinsic to such systems, making the attain-
ment of precise voltages diﬃcult and error-prone. Consider again the physical system
presented in the above paragraph, with the diﬀerence that its inputs and outputs are
values inside certain voltage intervals. Shagrir points out that voltage intervals can be
diﬀerently grouped, making the system tri-stable. Suppose that the system outputs a
voltage in the interval 5V-10V if and only if both its inputs are voltages in the inter-
val 5V-10V. In addition, it outputs voltages in the interval 0V-2.5V iﬀ both its inputs
are voltages in the interval 0V-2.5V; and it outputs voltages in the interval 2.5V-5V
otherwise. If we take voltages in the interval 2.5V-10V to represent `1' or `true', and
voltages in the interval 0V-2.5V to represent `0' or `false', the system is implementing an
OR-gate. However, a diﬀerent grouping of voltage intervals (0V-5V/5V-10V) makes so
that the system implements an AND-gate, as in the preceding paragraph. Once again,
we have dual logic gates  two logic gates implemented in the same physical system.
With Shagrir's method, other dual logic gates can be built, such as XOR/NAND-gates,
and even two diﬀerent AND-gates75!
There appears to be no way of deciding which logical function a logic gate is com-
puting by means of purely non-semantic considerations. It seems that the only way to
rule out dual logic gates is by means of their semantic properties. When certain voltages
represent certain values, such as `true' or `false', the ambiguity is solved. Therefore, the
argument goes, computational individuation must rely on semantic properties.
The argument from multiplicity of computations represents a crucial challenge to
non-semantic theories of concrete computation. In section 4.4, I will provide a solution,
which helps shift the debate in favour of non-semantic over semantic theories. This will
require ﬁrst exploring, and amending, a particularly promising non-semantic view of
concrete computation  the mechanistic view. The next two chapters will consist of a
presentation and defense of the mechanistic view, which will in Part III play a decisive
role in grounding the deﬂated notion of representation that I want to put forward.
3.4 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, I have presented the problem of making sense of concrete computation,
and stressed its importance for the foundations of the cognitive sciences. Cognitive sci-
ence, as well as the engineering branches of computer science, need a satisfying account
of what it is for a physical system to perform a computation, what it is to compute
74See also Rescorla (2013).
75See Shagrir (2012b, pp. 141-2).
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`in the wild'76. In the next chapter, I will present and defend an amended version of a
recent non-semantic view of concrete computation, formulated by Gualtiero Piccinini,
Marcin Milkowski, and Nir Fresco: the mechanistic account. I will argue that it is more
successful than its competitors in satisfying the four desiderata. I will moreover argue
that it evades arguments from multiplicity of computations. Treatment of the mechan-
istic view will conclude my analysis of theories of concrete computation, which will later
on prove useful when tackling, once again, the problem of cognitive representation.
76The expression comes from Fresco (2014).
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Chapter 4
The Mechanistic View of Concrete
Computation
The neo-mechanist approach to explanation in science has become increasingly popular
in the past years, with successful applications in biology, psychology, and neuroscience.
In many cases, New Mechanism has proved to be a promising framework for cashing
out how explanations in the special sciences work, and what they should look like. In
this chapter, I examine one of the applications of the neo-mechanistic framework: the
mechanistic view of concrete computation. The attempt to use the tools provided by
New Mechanism to account for computation in physical systems has been developed
most forcefully by Piccinini (2007b, 2015), Milkowski (2013), and Fresco (2014). The
fruits to reap should this endeavour be successful are very signiﬁcant: extending a
fruitful approach to scientiﬁc theorising to a domain, computation, that has so far
resisted satisfactory naturalisation, and remains problematic when appealed to in sci-
entiﬁc explanations. The mechanistic view of concrete computation may provide the
much sought-after satisfactory theory of computational individuation and implementa-
tion, succeeding where the accounts examined in the previous chapter failed.
The abstract nature of computational explanation introduces a tension in the neo-
mechanistic framework, as Haimovici (2013) has pointed out. For one of the deﬁn-
ing characteristics of New Mechanism is its insistence on the importance of providing
some degree of structural detail about the mechanisms that contribute to explaining
phenomena. This requirement seems to be at odds with the abstractness typical of
computational explanation. Hence computational mechanists ﬁnd themselves in a di-
lemma: either computational explanation is essentially incomplete, or by enriching it
with structural detail, we lose its peculiarity, and in particular its medium-independence
and multiple realisability.
After presenting the neo-mechanistic framework, and going into detail on its account
of concrete computation, I will try and dispel that apparent tension. This involves
amending how the mechanistic view of concrete computation is conceived in the exist-
ing literature, especially for what regards the role played by the appeal to mechanism.
I will argue that New Mechanism makes an essential contribution to our understanding
of concrete computation, though for reasons other than the ones normally adduced by
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computational mechanists. My approach to the mechanistic view of concrete computa-
tion has beneﬁcial consequences for other central debates in philosophy of computation.
The argument from multiplicity of computations, I show, can be dealt with satisfactorily
within a non-semantic framework.
Suitably amended, the mechanistic view of computation, I will argue in Part III,
can provide the basis for a deﬂated notion of representation. Before going back to
representation, however, I will need to delve into the issue of teleological function, a
central feature in the mechanistic account, on which its cogency hinges. Teleological
functions will be the topic of the next chapter.
Here is how I proceed in this chapter. In section 4.1, I brieﬂy introduce the neo-
mechanist approach to scientiﬁc explanation, opting for one of its most general formu-
lations. I then present the mechanistic view of concrete computation, in particular as
developed by Gualtiero Piccinini, in section 4.2, also bringing to the fore the apparent
tension that I aim to dissolve. Next, in section 4.3, I examine Haimovici's objection
to the view, which invites a ready reply by the computational mechanist. The reply
is unsuccessful against a related worry, and two strategies to answer the challenge are
available. The ﬁrst accepts the terms of the debate set by Haimovici, rendering the
recourse to mechanism trivial, and causing the mechanistic view to collapse onto a
purely functional view. The second strategy rejects the terms of the debate, embraces
the view that computational individuation is functional, but keeps an important role
for mechanism in an account of concrete computation  thereby justifying the label
`mechanistic view'. Finally, section 4.4 tackles Dewhurst's (2016) theory of compu-
tational individuation, and explores some positive consequences my approach has to
issues regarding computational equivalence. In particular, I argue that in accepting my
proposal about how to understand the mechanistic view of concrete computation, one
of the most powerful arguments against non-semantic theories  the argument from
the multiplicity of computations  is put to rest.
4.1 Mechanistic explanation
The neo-mechanicist approach to explanation in science has become increasingly popular
in the 16 years since the publication of what may be seen as the manifesto of New
Mechanism (Machamer et al. 2000). Though elements of the framework were already
being discussed by the likes of William Bechtel and Stuart Glennan, and hints of it can
be found even earlier, e.g. in work by Jerry Fodor and Robert Cummins, it was with the
publication of the 2000 paper by Machamer, Darden, and Craver  often abbreviated
in `MDC'  that the neo-mechanistic approach burgeoned.
A substantial part of the motivation for this movement in the philosophy of science
stems from the greater attention paid by philosophers to the workings of the special
sciences, such as biology, and the cognitive sciences. The theories of scientiﬁc explan-
ation available, such as Carl Hempel's and Wesley Salmon's, tailored as they were to
physics, are found wanting when applied to the special sciences. Diﬀerent types of ques-
tions, diﬀerent answers, and diﬀerent explanations are sought in the latter, setting them
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apart from physics, its explanatory methods and needs. Rather than looking for laws
of nature, which arguably do not exist in their ﬁelds, biologists and cognitive scient-
ists are interested in uncovering the mechanisms that produce and/or sustain a certain
phenomenon or ability. Explanation in the special sciences, in this picture, proceeds by
breaking up the phenomenon to be explained into its component parts, what they do,
and how they are organised, i.e. by unveiling the underlying mechanism that produces,
and sustains the phenomenon.
The notion of mechanism, in philosophy as much as in the sciences, is used in
importantly diﬀerent ways, with diﬀerent theoretical targets in view1. My focus is on
New Mechanism as a framework for understanding explanation in the (special) sciences2.
Other uses of the notion, e.g. as the basis for an account of causation3, do not concern
me here. One can be a proponent of mechanistic explanation while holding a non-
mechanistic theory of causation, such as manipulability theory4.
Within the domain of theories of scientiﬁc explanation, the notion of mechanism has
been diﬀerently cashed out by diﬀerent theorists. These diﬀerent ways of understanding
mechanism have consequences for what can be covered by a mechanistic account 
e.g. must mechanisms involve regularities, or can there be one-oﬀ mechanisms; must
they be stable or may they be ephemeral; must they be systems, or can their parts
be loosely connected? The answers to these (and other) questions help determine the
scope of the mechanistic account of explanation: for instance, if there cannot be one-oﬀ
mechanisms, most explanations in History cannot be mechanistic5; and if mechanisms
must be systems, many explanations in Physics are ruled out6.
For my purposes the debate on the characteristics of mechanisms are of secondary
importance, though some issues will arise in what follows, especially regarding abstrac-
tion from details in mechanistic explanation7. I endorse an inclusive notion of what
mechanisms are, put forward by Illari & Williamson (2012, p. 120). They propose a
characterisation of mechanism that ensures general applicability insofar as it is compat-
ible with diﬀerent more speciﬁc takes on the notion:
A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities and activities organised
in such a way that they are responsible for the phenomenon.
This general characterisation does not preclude that speciﬁc sciences work with a more
restricted notion of mechanism. The objective is highlighting what there is in common
among sciences when it comes to appeal to mechanistic explanation8. As Craver &
Tabery (2016) point out, at the bottom of the various proposed ways of understanding
mechanism lie the notions of parts (or components), causings (activities, interactions),
organisation, and phenomenon. Each of these notions can be characterised in diﬀerent
1See Andersen (2014a,b), Levy (2013), Moss (2012).
2What Levy (2013) calls `Explanatory Mechanism', and Andersen (2014a) calls `Mechanism1 '.
3See Glennan (1996, 2010b).
4See Woodward (2003, 2002), Craver (2007), Milkowski (2013).
5Glennan (2010a).
6Glennan (2010b).
7See section 4.3; Levy & Bechtel (2013), Piccinini (2015).
8Illari & Williamson (2012, p. 120).
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ways9. The fundamental idea, which Illari and Williamsom's (2012) formulation nicely
captures, is that, given a phenomenon that we are interested in explaining, explanation
proceeds by decomposing it into its parts, and seeing what the parts do, and how the
overall organisation of parts and their activities underlie, or lead to the production, or
maintenance, of the target phenomenon.
The explanandum phenomenon helps to individuate the mechanism10. Mechanisms
are of, or for, a certain phenomenon. Mechanistic explanation starts with a phenomenon
to be explained, and hopefully generates the mechanism for it11. The decomposition of
the mechanism into its components, activities and organisation proceeds with that in
mind. What components must there be, so that the target phenomenon takes place?
Which activities must those components engage in? How do their contributions come
together in bringing about the phenomenon? These are the questions that scientists
attempting to give a mechanistic explanation try to answer.
Components' activities have functions inside a mechanism insofar as they make a
contribution to the overall behaviour of the mechanism. Mechanisms may themselves
be functional  they might have functions to perform in the context of an organism
or artefact. I will refer to this notion of function, i.e. in terms of the causal roles of
a component inside a system  as systemic functions (Cummins 1975). Causal roles
depend on the activities that entities, or components, perform.
Functional considerations play an important role in mechanistic explanation. In
explaining the overall capacity of a mechanism, its decomposition proceeds by identify-
ing the components of the mechanism, as well as their systemic functions that help to
bring about the overall behaviour. Structural properties are also relevant in mechanistic
explanation. Roughly, while structural considerations deal with the components of a
mechanism, and their physical properties (such as size, shape, etc.), functional consid-
erations deal with the activities components perform, their causal powers and how they
contribute to the capacity of the whole mechanism (Piccinini & Craver 2011). How to
understand functional mechanisms is a matter of ongoing debate, and I will come back
to this issue in following sections, and in the next chapter12.
Some constraints on what count as parts or components must be put in place, on
pain of providing an account that is too liberal, in which almost anything would count as
a mechanism. Glennan (1996) proposes criteria of robustness and independence: parts
must be such that they can be extracted from the mechanism they help to compose and
be examined individually, without thereby losing their properties (except perhaps for
the functional properties they have inside the mechanism). Woodward (2002, S374-375)
proposes somewhat similar criteria by having recourse to a notion of modularity deﬁned
in terms of independent interventions  the generalisation that describes the behaviour
of each component of a mechanism must be invariant under interventions, and can be
intervened upon independently of other components. I will not dwell on this issue,
9For a detailed overview, see Craver & Tabery (2016).
10Glennan (1996, p. 52), Illari & Williamson (2012, pp. 123-4.)
11Or at least a possible mechanism. For the distinction between how-possibly and how-actually
explanations, see Craver (2006).
12See Machamer et al. (2000), Craver (2001, 2013), Garson (2011, 2013), Piccinini (2015).
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though it must be kept in mind that the individuation of the parts of a mechanism has
both top-down constraints  the functional decomposition of the mechanism whose
behaviour is to be explained  and bottom-up constraints  the parts must be, in
some way, entities that exist robustly and independently of their participation in the
mechanism.
In sum, mechanistic explanation proceeds by individuating the underlying com-
ponents and activities, as well as their organisation, that form the mechanism, and
unveiling how they bring about the phenomenon to be explained. Many cases involve
nested mechanisms  the components of mechanisms are themselves mechanisms that
can be decomposed into components, which might on their turn also be decompos-
able mechanisms, and so on, until a level is reached in which components cannot be
mechanistically decomposed. This leads to the multi-level nature of mechanisms, and
mechanistic explanation.
For my limited purposes, a more detailed characterisation of New Mechanism as
a general framework for scientiﬁc explanation is not necessary. My focus is on one of
its oﬀshoots, the mechanistic view of concrete computation. According to Milkowski
(2013), Fresco (2014), Piccinini (2015), computational explanation is a particularly ab-
stract form of mechanistic explanation, suitable for mechanisms that perform compu-
tations. I will be mostly concerned with Piccinini's view of mechanistic computation.
His theory, I believe, is the most well-argued account currently on oﬀer, and provides
the best candidate for a theory of concrete computation that can supplant its semantic
and non-semantic rivals.
4.2 Computational mechanisms
According to Piccinini, computational mechanisms are a type of teleofunctional mech-
anism. Teleofunctional mechanisms are mechanisms that have teleological functions,
that is to say, they have purposes or ends (Wimsatt 1972). The purpose of an engine is
to provide power, and purposes of organisms include survival and reproduction. The no-
tion of teleological function is not to be confused with the notion of systemic function.
In teleofunctional mechanisms, both kinds of function are relevant. The mechanism
has one or more teleological functions, and its mechanistic decomposition, in light of
those teleological functions that help characterise the mechanism's capacities, partially
depend on the causal roles, the systemic functions, of its components.
The appeal to teleological function makes it the case that teleofunctional mechan-
isms can go wrong: they may fail to perform their teleological functions due to breakage,
inappropriate circumstances, etc. Many mechanisms are not teleofunctional. Though
they have components that perform activities that explain a phenomenon, they have no
end or purpose  think about planetary systems, the formation of valleys, the water
cycle. These systems can be broken down into their components and what they do in
order nicely to explain how they work, and why they behave the way they do. Even
though their components have systemic functions, the overall mechanisms have no tele-
ological function, and therefore cannot succeed or fail in any substantial way. Planetary
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systems can be altered in their workings by the intrusion of a new wandering planet,
or by the eﬀects of a supernova. Nonetheless, they do not therefore fail in performing
any teleological function. They are mechanisms, but not teleofunctional ones. I will use
`function' to refer to systemic functions, and otherwise I will use `teleological function'.
Computational mechanisms, according to Piccinini (2015, pp. 119ﬀ.), are a subset
of teleofunctional mechanisms. They are those teleofunctional mechanisms that have as
one of their teleological functions that of performing concrete computations. Concrete
computation, in its turn, is deﬁned as the manipulation of vehicles according to a rule
sensitive only to (some of) their physical properties13. A rule, ﬁnally, is a mapping from
inputs (and possibly internal states) to (internal states and) outputs.
This understanding of concrete computation is general enough to encompass digital
and non-digital forms of computation  Piccinini (2015) dubs it `generic computation'.
Keeping to such a level of generality is appealing, as it allows various notions of com-
putation to be captured without privileging any one in particular. This is especially
welcome in the case of the cognitive sciences, as it is unlikely that the brain, if it is a
computational mechanism, computes digitally14.
Digital computation is a subset of generic computation. To perform a digital com-
putation is to manipulate digits and strings of digits according to rules sensitive only to
their physical properties. Digits are medium-independent vehicles characterised by the
fact that they can be neatly distinguished by the computational mechanism, insofar as
they are discrete, and that there is a ﬁnite number of them  an alphabet. Two digits
of the same type are processed equally, while two digits of diﬀerent types are processed
diﬀerently15. In physical terms, digits are realised by equivalence classes of physical
states that are treated uniformly by the system. A digit in an electronic computer is an
interval of voltage values (e.g. 05V) to which the system responds in the same way.
There are other subsets of generic computation, such as analogue computation,
quantum computation, and, more interestingly, neural computation16. However, they
are less well understood, so my focus will remain on the more tractable notion of digital
computation.
One important property of vehicles in concrete computation is their being medium-
independent  most of their physical properties are irrelevant to the computation
performed (Haugeland 1985). The rules that govern the changes undergone by the
vehicles are sensitive only to some of their dimensions of variation, some of their degrees
of freedom. Degrees of freedom abstract away from the physical properties themselves
 consisting only of their dimensions of variation  and are characterised in medium-
independent fashion. Physical systems made out of completely diﬀerent materials, from
silicon to neurons to vacuum tubes to beer tins, can perform the same computations
provided they have physical properties with the appropriate degrees of freedom on which
13Piccinini prefers the term `spatiotemporal properties'. However, it is not clear how voltages, on
which modern electronic computers rely, count as spatiotemporal properties. For this reason I prefer
the term 'physical'.
14Piccinini & Bahar (2013).
15Piccinini (2015, pp. 127-8).
16See Piccinini & Bahar (2013).
88
state-transition rules depend. For instance, they may perform digital computation if
they can stabilise into two distinguishable classes of physical states to which the rules
for vehicle-manipulation are sensitive (and if they are computational mechanisms, i.e.
mechanisms with the function of performing concrete computations). These equivalence
classes of physical states may be voltage intervals, presence/absence of beer tins in a
certain location, etc.
Medium-independence is stronger than multiple realisation. As Piccinini (2015,
p. 122-3) argues, multiple realisation normally involves further physical constraints
beyond having appropriate degrees of freedom. A corkscrew can be multiply realised:
it can be made of metal, plastic, steel, as well as diﬀerent combinations of these (or
other materials altogether); and it can have diﬀerent shapes. A device that is not solid
enough, or does not have an appropriate shape, will not be a corkscrew  it will not be
able to open wine bottles. Corkscrews are multiply realisable, but they are not medium-
independent. Computers, on the other hand, are medium-independent. As long as the
vehicles have the appropriate degrees of freedom, their further physical properties are
irrelevant to their computational role; for their being manipulated according to rules as
deﬁned above17.
Most functional mechanisms are not computational mechanisms insofar as they in-
volve components that are not medium-independent. Hearts have the teleofunction of
pumping blood to the body; and though hearts are multiply realisable  diﬀerent spe-
cies have hearts with diﬀerent physical properties, and there can even be artiﬁcial hearts
 they are not medium-independent, for reasons analogous to the ones involving the
corkscrew.
Vehicles and their activities are arrived at by means of mechanistic decomposition.
Given the overall capacity of the mechanism to perform computations, it is decom-
posed into the entities and activities so organised as to bring about that behaviour.
The medium-independence of computational vehicles makes computational explanation
a particularly abstract sort of mechanistic explanation. The physical details of the com-
ponents of the implementing mechanism, be them transistors, valves, or neurons, are
not taken into account. What matters is that those components have physical proper-
ties with the appropriate degrees of freedom  to which transition rules are sensitive
 and be adequately organised.
Computational explanation abstracts away from lower-level, implementational de-
tails, sticking to a medium-independent description of the behaviour of the system. In
order to provide a computational explanation of a system, its explanatory states must
be individuated as computations following one's preferred account of concrete compu-
tation  in our case, the mechanistic view. If computational individuation involves the
medium-independence of vehicles (among other requirements), computational explan-
ation will have recourse to medium-independent states and processes. Computational
explanation is abstract inasmuch as it involves the omission of some detail in its de-
17Piccinini & Maley (2014) explore in more detail how the medium-independence of concrete com-
putation leads to the many ways in which computational systems can be multiply realisable.
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scription of mechanisms18.
4.3 The mechanistic view of computation
and New Mechanism
The question of abstraction from details is a contentious matter in the literature on
the neo-mechanistic approach to scientiﬁc explanation. Some neo-mechanists seem to
imply that a fully satisfying mechanistic explanation should provide a high-level of detail
(ideally complete) on all levels of the mechanistic decomposition of the system19. This
seems at odds with computational explanation as presented above, as well as with other
types of explanation, e.g. those that rely on the causal connectivity, rather than the
structural details, of mechanisms20.
Such considerations partially motivate Haimovici's (2013) objection to the mech-
anistic account of computation. She believes that the computational-mechanist is in a
dilemma. On the one hand, if good mechanistic explanations require the most detailed
description on all levels of the mechanism, computational explanations are clearly not
good mechanistic explanations. By necessarily involving medium-independent vehicles,
computational explanations will never be detailed enough to respect that mechanistic
norm. If, on the other hand, computational explanations should go into detail at all
levels of the mechanism, they would also have to include the implementation details
for each computational system, forgoing thereby the medium-independence of compu-
tational vehicles. What is distinctive of concrete computation, as well as the scientiﬁc
value of computational explanations in allowing generalisations not otherwise attain-
able, would be lost. However, this line of objection is not promising, as Haimovici
seems to recognise.
The mechanistic framework need not pose such strict requirements on what counts
as a good explanation. These would be at odds not only with actual scientiﬁc practice,
in which abstraction from details and idealisation play a major role; but would also
be detrimental as a strategy for scientiﬁc investigation. Not every detail is relevant for
explanation, quite on the contrary. An important part of scientiﬁc explanation consists
in selecting what is explanatorily relevant from what is not for a phenomenon under
investigation. Often, including irrelevant detail muddles explanation, and undermines
its adequacy  in many cases, `more is less'21. The neo-mechanist approach to scientiﬁc
explanation would be in dire straits should it require detail at all levels up and down
the mechanism. Fortunately, it need not subscribe to such stringent requirements on a
18Levy & Bechtel (2013, p. 242.)
19Such a position is often ascribed to Machamer et al. (2000) and Craver (2006, 2007), among others,
and there is space for seeing Piccinini himself as arguing for it, as some remarks in Piccinini & Craver
(2011) seem to suggest. Craver, as well as Piccinini have later denied that they subscribe to this view,
and have argued that abstraction from detail and idealisation are vital parts of scientiﬁc mechanistic
explanation (Craver 2014, pp. 39-40, Piccinini 2015, pp. 124-125 ). See Levy & Bechtel (2013) and
Haimovici (2013) for discussion of the role of abstraction in mechanistic explanation. The confusion may
stem from an ambiguity between ontic and non-ontic views of explanation (see Halina forthcoming).
20See Levy & Bechtel (2013)
21Levy & Bechtel (2013)
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good explanation. As Piccinini (2015, pp. 124-5) claims,
... mechanistic explanation requires the speciﬁcation of all relevant struc-
tural and functional properties at the relevant level(s) of mechanistic or-
ganisation  in other words, mechanistic explanation of any given phe-
nomenon requires performing appropriate abstractions from lower level de-
tails ... Mechanistic explanation in general requires abstraction, and com-
putational explanation is an especially abstract form of mechanistic explan-
ation  so abstract that computation is medium-independent.
However, there is a related worry that Piccinini's reply does not directly address. Full
mechanistic explanation diﬀerentiates itself from purely functional explanation by in-
volving not only (systemic) functional considerations, but also detail on the structural
properties of the components of a mechanism. Pure functional explanation, by the lights
of Piccinini & Craver (2011), is at best a particularly `incomplete or elliptical' type of
mechanistic explanation, one in which `crucial' detail, and/or most of the structural
detail (including the decomposition into physical components) is left out (`mechanism
sketches'22).
Some structural constraints, according to Piccinini & Craver (2011), remain: the
functional analysis of a system places constraints on its organisation and components
inasmuch as the latter must be such that they can carry out the functions individuated
by the functional analysis. The constraints go in the other direction as well  the struc-
tural properties of the system limit which functions it can perform. Since mechanistic
explanation, in unveiling the mechanisms responsible for phenomena, makes use of both
functional and structural considerations, the two being interdependent, functional ana-
lysis is an incomplete form of mechanistic explanation  one in which most structural
detail is omitted23.
These considerations lead to a dilemma in many ways not unlike the previous one.
On one hand, if we take computational explanation to be a form of functional analysis,
it follows that it is an incomplete kind of explanation  one that should be supple-
mented with more structural detail. But if computational explanation is supplemented
by structural detail, then concrete computation loses its medium-independence. On
the other hand, and this is the line taken by Piccinini (2015), computational explan-
ation is to be seen as full-blown mechanistic explanation  one in which all relevant
detail at the relevant explanatory level is provided. Given that the relevant explanat-
ory level involves medium-independent vehicles, full computational explanation remains
quite abstract  it omits all structural detail, except for the degrees of freedom of the
system. This horn of the dilemma is not free from problems.
As computational mechanists admit, the structural constraints posed by computa-
tional explanation are extremely weak. Almost all structural detail is left out, and only
constraints on the degrees of freedom of the structural components of the mechanism
22See Machamer et al. (2000), Craver (2006).
23See Shapiro (2016) for discussion and criticism of Piccinini & Craver (2011), especially for what
regards their claim that it follows from these considerations that psychological explanation is not
autonomous from neuroscience.
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are left in place. This weak sort of structural constraint is on a par with the structural
constraints posed by functional explanation  there as well most of the structural detail
is left out, and only very weak structural constraints are in place.
Consider how functional and structural decomposition would proceed when the
mechanism under examination is my laptop computer. The functional decomposition,
by referring exclusively to functional components such as `processor' and `memory re-
gister', abstracts from structural detail. Nonetheless, it does place some structural
constraints: whatever plays the role of a processor must be so physically arranged as to
do what a processor does, and the same goes for the other sub-capacities individuated
by the functional analysis. Analogously, the structural decomposition of my laptop, by
mentioning components such as the 2Ghz Intel Core chips, or the 500GB solid-state
Flash hard-disk, places constraints on the functional properties of the computer: it lim-
its which functions it can perform in a certain interval of time, and how. Functional and
structural properties constrain each other to some extent (Piccinini & Craver 2011).
In computational explanation, the only structural constraint in place, having ad-
equate degrees of freedom, is the one that ensures that the structural components of
the computational mechanism can participate in computations, be digits, strings of di-
gits, manipulators of digits, etc.  that is, that ensure that they can play the required
functional role. This does justice to the medium-independence of concrete computation.
Importantly, this is the kind of weak structural constraint that characterises functional
explanation. The abstraction from details that is an essential characteristic of compu-
tational explanation is comparable to the abstraction from details found in functional
explanations24.
Moreover, providing any further structural detail beyond the vague ones given by
a functional analysis is fatal to the nature of computational explanation. If the com-
putational explanation should mention structurally-individuated components, such as
my 2Ghz Intel Core chips, it would immediately foil any attempt at multiple realisab-
ility or medium-independence. Computational explanation and functional explanation
look therefore much alike. Some fundamental features of computational explanation are
identical to features of functional analysis. Those same features are essential to compu-
tational explanation, thereby leading to the conclusion that computational explanation
is essentially a form of functional explanation.
If, as computational mechanists claim, functional explanation counts as providing
mechanism sketches due to the lack of structural detail, then there are good grounds
to reserve the same treatment to computational explanations  bringing us back to
the ﬁrst horn of the dilemma. In other words, some fundamental features of compu-
tational explanation are identical to features of functional analysis, taken by Piccinini
and Craver to be incomplete mechanistic explanations. Those same features are es-
sential to computational explanation as understood by Piccinini's mechanistic view,
24See Cummins (1975, p. 764), according to whom in functional explanation, as the functional
analysis absorbs more and more of the explanatory burden, the physical facts underlying the analysing
capacities become less and less special to the analysed system [...] this is why it is plausible to suppose
that the capacity of a person and of a machine to solve a certain problem might have substantially the
same explanation . . . . See also Egan (forthcoming).
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leading to the conclusion that computational explanation is fundamentally a form of
functional explanation, and therefore of incomplete mechanistic explanation. This is at
odds with the claim that, given the relevant explanatory level for concrete computation,
computational explanations are full-blown mechanistic explanations.
It is of no help to claim that while computational explanation stops at the adequate
level of abstraction  for if more structural detail were to be provided, it would cease to
be a computational explanation  functional analysis, on the other hand, stops short of
providing a more satisfying explanation. For the reasons why functional analysis stops
where it does, taking on board mostly functional considerations25, are analogous to the
ones that motivate appeal to computational explanation: capturing generalisations that
would otherwise be ignored, and making space for multiple realisability26.
It is interesting to note that Piccinini, in earlier work, has referred to his view of
computation as the `functional view', even though he stressed its relationships with the
neo-mechanistic framework already then27. He claims that ... computing mechanisms
and their states have functional identity conditions, and ... the functional properties of
computing mechanisms are all that is needed to individuate computing mechanisms and
their states28. And, in another occasion, he holds that ... computational explanation
is a special form of functional (or better, mechanistic) explanation, which applies only
to systems with special functional properties29.
Truth be told, Piccinini subsequently argues that the term `mechanistic explanation'
is more suitable than `functional explanation'. However, the reasons he adduces for
this move are not particularly deep, especially once one has accepted that functional
explanation also poses structural constraints on the realising system. His key motivation
for switching to talk of mechanistic, rather than functional, explanation, is that some
take the latter to explain only by means of ascribing sub-capacities to the whole system,
rather than to its structural components, and their organisation. But, ﬁrst, this is true
only of some types of functional analysis30. Boxology, for instance, ascribes capacities
to functional components of systems, and not to whole systems. Second, once we accept
that functional analyses place structural constraints on the realising system, then they
place constraints, albeit weak ones, on structural components and their organisation,
as mechanistic explanations do.
In sum, there are 5 claims that when put together in a group (or even in sub-groups)
are inconsistent with each other:
1. Good mechanistic explanation tends toward full structural detail at all levels of
25I say `mostly' because I am accepting Piccinini and Craver's (2011) claim that functional analysis
does introduce some weak structural constraints.
26Functional analyses, though abstract, need not be medium-independent, but are often multiply
realisable, as shown in the example in section 4.2. There has been in recent years a rich debate on
whether multiple realisability, at least for what regards cognitive states, is true. See Shapiro (2000)
and Egan (forthcoming) for a taste of the debate.
27Piccinini (2007a, 2008a).
28Piccinini (2008a, p. 232.)
29Piccinini (2007a, p. 107.)
30Of the three types of functional analysis that Piccinini & Craver (2011) examine, only one, task
analysis, would correspond to the description.
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the mechanism.
2. Computational explanation is necessarily abstract, insofar as it ignores most struc-
tural detail, caring only about degrees of freedom. (Piccinini 2015)
3. Computational explanation is a type of functional explanation. (Piccinini 2007a,
2008a)
4. Functional explanations are at best mechanism sketches. (Piccinini & Craver
2011, Piccinini 2015)
5. Computational explanation is good mechanistic explanation. (Piccinini 2015)
As we have seen, Piccinini, as well as Craver, Levy, and Bechtel, reject 1., and for
good reason. But 2-5 are still inconsistent. There are two ways to deal with this
problem, which I will analyse in turn. The ﬁrst one, in which I believe Piccinini (2015)
falls, accepts that Haimovici (2013) poses a legitimate challenge to the mechanistic
view, and tries to reply in a way that is consistent with her assumptions about what
the mechanistic view of concrete computation is about. I will show that this strategy
fails, and that Haimovici is correct in claiming that she has spotted a problem in the
mechanistic account, given those assumptions. Some claim or claims among 2-5 must
give. I argue that 4. is the one that must be rejected if consistency is to be saved. In
so doing, however, it becomes obscure why the mechanistic view is mechanistic at all.
I will argue that these become false dilemmas when the structure of the mechanistic
view is properly construed. This construal is in agreement with some of Piccinini's
earlier work, and in particular his (2007a). But let us proceed in order. Let us ﬁrst
accept the terms of the foregoing debate as they are, let us accept Haimovici's points
as a challenge, and see what happens.
4.3.1 Accepting the terms
Apparently the best way to keep the mechanistic view of computation consistent with
the overall mechanist approach is to reject the claim that explanations that appeal
mostly to functional considerations, such as functional analysis, are only mechanism
sketches. It is 4. that seems to be causing all the trouble. Get rid of it, and all is
well. If this is done, the mechanist can happily accept that functional analyses and
other kinds of highly abstract explanations, such as computational explanation, can
also be full-blown mechanistic explanations, provided that they include detail about
the explanatorily relevant levels of the mechanism. If the relevant level of explanation
is fairly abstract, very few structural details are to be included, e.g. constraints on
degrees of freedom.
This is consistent with Piccinini (2015, p. 124) when he claims that ... computa-
tional explanation counts as full-blown mechanistic explanation, where structural and
functional properties are inextricably mixed  because they are mutually constraining
 within the mechanism. If we accept that functional analysis also features such a mix
of structural and functional properties, as Piccinini & Craver (2011) do, then it follows
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that it qualiﬁes as full-blown mechanistic explanation. We should therefore reject the
view that functional analysis provides only sketches of mechanism, and on the contrary
accept it as a type of full-ﬂedged mechanistic explanation. Otherwise, we fall in the
inconsistency highlighted above.
The suggestion is to endorse the following jointly consistent claims: a) Computa-
tional explanation is a type of functional explanation insofar as it abstracts away from
most structural detail, as much as functional analysis; b) functional explanation is a
type of mechanistic explanation  one in which most structural detail is left out; c)
computational explanation, and at least some kinds of functional analysis, are full-blown
mechanistic explanations inasmuch as they give all the relevant functional and structural
detail at the relevant level of the mechanism for the phenomenon to be explained.
What is the price to pay for ditching 4.? It is certainly a concession to functional
analysis, and it is doubtful that many proponents of New Mechanism will be willing to
be this generous. Part of the motivation for the neo-mechanistic framework is to sup-
plement the shortcomings of functional explanation with more demanding requirements
on what counts as good explanation  requirements that involve a certain amount of
structural detail. Moreover, those mechanists (if there are any) that subscribe to 1.,
at least as an ideal target for explanation, clearly cannot endorse the suggestion that
functional analysis can be a type of full-blown mechanistic explanation in its own right.
There are reasons to take the concession as not only generous, but also well-motivated.
On this picture, functional analysis is a kind of mechanistic explanation  the kind suit-
able for those explananda that, by their nature, involve considerable abstraction from
structural details, such as concrete computations, and perhaps some psychological ca-
pacities. Even though more structural detail can be provided, thereby unveiling the
workings of more levels of speciﬁc mechanisms, doing so amounts to losing multiple
realisability and medium-independence. It amounts to giving up on computational and
psychological explanation, inasmuch as we fail to stop at the relevant explanatory level
for those kinds of phenomena.
At this point, one may ask whether the mechanistic view of computation actually
has anything to do with New Mechanism. What role does the appeal to mechanism
play? Its only role seems to be that of making clear that there is recourse to struc-
tural constraints, to the components and organisation of the system, even though they
may, as is the case with computational explanation, be rather weak. On this construal,
I suggest, New Mechanism does not play a substantial role in the characterisation of
computational explanation. It amounts only to the observation that good explanations
place some structural constraints on the system sporting the behaviour under investiga-
tion  a rather trivial claim31. The functional decomposition of a system constrains the
structural properties that the system sports: they must be such as to allow the functions
described by the functional explanation to be carried out. Analogously, the structural
properties of the system constrain what its functional properties are  speciﬁc functions
can only be performed if the system has appropriate structural components capable of
31For a similar argument, see Shapiro (2016).
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having those functional properties. As abstract as they may be, functional explana-
tions, the mechanist seems to be urging, cannot ﬂoat free from considerations about the
physical structures that underlie the relevant functional properties. But this is hardly a
surprising conclusion, to motivate which we would need the neo-mechanist framework.
In conclusion, if the mechanist about computation buys the terms of Haimovici's di-
lemma, the appeal to mechanism ends up having a trivial and uninteresting role to play.
If one should want it, the appeal to New Mechanism could be safely dropped, leaving
the foregoing view of computation unscathed. Concrete computation is individuated
by some speciﬁc functional properties, as described in section 4.3, and computational
explanation is a type of functional explanation in which the only structural constraint
on the realising system is that it have the appropriate degrees of freedom. Piccinini's
(2015) talk of mechanisms seems to add nothing to the picture other than the rather un-
surprising claim that whether a system implements a given computation still depends
on its structural features32.
4.3.2 The role of mechanism
Accepting the terms of Haimovici's objection is misguided. The role that the appeal to
mechanism plays in the account is diﬀerent from the one assumed by both participants
in this discussion. Once we get back on trail, I argue, the crucial role played by appeal
to mechanism in the mechanistic account comes to surface is a way that sets aside
Haimovici's (2013) worries.
I suggest that the right way to see the role of mechanism in the mechanistic view
of computation is as providing the connexion between abstract computation and world
that a theory of computational implementation must deliver. The fact that providing
structural detail is part and parcel of mechanistic explanation poses no challenge to
the view once it is seen in the correct light. Computation is individuated by functional
considerations  it is mainly the capacity to go from inputs to outputs according to
rules, which, as we have seen, place structural constraints, albeit rather weak ones, on
the realising physical system. Computational systems are physical systems that feature
this capacity, or alternatively, that have this function. What the appeal to mechanism
gives us is a way of connecting computation and world, providing thereby a theory of
concrete computation.
The mechanistic view of concrete computation is best seen as a hypothesis about
those systems in the world that actually perform computations  the hypothesis being
that such systems are teleofunctional mechanisms. The mechanistic view has it that
those physical systems in the world that perform computations, and therefore that can
be explained computationally, are tokens of a speciﬁc type of teleofunctional mechanism.
Therefore, the amended version of the mechanistic view of concrete computation
that I propose has it that computation in physical systems consists in:
1. Manipulation of medium-independent vehicles according to rules sensitive only to
their degrees of freedom.
32Piccinini (2015, p. 98.)
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2. The medium-independent vehicles are components of a teleofunctional mechan-
ism33.
3. The manipulations that vehicles undergo are activities internal to a teleofunctional
mechanism.
4. It is one of the teleological functions of the teleofunctional mechanism to carry
out 1.
This is a functional characterisation of concrete computation, despite the appeal to
mechanism. It provides very little structural detail, as functional characterisations typ-
ically do  it is silent on the physical nature of vehicles and the ways they are manipu-
lated, preserving thereby their medium-independence. However, it makes clear the role
that mechanism should play in the account. What makes computational explanation
mechanistic is the suggestion that physical computational systems are mechanisms, to
which, in consequence, mechanistic explanation applies most suitably. These systems
can be mechanistically decomposed in light of their functionally-individuated capacity
to perform computations.
The resulting mechanistic view of concrete computation is not incompatible with
the constraints posed by competing theories. Rather, it includes mapping as well as
causal considerations, into a richer, more constrained, picture34. The mechanistic view
requires that physical computational systems not only have physical states mappable
onto abstract computational states, or that they be causal systems. They must be
more than that, they must be mechanisms  organised systems with relatively clear
boundaries, decomposable into physical parts that play a role in bringing about the
overall behaviour of the system. In addition they must be, at least in Piccinini's (2015)
picture, teleofunctional mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms that have the teleological function
of performing computations.
What the mechanistic view insists on is that computational implementation involves
components and activities of mechanisms that lead to and enable the capacity to per-
form concrete computations. Structural detail can be provided here with no risk, since
this is not the dimension in which considerations about medium-independence or mul-
tiple realisability are of relevance. Implementations are not medium-independent, they
must involve things such as silicon, neurons, valves, beer tins, or what have you. To be
a physical computational system is to be a system that can perform computations func-
tionally individuated. The mechanistic view argues that such physical computational
systems are teleofunctional mechanisms, rather than mere causal structures, as per the
causal account.
This is what Piccinini (2007a, p. 108) defends, when he claims, referring to digital
computation, that to digitally compute is to manipulate strings of digits according to
33There need to be no one-to-one mapping between functionally-individuated vehicles and structural
components.
34Semantic views, as we have seen, do not provide a means to connect computation abstractly
characterised (nb. not in the sense of abstraction from details) and concrete computation  they only
insist that a semantic constraint be added to the ones oﬀered by non-semantic accounts.
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rules. This is a functional characterisation of what it is to compute, one that can be
multiply realised. On the same page, he goes on to say that
of course, there remains the task of explaining how it is that a system is
capable of performing a certain computation. This will be done by a mech-
anistic explanation of the system, which explains how the system performs
its computations by pointing at the functions performed by its compon-
ents under normal conditions and the way the components are organised
together.
Mechanistic explanation is what provides the explanatorily relevant functional and
structural properties on which computational explanation relies35. A system performs a
certain concrete computation only if it has structural components that have the degrees
of freedom required by that computation. The mechanistic decomposition of a system,
involving as it does both functional and structural considerations, reveals their mutual
constraints, and helps to pin down the explanatorily relevant structural and functional
properties. By considering structural components and their organisation, mechanistic
explanation avoids that functional properties be ascribed to arbitrary or hotchpotch
groupings of physical states. And by taking into account functional considerations, the
contribution of structural components to the overall behaviour of the system is unveiled.
This can be seen in the case of computational devices, such as a personal computer.
A functional analysis of the device in terms of its capacity to perform computations leads
to its functional decomposition in terms of functional components (e.g., black-boxes with
labels such as `processor', `memory', etc.)36. At the same time, its decomposition into
its structural components, their activities, and how they are organised, allows ascribing
those functions to one or more structural components of the system, given what they
do, and how they inﬂuence other components. Moreover, the structural decomposition
of the system can help reveal its functions, as well as the functions of the structural
components. By examining the structural components of a personal computer, the hard
disk, the integrated circuit, the transistors, how they interact and what they do, one
may, with non-trivial ingenuity37, conclude what the overall device's function is, i.e. to
compute  to manipulate medium-independent vehicles according to a rule.
New Mechanism insists on the interdependence of functional and structural consid-
erations when explaining the phenomenon of interest. We can now see a better reply
to the dilemmas presented above than the one oﬀered by Piccinini (2015). Computa-
tion is to be explained mechanistically because, when physically realised, it essentially
involves teleofunctional mechanisms. This would be question-begging if there were no
independent reasons to uphold the neo-mechanistic framework. Fortunately, support for
the mechanistic account comes from elsewhere, namely from its meeting the desiderata
for a theory of concrete computation, as we will see in the next chapter.
35See Piccinini (2008a, p. 210); Fresco (2014, p. 25); Piccinini (2015, pp. 84-85.)
36I will come back to the issue of the ascription of the capacity, or function to perform computations
in the next chapter.
37See Brown (2014) for a nice cautionary tale.
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Piccinini's reply to Haimovici is misguided, as it stresses the wrong aspects to try and
solve the dilemma she presents. Computational explanation is not mechanistic because
it also places structural constraints, albeit rather weak ones, on physical systems  this
is true of many (maybe most) kinds of explanation, even at high levels of abstraction;
rather, computational explanation is mechanistic because it pertains to systems that
are types of mechanism, and thereby for which the most suitable kind of explanation
is mechanistic. The issue rests on whether computational systems are to be seen as
(teleofunctional) mechanisms. More on that in the next chapter.
The arguments in Haimovici (2013) and in section 4.3, as well as the explicit reply
oﬀered by Piccinini (2015), are beside the point. Computational explanation is mech-
anistic because, if the mechanistic view of concrete computation is correct, physical
systems that compute are mechanisms. This does not in any way impinge on the
medium-independence of computational description, or on its functional nature. Mech-
anistic explanation provides structural detail about computational mechanisms because
this is needed to explain how those physical systems are able to compute  it is the way
to connect abstract computation and the world, to explain how concrete computation
is possible.
4.4 Computational individuation
and the multiplicity of computations
The version of the mechanistic view of concrete computation I propose leads to other
welcome results. In this ﬁnal section, I argue that my view helps solve a central issue
that has been at the centre of debate in philosophy of computing: the problem of
multiplicity of computations, presented in section 3.3.238.
Recall that, the argument goes, non-semantic theories of computational individu-
ation, including the mechanistic view, do not have the tools to draw distinctions central
to the practices of computer science. Shagrir and Sprevak argue that semantic con-
straints on computational individuation are needed. The argument from the multiplicity
of computations is perhaps the most powerful argument in favour of semantic views of
computational individuation against non-semantic views, such as the mechanistic one.
Thanks to the points made in this chapter, there is a satisfactory answer to the argu-
ment, drawing especially on the considerations brought to bear in the previous section.
It is thus time to tackle the argument once again, this time better equipped.
I will focus on Sprevak's version of the argument for expository reasons, as it is con-
siderably simpler than Shagrir's version. Consider an electronic computational device
D that takes two voltage values as inputs, and produces one voltage value as output
according to the following input-output table (in terms of ranges of voltage values):
38The multiplicity of computations problem can be seen as one of the possible arguments leading to
a deeper issue, which Fresco et al. (forthcoming) label the `indeterminacy of computation' problem.
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Table 4.1: Device D's input-output table





The device seems to be working as a paradigmatic logic gate. Logic gates are basic
computational building blocks that compute logical functions such as AND, OR, NOR,
NAND, etc. At ﬁrst glance, D seems to be an unequivocal AND-gate. Take voltage
range 05V to stand for 'False', and voltage range 510V for 'True', and we get the
truth table of conjunction.
However, as Sprevak points out, if we switch semantic contents, that is, if we take
the range 05V to stand for 'True', and range 510V for 'False', we get an OR-gate 
the truth table we end up with is the one for disjunction. Without a decision on what
the voltage levels stand for, or represent, so Sprevak argues, there is no way of telling
whether D is an AND-gate or an OR-gate39. Since logic gates are at the basis not only
of theorising in computer science, but also in the engineering of actual computers, se-
mantic properties seem to be required for adequate computational individuation, contra
theories, such as the mechanistic view, that rely completely on non-semantic properties.
Piccinini (2008a) defends the mechanistic view from the argument from multiplicity
of computations. He argues that even though D implements more than one computation,
a wide understanding of systemic functions, reaching to the immediate context of the
computational device (and of the overall mechanism), suﬃces to determine what the
explanatorily relevant computation performed by the device is. Though this answer has
some appeal to it, it concedes too much. It concedes that D implements more than
one computation, that is, that there is multiplicity of computations  a concession
that I believe should not be granted. Moreover, it is not clear that the appeal to the
immediate context will be able to curb the multiplicity of computations that Shagrir
and Sprevak point out, even when taken in terms of explanatory relevance. Fully dual
computational systems, in which all logic gates, as well as the whole system, can be
consistently interpreted in two diﬀerent ways are possible40. Though improbable, these
systems spell trouble for Piccinini's appeal to wide functional individuation, as in their
case, this seems insuﬃcient to eliminate multiplicity of computations  it survives
even taking the immediate context of the device, and of the overall mechanism into
consideration.
Dewhurst (2016) recently put forward a more promising line of reply. In a nutshell,
he accepts that whether devices like D compute a logical function or its dual remains
indeterminate by the mechanistic view's lights. However, he claims that this should
not worry the computational mechanist, for computational individuation is done at the
level of the physical description of the device. The table above is all that is needed to
39This is also true of other logic gates, which, due to this property, are dubbed dual gates.
40I thank Oron Shagrir and Nir Fresco for bringing this point to my attention.
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individuate the computational device, no labelling or ascription of semantic properties
is required. AND- and OR-gates are equivalent insofar as computational individuation
is concerned. They compute the same function from physical inputs to physical out-
puts  the patterns of voltage transformation are the same. Contra Shagrir, Sprevak,
and Piccinini, there is no multiplicity of computations. The indeterminacy lies at a
diﬀerent level, the logical one, that is outside the purview of a theory of computational
individuation proper.
This does not mean that individuation in terms of logical functions is uninterest-
ing. On the contrary, it is relevant for many applications in computer science, both
in theory and in engineering. But individuation by logical function is over and above
computational individuation, and may well rely on wide functions, or semantic prop-
erties. Computational individuation is more basic, and non-semantic  it is done at
the physical level of the mechanism. Therefore, the charge that Shagrir and Sprevak
move against the mechanistic view is misguided. It is true that the mechanistic view
does not distinguish AND- from OR-gates (as well as other dual gates), but this dis-
tinction is not at the level of computational individuation, for which only the physical
patterns of transformation are relevant. Two devices may perform the same compu-
tation, but carry out diﬀerent logical functions depending on contextual and semantic
considerations. Computational individuation and logical individuation should be kept
distinct. Non-semantic properties suﬃce for the former, while they might not suﬃce for
the latter.
Admittedly, this picture suﬀers from a serious shortcoming. It makes computational
equivalence impossible, thus also threatening the closely related idea that computations
are multiply realisable. As Dewhurst (2016) recognises, the physical structure of two
computing mechanisms is always going to be distinct, and it is unclear whether we can
draw any non-arbitrary boundary between the structures that are relevant or irrelev-
ant to computational individuation. It follows that no two computational devices are
equivalent, for there will always be physical diﬀerences between them that are diﬃcult
to rule out as computationally irrelevant in a principled way. But even if we could dis-
tinguish the structural properties that are computationally relevant from those that are
not, computational equivalence would still be excessively ﬁne-grained, for the physical
description of the system is too ﬁne-grained for computational individuation.
To illustrate, take two devices D1 and D2. They work in an analogous way to
device D, but with one important diﬀerence: for engineering reasons, they have `cushion'
intervals between the voltage ranges relevant for determining the output. Voltages that
fall inside these cushion intervals have a `null' value, and when the device has one such
voltage as one of the inputs, it produces a null value, or no output at all. Suppose that
D1's cushion interval is 45V, while D2's is 56V. It follows from Dewhurst's proposal
that these two devices are not computationally equivalent, for in the case of D1 the
acceptable inputs and outputs are voltages in ranges 04V and 510V, while in D2's
case these are voltages in ranges 05V and 610V41. The two devices have diﬀerent
41I am indebted to Jack Copeland, Nir Fresco, and Oron Shagrir for raising and discussing the points
in this and the next paragraph.
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physical descriptions, but it seems overly strong to argue that it follows from this that
they are not computationally equivalent. Indeed, they have the same number of input
and output types (even counting cushion ones), and the former are transformed into
the latter by analogous rules of transformation  despite the fact that the processors
are sensitive to diﬀerent voltage ranges.
Similarly, suppose that instead of having diﬀerent cushion intervals, D1 and D2 were
identical if not for being subject to diﬀerent degrees of noise. Noise makes D1's beha-
viour unreliable when inputs fall within the range 4.55.5V, say, whilst noise interferes
with the functioning of D2 when inputs fall within the 4.95.1V range. Individuating
computation at the physical level would have it that D1 and D2 are not computa-
tionally equivalent, despite their striking similarity. In sum, the physical level is too
ﬁne-grained to make computational equivalence possible. If we want to save the notion,
as we should given its explanatory importance in computer and cognitive science, we
need a coarser-grained method for individuating computation (Fresco et al. 2016)42.
The version of the mechanistic view of concrete computation that I defend in the
previous section has the tools to improve over Dewhurst's account in allowing for a
meaningful notion of computational equivalence, while keeping to the spirit of his solu-
tion to the argument from the multiplicity of computations. In my view, the physical
level of description is the wrong one to focus on in order to get adequate, determinate
computational individuation  it is too ﬁne-grained to allow for a useful notion of com-
putational equivalence. The physical description gives us the implementational details,
but computational individuation takes place at the functional level, in which the only
structural considerations at play are having appropriate degrees of freedom. There is a
meaningful notion of computational equivalence available at this level of description.
Take again D1 and D2, and their diﬀerent cushion intervals (or noise levels). While
the physical description of the two devices diﬀer, at the functional level their description
is identical. The devices respond to two distinct equivalence classes of acceptable phys-
ical inputs (voltage ranges), EC1 and EC2, and produce the same equivalence classes
of physical outputs (voltage ranges) given the inputs.
The labels are fully arbitrary, and introduced only for ease of exposition. How we
label the equivalence classes is irrelevant to computational individuation; what matters
is the overall functional proﬁle that deﬁnes them. Equivalence classes are deﬁned by
input values that lead to uniform behaviour of the whole device  the diﬀerences in
value to which the device is sensitive, and which are uniformly transformed into new
values. For D1, EC1 is the range 04V, and EC2 is the range 510V, whilst for D2 EC1
42Fresco et al. (2016) propose a coarser-grained method for individuating computation that goes some
way in the direction I recommend. However, there are fundamental diﬀerences between our approaches:
they focus on coarse physically-individuated properties, in particular intervals of voltage values grouped
into high and low voltages, instead of medium-independent functionally-individuated properties, as in
my view; and they fail to draw the crucial distinction between computational and logical equivalence,
which leads them to claim that even such coarser-grained individuation methods, as the one I propose,
fail to solve the problem of the multiplicity of computations. As I argue, following Dewhurst (2016),
once the latter distinction is properly understood, the multiplicity of computations problem becomes
considerably more tractable.
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is the range 05V, and EC2 is the range 610V43. The input-output tables of D1 and
D2, when put in terms of equivalence classes, are identical.
Table 4.2: Input-output table of D1 and D2's functional equivalence classes





The physical details of the two devices can be glossed over  structural details
come in only when we are interested in the particular implementational details of a
computational device  as it is the functional description which is of relevance for
computational individuation44. It follows that D1 and D2 are computationally equival-
ent: the functional proﬁle from input equivalence classes of physical states to output
equivalence classes of physical states is the same.
What the physical states consist in is irrelevant for computational individuation.
A hydraulic computational device D3 shares the same functional proﬁle of D1 and D2
if it is sensitive to  and responds uniformly and in the same way to  the same
number of equivalence classes of physical states. That those equivalence classes be of
ranges of water levels in tanks is interesting when it comes to implementational details,
but irrelevant for computational individuation. Thereby, computational equivalence
is possible even between systems that work by means of completely diﬀerent physical
principles  and the multiple realisability of computation is preserved.
Indeterminacy of logical function computed still follows. The table above cannot
determine whether the devices are AND- or OR-gates (recall that the labels are purely
arbitrary, and can be freely switched or changed). Computational individuation, as
per Dewhurst's account, leaves logical individuation indeterminate. This is a welcome
result, since, as Dewhurst convincingly argues, logical individuation is at least one step
above computational individuation. The mechanistic view of concrete computation
should not therefore worry about the arguments from multiplicity of computations put
forward by Shagrir and Sprevak. What they point out is correct: the mechanistic view
does not have the tools to distinguish between dual logic gates. However, such a feat
43Alternatively, one could consider there to be three equivalence classes, including the cushion in-
tervals as an equivalence class. This would be the more precise way to go, but I am ignoring this
complication for ease of exposition.
44In consequence, devices that diﬀer in the number of stable states (e.g. two vs. three), as in Shag-
rir's (2001) version of the argument from the multiplicity of computations, are never computationally
equivalent (Dewhurst 2016). They may be logically equivalent, i.e. carry out the same logical function.
A bi-stable and a tri-stable device may carry out the same logical function, and thus be logically equi-
valent, despite not being computationally equivalent given their diﬀerent functional proﬁles. Diﬀerent
possible groupings of the devices' stable states, as in Shagrir's argument, are irrelevant to computa-
tional individuation: given the diﬀerent number of equivalence classes of physical states the two devices
stabilise on, and are diﬀerentially sensitive to, they will always be functionally distinct according to the
foregoing account, and therefore not computationally equivalent. This is, I take, as it should be: given
their diﬀerent functional proﬁles, those two devices diﬀer in their capacity to carry out logical and
mathematical functions  having a richer functional structure makes the tri-stable device considerably
more versatile.
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is not something we should be asking of a theory of computational individuation, for
computational individuation takes place below the level of logical functions.
Where I part ways with Dewhurst in on what the appropriate level for computational
individuation is. He argues that it is the physical level that allows suitably to distinguish
between computational devices. But he has consequently to give up any useful notion
of computational equivalence. This is too high a price to pay. In contrast, I argue that
computational devices can be appropriately distinguished from each other, or found to
be equivalent in an informative way, by focusing on the functional level, in which it is
functional, rather than physical, structure, that individuates computational states and
processes.
It may be objected that computational equivalence is impossible even when we fo-
cus on the functional level, rather than the physical one45. It may be argued that the
maximal functional proﬁles of two physical systems will always diﬀer, and thereby that
they can never be computationally equivalent. I think that the foregoing account has
the means to avoid this objection. For recall that the functional decomposition of a
physical system always takes place in light of a target capacity, or teleological function
 in our case, the capacity to perform computations. The functional decomposition,
and the resulting functional proﬁles of component computational devices, does not in-
clude functional features that are irrelevant to the overall system's capacity to compute.
Functional diﬀerences between devices which play no role in their general computational
capacities are excluded  e.g. because they are not relevant to the regimented input-
output transformations of equivalence classes of physical states across the system. This
makes so that devices that have diﬀerent physical properties, such as D1, D2, and D3
above, are computationally equivalent, insofar as their computationally-relevant func-
tional proﬁles are the same46.
The foregoing proposal hinges on whether there are principled ways of carving the
functional structure of a computational device47. This is analogous to Dewhurst's (2016)
worry about principled ways of carving the computationally relevant physical properties
of a system; a worry that, he argues, runs through the whole neo-mechanist framework,
and is not a problem speciﬁc to its application to concrete computation. Dewhurst
suggests, following Piccinini, that only through choices dictated by our explanatory
interests can such principles be arrived at. Consequently, a degree of observer-relativity
is always in place in mechanistic explanations.
While I agree that there is a crucial worry here, to which a suitable answer must
be provided, I believe that a theory of computational explanation has additional tools
to deal with it in comparison to other types of explanation tackled by New Mechan-
ism. For the mechanistic view of computation appeals to teleofunctional mechanisms,
i.e. mechanisms with teleological functions. Teleological functions bestow privileged,
45I thank an anonymous referee to Synthese and Nir Fresco for bringing this issue to my attention.
46Devices that diﬀer in the number of their stable states do not count as computationally equivalent,
even though they may be able to carry out the same logical and mathematical functions. This is so be-
cause their maximal computationally-relevant functional proﬁles diﬀer, since the number of equivalence
classes of physical states they are sensitive to is diﬀerent.
47I thank Nir Fresco for bringing this point to my attention.
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objective capacities on teleofunctional mechanisms, and their components. Hence priv-
ileged observer-independent functional and structural decompositions are available for
all functional mechanisms, computational ones included. Whether this strategy will
bear any fruit depends, though, on whether there are objective teleological functions in





The mechanistic view of concrete computation involves an important appeal to teleolo-
gical functions. Computational systems are not only functional in the sense that they
can be functionally decomposed and explained, they are functional in a further sense:
they are endowed with teleological functions. They have, to put it crudely, a purpose,
something they are supposed to do1. In order to provide a complete mechanistic ac-
count of computation, we need to delve into the notion of function, in particular for
what regards three crucial questions that arise for the mechanistic approach: what are
the grounds to claim that computing systems have teleological functions?; what role
does the appeal to teleological function play in the account?; which theories of teleolo-
gical function are up to the task of ﬁlling the role the mechanistic view imposes on the
notion of function?
In this chapter, my aim will be to answer the three questions above by making clear
why the appeal to teleological function is important for the mechanistic view of concrete
computation, which relationships it has with the notion of mechanism itself, and how
it makes the account more cogent. Moreover, I will examine several proposals on the
nature of teleological functions present in the literature, and assess whether they can
play the role that the mechanistic view requires. My aim is not to oﬀer an exhaustive
treatment, or to take a position on which account of function is correct. My objective is
to oﬀer an existence proof; to show that at least some of the theories of function available
in the literature are up to the task set out by the computational mechanist. Thus the
cogency of the mechanistic view of concrete computation, with its strong reliance on
the notion of teleological function, is preserved.
Before going into depth on the nature and role of teleological functions in concrete
computation, I put to rest, in section 5.1, an important worry to the eﬀect that there
can be no teleological functions to compute, given the medium-independence of compu-
tational states and processes, and the reliance of theories of function on concrete causal
powers. That issue circumvented, in section 5.2 I oﬀer an analysis of the roles that
1Wimsatt (1972), Neander (1991).
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appeal to teleological function plays in the mechanistic view of concrete computation,
and what advantages accrue to the view. Teleological function helps the computational
mechanist in at least four ways. It helps ensure the objectivity of computation; it helps
avoid pancomputationalism; it introduces normativity, making space for miscomputa-
tion; and it makes the account ﬁt well with our pretheoretical intuitions about which
physical systems are computational. I then move on, in section 5.3, to a closer examin-
ation of several theories of function put forward in the literature, divided into two rough
categories: dispositional theories, and selected-eﬀects theories. I assess these theories
with an eye to whether they are able to complement in the desired way the mechanistic
view of concrete computation. I argue that at least two theories of function appear to
be suitable candidates: Piccinini's (2015) goal-based theory, and a liberal, broadened
selected-eﬀects theories on the lines proposed by Garson (2011). Given a suﬃciently
robust notion of teleological function, which may already be at hand, the mechanistic
view is the best account of how computation takes place in the physical world.
In contrast to the previous chapter, where the systemic notion of function was at
the foreground, making me drop the qualiﬁcation, in this chapter the opposite is the
case. Hence I will use `function' to refer to `teleological function' throughout, unless
otherwise noted.
5.1 Teleological functions and
medium-independence
Before we delve into the role of teleological functions in the mechanistic view of concrete
computation, a basic worry has to be put to rest. The mechanistic view characterises
physical computational systems as mechanisms endowed with the teleological function
of performing computations, i.e. manipulating medium-independent vehicles according
to rules sensitive only to some of their degrees of freedom. There is an internal tension
in this formulation. For it is mysterious how a physical system can acquire teleological
functions that involve medium-independent vehicles.
Theories of function generally rely on causal contributions of components, present
or historical, which explain either their role inside a system (dispositional theories), or
their persistence (selected-eﬀects theories). These causal contributions are not medium-
independent: they are made by speciﬁc components in physical systems, or past in-
stances thereof. It would appear, the worry goes, that theories of function cannot
contemplate the bestowing of teleological functions that involve medium-independent
vehicles. The causal powers of components and systems that justify ascription of tele-
ological functions involve concrete, medium-dependent vehicles. Even though abstract,
medium-independent descriptions of these vehicles and systems are possible, they are
not the descriptions that capture how they help bestowing functions on those vehicles
and systems. Those descriptions will need to include details about the physical consti-
tution of vehicles, and the systems they help to make up, for it is partly due to such
details that a story about how they acquire teleological functions gets oﬀ the ground.
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The mechanistic view of concrete computation seems in trouble: it claims that com-
putational systems are those mechanisms with the function of performing computations.
But the performance of computations, which essentially involves medium-independence,
seems to be a bad candidate for being a teleological function of any system  for tele-
ological functions seem to hinge on medium-dependent properties of systems and their
components. In this section, I aim at dispelling this worry.
There seems to be an immediate way out for the computational mechanist: to
reduce the role that medium-independence plays in the individuation of concrete com-
putation. Computational mechanists insist that vehicles are manipulated according to
a subset of their physical properties  those to which the general rule of manipulation
is sensitive2. It is the causal powers of this subset of physical properties that make the
causal contributions relevant for the bestowing of teleological functions  for instance
by contributing to the goals of organisms, or being selected for by selection processes.
There is nothing problematic in having teleological functions depend on those causal
contributions, the computational mechanist could reply.
There are three problems with this line of defence.
First, it seems circular. The subset of physical properties that make the causal
contributions of relevance are determined by the general manipulation rule, i.e. the
computational rule. But such a general rule presupposes that the system has the tele-
ological function of computing that function. As we have seen in section 3.1, there
is an indeﬁnite number of ways of mapping causal goings-on in physical systems into
computational rules. The general rule that helps select the subset of relevant phys-
ical properties of the computational system and its components must be determined
by some other factor in order to avoid pancomputationalism. Such a factor, according
to the mechanistic view, is precisely the teleological function of the system. It is by
having the performance of computations as the teleological function of a system that
it is possible to carve it into the physical components and processes that are causally
relevant for performing that function. As Piccinini (2015, p. 121) claims, the rule
followed by the system is an abstract (macrocospic) description of the behaviour of
a physical computing system when it fulﬁls its teleological function. Therefore, the
computational mechanist cannot appeal to the general rule of manipulation in order to
avoid the worry.
Second, if the computational mechanist avoids circularity by refraining to appeal to
a general rule, it becomes unclear why the relevant vehicles and processes are compu-
tational. The computational mechanist may want to rely directly on a subset of the
physical properties of the system, without the intermediation of a general computa-
tional rule: the subset that has the causal powers relevant for possessing teleological
functions. Once a theory of function gives us the criteria for systems to possess tele-
ological functions, we can search the system for those causal contributions (current or
historical) that qualify. Though this is how it works in the general case, it does not
work for computational systems.
2Piccinini (2015, p. 122.)
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For it is not clear why such causal contributions should be seen as involving computa-
tional states and processes at all. The function bestowed will be of the same kind as that
bestowed on digestive systems, hearts, etc. The latter are not computational systems.
Furthermore, by giving up medium-independence, the multiple realisability typical of
computations is lost: the causal powers relevant for the possession of the function are not
abstractly characterised, they are not primarily functionally individuated, but, on the
contrary, include implementational details. As I have argued in section 4.4, focusing on
implementational details is misguided when it comes to computational individuation.
Third, the computational mechanist cannot seek refuge in the claim that though
implementational details play a role in the bestowing of functions, they count as com-
putational because computational descriptions are possible. Admittedly, computational
descriptions of physical systems are always possible3. Medium-independence plays a
crucial role in driving a wedge between computational and non-computational systems.
If it is given up, pancomputationalism looms, and most of the motivation for developing
the mechanistic view of concrete computation evaporates.
In sum, this line of reply fails. The problem that got us started is still here: it
seems impossible that physical systems can have functions bestowed on them that are
to be characterised primarily in a computational fashion. Teleofunctional mechanisms,
it appears, cannot have the teleological function of performing concrete computations,
since these are charaterised primarily in a medium-independent way, while part of the
conditions for function-bestowing, i.e. the causal powers of components and systems,
are not medium-independent. If that is so, and the medium-independence of vehicles
and processes is lost, the computational mechanist has either to embrace pancompu-
tationalism, or to accept that there are no computational teleological functions in the
world. As a consequence, the mechanistic view of concrete computation crumbles.
Luckily, all is not lost. There is a way out for the computational mechanistic.
Vehicles and processes primarily characterised in medium-independent terms can be
involved in the bestowing of teleological functions. Theories of function can deliver
medium-independent characterisations of the causal contributions of components and
systems as the ones grounding the possession of teleological functions, at least in the
special case of computational systems. Let us see how this is so.
It is best to start with the easier case: designed computational systems. In the
case of designed systems, it is plausible to think that the intentions of designers play
at least some role in ﬁxing their teleological functions. It is plausible to assume that
in most cases designers intend to build devices that behave in such a way as to respect
abstract computational rules. Typically, the medium-independent speciﬁcation of the
abstract computational architecture of the device to be built predates implementational
considerations. Designed computers are then arranged so that their causal behaviour
mirrors that computational architecture. In sum, what explains why the physical com-
ponents of computational artefacts are regimented the way they are are the abstract
computational rules to which they are supposed to conform, and for which details of
3Piccinini (2015, p. 145.)
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the physical constitution of vehicles are irrelevant.
At the basis of the intentions of designers lies the abstract functional characterisa-
tion of the computational system. The selection of the best design among the available
options is eﬀected on the grounds of to what extent, and how eﬃciently, a physical
system implements that abstract characterisation. Computational physical artefacts
are designed and selected in light of the medium-independent functional characterisa-
tion that they are built to satisfy. Computationally equivalent computational artefacts
are routinely built out of diﬀerent materials and components, while having the same
functional structure. The contributions that computational artefacts make are inde-
pendent of details about their physical constitution, insofar as functionally equivalent,
but diﬀerently physically constituted systems, make the same contributions4. These
considerations lend force to the claim that, as far as computational artefacts are con-
cerned, their teleological functions are primarily characterised in medium-independent
terms. Thus the mechanistic view of concrete computation seems able to avoid the
objection, at least for what regards designed computers.
This is already quite an achievement. However, computational mechanists also
want to account for putative non-designed computational systems, such as cognitive
systems. Much of the cognitive sciences, I have insisted throughout, rely on concrete
computation as a foundational notion. The mechanistic view would hence better also
contemplate the case of (biological) cognitive systems. Things get trickier here, as
appeals to intentions of designers are clearly not in the cards. But there is a plausible
path available to the computational mechanist. In the case of biological computational
systems, there is a sense in which the explanation for why their causal structure is the
way it is has to do partly with the computations that it enables. In a way analogous to
designed computational systems, computations medium-independently described play
a role in determining the teleological functions of those biological systems. There are
reasons to believe that the medium-independent characterisations of the causal goings-
on in biological computational systems are explanatorily primary in determining their
teleological functions.
To understand how this is so, it is useful to make use of the notion of an organisa-
tionally invariant property, developed by Chalmers (2011). Organisationally invariant
properties are properties that remain invariant as long as the abstract causal struc-
ture of a system  what Chalmers calls its causal topology  remains unchanged. In
Chalmers' (2011, p. 337) own words, a property P counts as an organisational invari-
ant if any change to the system that preserves the causal topology preserves P . The
causal topology of a system, in turn, is deﬁned as the pattern of interaction among
parts of the system, abstracted away from the make-up of individual parts and from the
way the causal connections are implemented. These notions, which are put forward
by Chalmers in the context of discussing the role of concrete computation in cognitive
4There are of course further issues such as speed of processing, size, etc. Though these may inﬂuence
to some extent the teleological function of the computational system (e.g. in limiting which functions it
can compute in a certain interval of time), they do not jeopardise their general function of performing
computations.
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science, are closely related to the notion of medium-independence that Piccinini (2015)
discusses.
What is particularly helpful in Chalmers' discussion is the nexus he builds between
organisational invariant properties, concrete computation, and cognition. Concrete
computations provide a way of capturing the abstract causal structure of (computa-
tional) systems5. Crucially, Chalmers claims, mainstream cognitive science accepts
that cognitive states and processes involve organisationally invariant properties: it is
the special abstract causal structure of some biological systems that makes them into
cognitive systems  functionalism about cognition is still the default background po-
sition. If that is so, computational description is particularly appropriate to cognitive
states and processes, as it captures what is most relevant about them: their causal
topology. By the same token, computational explanation is the most appropriate type
of explanation for cognitive phenomena6.
If it is true, as most cognitive science assumes, that cognition is primarily to be
explained in terms of causal topology, then the properties that are relevant for bestowal
of teleological functions on cognitive systems are also to be primarily characterised in an
organisationally invariant way  even though a story that includes the more concrete
implementational details will always also be available. Organisationally invariant prop-
erties are the realm of computational description. It seems therefore acceptable that
some biological systems may have as their teleological function that of going through
causal goings-on that are primarily to be described in computational terms  that is,
they have the teleological function of performing concrete computations, characterised
in medium-independent terms.
Even though the causal contributions that ground teleological functions always in-
volve medium-dependent properties, i.e. entities and processes that have (or had) the
relevant causal powers due to their physical constitution; in the case of cognitive sys-
tems the best way to describe those contributions is in computational terms, abstracting
away from details about physical constitution. Thereby, there is a sense in which an
explanation of why cognitive systems do what they do  what their function is 
is appropriately cashed out in medium-independent, organisationally invariant, terms.
More concrete, implementational explanations are always available, and are equally
correct. However, they are less adequate insofar as the phenomena under investigation
are cognitive abilities themselves  for which explanations are primarily cashed out in
organisationally invariant terms.
Another way of putting the point is in terms of counterfactuals. Were cognitive sys-
tems composed fully or partly of a diﬀerent material than neurons and glia, they would
function in the same way as actual cognitive systems do7, provided that the causal
topology of the former and the latter were the same (and that the diﬀerent material
5As we have seen in section 3.3.1, Chalmers' view of concrete computation embraces limited pan-
computationalism. While for Chalmers concrete computations adequately capture the abstract causal
structures of all physical systems, the mechanistic view has it that the domain of physical systems
adequately so captured is much narrower.
6Chalmers (2011, p. 337.)
7Except for, possibly, diﬀerences in speed and size.
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is suitably connected to, and able to interact appropriately with sensory and motor
systems). Thereby, the teleological functions of cognitive systems are not primarily de-
pendent on the physical constitution of the components and processes doing the causal
work, but on the causal topology of the systems, which is best described computation-
ally8.
This line of reasoning does not make the mechanistic view of concrete computation
too closely connected to functionalism about cognition, though it does make the former
partly depend on the latter, at least for what regards biological computational systems.
Functionalism about cognition is only helping account for why, in the case of cognitive
systems, it is sensible to believe that their teleological functions can be best charac-
terised in abstract, medium-independent terms. All the other constraints on concrete
computation that the mechanistic view puts forward are still in force.
Furthermore, it does not follow that computational explanation and (non-teleo-
logical) functional explanation are identical. While, as I have argued in section 4.4,
computational explanation is a type of functional explanation, not every functional
explanation is computational. For one, computational explanation involves more than
functional decomposition simpliciter  it requires a very speciﬁc kind of functional
decomposition in which there are inputs to the system, outputs from the system, and
intermediate states that are manipulated according to a general rule. Moreover, many
functionally decomposable systems do not qualify as mechanisms, and are therefore
excluded from being computational by the lights of the mechanistic view.
Most importantly, the foregoing argument applies only to those systems for which
organisationally invariant properties play the primary explanatory role in making sense
of their workings. Physical systems of enough complexity, as we have seen in sec-
tion 5.3.1, can always be functionally analysed in terms of the abstract causal roles of
their components. However, in most cases, the functional analysis does not exhaust the
explanatory causal contributions of the system, whereas it arguably does in the case of
cognitive systems.
Think about digestion9. A functional decomposition of the digestive system is no
doubt possible. There are subsystems for allowing food to get inside the organism,
for breaking food into smaller and more easily processable bits, for transporting food
to subsystems dedicated to breaking it further into substances of use to the organism,
for absorbing those nutrients, and ﬁnally for getting rid of the material that fails to
be absorbed. Such a functional decomposition of the digestive system is even quite
illuminating: we get a breakdown of the functional components, the work they do, and
how that work is subdivided into diﬀerent stages responsible for diﬀerent parts of the
process of digestion10.
8Chalmers (2011, p. 342.)
9Digestion is used as an example by Piccinini (2015) to contrast medium-dependence and medium-
independence, and it is used by Chalmers (2011) both to defend limited pancomputationalism from
the charge of making appeal to computation explanatorily vacuous, and to contrast organisationally
invariant properties with other types of property.
10The functional analysis need not stop at this macro-level, but can go on to the causal roles of
functional components internal to each subsystem.
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However, the properties of those subsystems that are relevant for explaining their
causal contributions to digestion are not organisationally invariant properties (or, in
other terms, not medium-independent). They may be multiply realisable, but they
must be such that they are able to break bits of food, thereby placing important con-
straints on their physical constitution. Moreover, digestion cannot take place at all
without food, which though a variegated category, also places constraints on the phys-
ical constitution of its members. Therefore, the causal topology of digestion, its abstract
causal structure, though interesting, is not what is primarily explanatory of the capa-
city of the digestive system to digest. The teleological functions of digestive systems
are best characterised in terms of non-organisationally invariant (medium-dependent)
properties  properties which are not fully captured by computational description, in
contrast with what happens for cognitive systems.
The foregoing considerations lend force to the idea that, when it comes to com-
putational systems, both biological and designed, the factors that ground their having
teleological functions are medium-independent, organisationally invariant properties.
Such properties are best made sense of in terms of concrete computation.
In sum, the best way to characterise the teleological function of computational
systems  designed computers and cognitive systems  is in medium-independent,
organisationally invariant terms, rather than in terms of their implementational details.
The computational mechanist has thus a plausible rejoinder to the worry presented in
this section: physical systems can have as one of their teleological functions that of
performing concrete computations.
5.2 Teleofunctional mechanisms
Part of the reason why computational systems are to be understood as having tele-
ological functions is that by so doing, a coherent, cogent, and well-motivated theory
of concrete computation becomes available. There are four main grounds for having
teleological function play such a central role in the mechanistic view: ensuring the
objectivity of computation, avoiding pancomputationalism, introducing normativity 
thus allowing miscomputation  and doing justice to our pretheoretical intuitions about
which systems in the world are computational. I will examine each of them. Any notion
of teleological function suitable to the foregoing view will have to be able to fulﬁl the
four requirements below.
5.2.1 Objectivity
Mechanistic explanation involves the decomposition of a system into its components,
activities, and organisation. The decomposition takes as its starting point a certain
phenomenon to be explained, and often a certain capacity or function that the system
is able to perform. For instance, mechanisms are posited to explain the capacity of
the kidneys to ﬁlter blood. Once we ﬁx the capacity or function to be explained, the
search for the explanatory mechanisms behind it can begin, and will be directed and
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constrained by the characterisation of the explanandum. Choosing the explanatory
target, and determining its relevant features, is crucial for mechanistic explanation to
take oﬀ the ground.
A crucial issue for mechanistic as well as functional explanations is determining the
capacities or functions to be explained. Mechanisms are partly individuated by the
capacity they aim at explaining, and that motivate the mechanistic and/or functional
decomposition that the explanation provides. To some extent, the ascription of capacit-
ies and functions to a system depends on scientiﬁc interests and explanatory aims. That
notwithstanding, the issue remains of whether what is being ascribed to systems, i.e.
capacities and functions, are observer-independent properties (and therefore interest-
based ascriptions may succeed or fail, partially or completely, to capture them), or if
they are partly or fully in the eyes of the beholder.
For now, suﬃce it to note that the mechanistic view of concrete computation ad-
vocates an objectivist take on teleological functions. By this means, the computational
mechanist is able to defend the objectivity of concrete computations. For a system
with one or more objective teleological functions has, as it were, privileged capacities,
namely those teleological functions themselves. They are privileged in the sense that
they are there regardless of the explanatory interests of anyone. Hearts would have the
function of circulating blood even if there were no intelligent life forms in the universe
 or so argues the objectivist about functions. The teleological functions of systems
are primary targets of mechanistic and functional explanation.
By claiming that computational systems are teleofunctional mechanisms  mech-
anisms endowed with teleological functions  one of whose teleological functions is that
of performing computations, the computational mechanist secures a privileged explan-
atory target for such systems. Computational systems are to be primarily explained
in terms of their capacity to perform computations, since it is one of their teleological
functions so to do. They might also be explained with other functions in view, such
as that of heating the environment. However, given that heating the environment is
arguably not one of the teleological functions of a computational mechanism, such an
explanation is of secondary importance  dependent as it is on particular contexts
of use  and does not deprive computational systems of their computational nature.
Analogously, hearts can be seen as having the function of producing thumping noises in
the context of diagnostic procedures carried out by doctors  which is not (arguably)
one of their teleological functions. It is the task of a theory of (objective) teleological
function adequately to determine what are and what are not the teleological functions
of systems, and if they have any.
The mechanistic view of concrete computation, with its appeal to objective tele-
ological functions, makes the computing capacity of computational systems something
objective, observer-independent. Such a capacity is a privileged explanatory target,
and motivates the functional and mechanistic decomposition of such systems in terms
of their performance of computations. This leads to the functional and mechanistic de-
composition of computational systems in terms of the components, activities, and their
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organisation that give rise to their computational capacities. This decomposition inher-
its the objectivity of teleological function. It is a non-arbitrary, observer-independent
functional and/or mechanistic decomposition11.
Moreover, the objectivity that the appeal to teleological function bestows on con-
crete computation puts to rest one of Searle's objections against computationalism in
the cognitive sciences. As we have seen in chapter 3, Searle holds that computations
are observer-relative  any system can be said to be computational, provided that we
ﬁnd it interesting or useful to regard it that way. Against this view, which risks making
claims about physical computing systems vacuous  since any system can be regarded
as computational if we should so want  the mechanistic view oﬀers a notion of con-
crete computation that is objective, non-vacuous, and non-trivial. To attain this result
it hinges heavily on the objectivity of teleological functions. Therefore, theories of func-
tion able to play the role set by the mechanistic account need respect the objectivity
requirement.
5.2.2 Help avoid pancomputationalism
The appeal to function helps with a related problem: pancomputationalism, in its
limited, and unlimited forms. For the mechanistic view insists that only mechanisms
endowed with speciﬁc kinds of functions can be candidates for being computational
systems. This is a demanding constraint on which physical systems count as computa-
tional. On the mechanistic view, computational systems are mechanisms (thus systems
that have to respect some constraints regarding their composition and organisation)
which are teleofunctional. In the case of computational mechanisms, one of their tele-
ological functions is that of performing concrete computations. The appeal to function
helps curb pancomputationalism in two ways.
First, it provides a robust notion of mechanism. For recall that mechanisms are
partly individuated in terms of their capacities. A physical system may undergo diﬀerent
mechanistic decompositions according to the capacities it is taken to have. If functions
are not objective, then mechanisms themselves are not objective. Functions, capacities,
and mechanisms would thereby depend on the explanatory interests of human beings,
not being part of the objective structure of the world. This view, to which I will come
back in more detail below, is often dubbed `perspectivalism'12. It has the consequence
that potentially any physical system, even of very little complexity, can count as a
mechanism, provided that there is an interest in so regarding it13. In this watered-
down understanding of mechanisms, arbitrary groupings of physical states, as well as
agglomerates can be seen as mechanisms of some ascribed, and perhaps outlandish,
capacity  provided that they prove in some way to be useful or interesting.
11Epistemological limitations may bar us from coming up with an accurate decomposition (even
given the relevant explanatory level). Regardless of our epistemic capabilities at any point in time 
or of the existence of intelligent subjects  computational systems have a privileged decomposition.





This outcome brings back the spectre of the Putnam-Searle trivialisation objec-
tions: if computational systems are mechanisms, and nearly every physical system can
be taken as a mechanism, then nearly every physical system can be taken as com-
putational. Though the risk of trivialisation exists, it does not follow from accepting
perspectivalism about mechanisms. Perspectivalism would be compatible with some
sort of pragmatism about computation, in which pragmatic constraints would draw the
needed distinctions between systems usefully regarded as computing, and those that
are not, as per section 3.2. But there remains the lingering worry, fuelled by consid-
erations such as Searle's, that pragmatic constraints will not suﬃce adequately to curb
the liberality that follows from perspectivalism, and will thus lead to the trivialisation
of computational claims.
In contrast, a robust, objective notion of function opens the way for a much stronger
view of mechanisms. If functions are objective features of reality, and mechanisms are
individuated in terms of them, then mechanisms themselves are objective, existing in-
dependently of observers and their interests. This does not mean that a physical system
will have only one, or even few, functions  and thus contain one or few mechanisms.
Physical systems may have diﬀerent capacities, which will reveal diﬀerent mechanisms.
The point is rather that all those functions and mechanisms will be objective properties
of physical systems, independent of observers' aims and interests. Thereby mechanisms
themselves are robust, objective features of the world. Importantly, not any physical
system will qualify as a mechanism. Mechanisms must answer to special requirements
of organisation that exclude from their kin arbitrary hotchpotch groupings of physical
states, as well as mere aggregates.
In sum, the appeal to objective functions leads to a non-perspectivalist, object-
ivist view of mechanisms. If, as per the mechanistic view, computational systems are
mechanisms, then arbitrary groupings of physical states are not candidates for computa-
tional status. The Putnam-Searle trivialisation objections are thereby at least partially
deﬂected.
There is a second way in which the appeal to objective functions helps the mech-
anistic view to avoid pancomputationalism. For the claim made by computational
mechanists becomes quite stringent. It is not just that computational systems must
be mechanisms, but they have to be mechanisms endowed with teleological functions.
This rules out systems that, though their components and even the whole mechanisms
themselves have systemic functions, lack teleological functions  e.g. the water-cycle,
and planetary systems.
What is more, not only must computational systems be teleofunctional mechanisms,
they must be teleofunctional mechanisms endowed with a speciﬁc teleological function:
performing computations, i.e. transforming input vehicles into output vehicles accord-
ing to transformation rules sensitive only to speciﬁc dimensions of variation of the
vehicles (medium-independence). This constraint rules out from being computational
all those functional mechanisms that do not have performing computations as their tele-
ological function. Hearts and digestive systems do not qualify. Though they arguably
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have teleological functions, none of them is that of performing computations. Hearts
and digestive systems do not have the function of manipulating physical states in a
medium-independent way14.
These requirements considerably constrain the domain of mechanisms, let alone
physical systems, that can legitimately receive computational explanations. The mech-
anistic view of concrete computation thereby substantially limits the domain of physical
systems that are computational: they must be mechanisms, they must have teleological
functions, and one of their functions must be that of manipulating physical vehicles
according to rules in a medium-independent way. These constraints disqualify most
physical systems from counting as computational, keeping at bay pancomputationalism
in its limited, as well as in its unlimited form.
An objective notion of function can provide one or more privileged explanatory
targets, i.e. the capacities that a mechanism has the function to perform. Moreover,
an objective notion of function constrains which mechanisms can be analysed in terms
of the performance of which functions. Computational explanation is legitimately ex-
planatory for those mechanisms that have as one of their functions that of performing
computations. In their case, describing the phenomenon to be explained as the perform-
ance of computations is true to the system's objective nature. In contrast, most systems
can receive computational descriptions; they can be seen as performing computations
 e.g. rocks, pails of water, walls, climatic, as well as digestive systems. Though
computational models of such systems can be built  and even be scientiﬁcally in-
teresting by, for instance, allowing us to predict their behaviour  as such systems
do not have the function to perform computations (and often do not even qualify as
mechanisms), they will not count as genuinely computational. The appeal to objective
functions helps secure the special, non-trivial nature of computational systems. Though
most systems can be seen as performing computations, only some actually do compute:
those teleofunctional mechanisms that have as one of their functions that of performing
computations.
In summary, the mechanistic view of computation requires an objective notion of
function in order to secure the objectivity of concrete computation, and stave oﬀ the
triviality problems that plague other accounts. Without such a theory of function, the
notion of teleofunctional mechanism, and even of mechanism itself, becomes observer-
dependent. If mechanisms and teleofunctional mechanisms are not objective features
of the world, but rather depend on interests and explanatory practices, it would follow
that there is no privileged way of individuating functions, teleofunctional mechanisms,
or mechanisms in general. Rocks, pails of water, and walls could be taken to be mech-
anisms, teleofunctional mechanisms, or even computational mechanisms. At that point,
we would be back to the spirit of the Putnam-Searle trivialisation results, in particular
in its Searlean version15. The success of the mechanistic view of computation, when
compared to its rivals, hinges heavily on whether functions are objective, and if they
14For more details on medium-independence and multiple realisability, see section 4.2.
15Pragmatism about computation in the lines of Schweizer (2014, 2016), and section 3.2 would still
be possible.
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are, on which theory or family of theories most satisfactorily accounts for the existence
of functions in nature.
5.2.3 Normativity
The appeal to function introduces a dimension of normativity in the mechanistic picture
of computation. Functions may be performed or may fail to be performed. Moreover,
they may be performed at the correct times and at the adequate rates, or they may fail
to be so performed16. A functional mechanism malfunctions when it fails to perform
one or more of its functions, or when it performs at least one of its functions at inap-
propriate times and at inappropriate rates. This possibility of mistake, of malfunction,
makes normative considerations relevant for teleofunctional mechanisms. Kidneys can
malfunction if for some reason they are unable to ﬁlter blood appropriately, as much as
hearts malfunction if they pump blood irregularly.
Similar considerations apply to computational systems. Computational systems can
miscompute: they may produce outputs that are at odds with the input-output function
it is their teleological function to compute17. In analogous ways, pieces of software,
such as the LYX word editor, may malfunction when one or more of the computations
dictated by the programme are incorrectly carried out  yielding, say, a character that
the user did not input. Miscomputation is an important notion in computer science
that is often neglected. By giving pride of place to a robust notion of function, the
mechanistic view of concrete computation provides the tools to account for the fact
that occasionally computations can go wrong, or better put, that there is something it
is for a computation to be performed according to the function it is supposed to play,
as well as for it to be performed in deviant ways at odds with the teleological functions
of the mechanism carrying out the computation.
5.2.4 Intuitive appeal
The appeal to function, as suggested by Piccinini (2015), has some intuitive appeal.
There are two main kinds of systems that seem intuitively amenable to computational
explanation, and to which the ascription of computational nature seems compelling.
Both kinds of systems are normally seen as having teleological functions. The ﬁrst
and less controversial kind is composed by designed computers of all types, of which
the programmable electronic digital computer implemented on silicon chips is by far
the most pervasive in contemporary societies. Electronic computers have clear, albeit
often variegated, functions. They are designed by engineers to perform concrete com-
putations, a capacity tapped on by software developers to make computers compute
particular functions instrumental to tasks of interest to human beings.
Electronic computers (as well as other kinds of computational devices) have the gen-
eral function of performing digital computations for the straightforward reason that they
are designed to do so. Computational devices, especially those that work with stored
16Garson & Piccinini (2014).
17Fresco & Primiero (2013), Piccinini (2015, pp. 148-150.)
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programmes, also have more specialised functions  functions to perform particular
computations following the instructions implemented in the programmes, and which
are on their turn designed to contribute to tasks of interest to the users (or perhaps
to other computers in the same network). The designed computers that have become
nearly ubiquitous in modern societies are teleofunctional systems, insofar as they are
designed and built in order to perform certain functions.
The other kind of systems in the world that are seen as computational, though
matters here are considerably more controversial, are cognitive systems of living or-
ganisms. Most of cognitive science works on the assumption that cognitive systems
operate by performing computations that integrate incoming information, and control
appropriate behaviour toward the environment, contributing to the survival and repro-
duction of organisms. Whether the computational hypothesis will turn out to be correct
is still far from settled. At any rate, it has contributed to advances in the young, but
quickly developing sciences of the brain and mind. If the idea that cognitive systems are
computational should be vindicated, we would have another example of a kind of com-
putational system which is best understood functionally. Talk of function is particularly
justiﬁed when it comes to organisms and how they are organised. The organs and the
processes going on in the bodies and brains of organisms are paradigmatic cases of en-
tities and activities that have teleological functions, most often helping sustain survival
and reproduction. Putting together biological functions with the computational hypo-
thesis leads to the view that cognitive systems have the biological teleological function
of performing computations.
In sum, the two kinds of systems in the world most likely to be genuinely com-
putational are teleofunctional systems. This observation lends force to the idea that
concrete computations are performed by teleofunctional systems, be them biological or
artiﬁcial. The mechanistic view of concrete computation seems therefore to ﬁt well with
the physical computational systems found in the world.
5.3 Theories of function  a (not so) brief excursus
A robust and objective notion of teleological function plays a central role in the mechan-
istic view of concrete computation. It contributes the grounds for claiming that concrete
computation is objective, non-trivial, and normative. Moreover, the picture squares
well with pretheoretical views on the partial overlap between the kinds of systems in
the world that have teleological functions, and those that perform computations. But
are teleological functions robust and objective, i.e. are teleological functions observer-
independent features of the world? Unless the answer to these questions is positive, the
mechanistic view of concrete computation is in trouble, for all the advantages above are
put in jeopardy.
I do not intend to analyse speciﬁc theories of function, if not very cursorily. I will
rather focus on circumscribing the families of theories of function that are suitable to
fulﬁl the role the mechanistic view of computation requires. Two main approaches to
function have been particularly inﬂuential in the debate: dispositional theories, and
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selected-eﬀects theories. Though many members of these families fail to respect the
desiderata set out above, I argue that some versions of the two approaches succeed.
From the 1970's on, seminal works by Wimsatt (1972) and Wright (1973) spurred
research on functions, helping to give rise to the vast literature on the subject that
developed in the course of the past 40 years. The debate around functions is compre-
hensibly very complex, and I do not aspire to give anything close to a full treatment.
It is though worthwhile to keep in mind at least four dimensions of discussions around
functions, revolving around the following questions:
1. Are functions objective features of the world? This is the dispute between ob-
jectivism and perspectivalism18, already brieﬂy touched upon above. According
to objectivists, functions are objective features of entities in the world; while the
perspectivalist denies that, insisting rather that they are imposed by us in light
of explanatory interests.
2. Is function an uniﬁed notion? This is the debate between uniﬁcationism and
pluralism about functions. For the former, a single account can capture what
functions are 19, while the pluralist argues that more than one account is needed
in order to do justice to the variegated nature of the notion and its usages20.
3. Which theories of function do justice to scientiﬁc employment of the notion? This
is a debate about the adequacy of speciﬁc theories, or families of theories of
function with respect to their ability to capture the use of the notion made by
the sciences. For a pluralist, a further question is worth asking: which notions
of function are suitable for which scientiﬁc enterprises? For our purposes, the
question can be stated in a more speciﬁc way: which theory, or theories of function
are suitable to the cognitive sciences?21
4. Which theory or theories of function are best? This question is often asked in
debates internal to particular families of theories, in an attempt to develop the
most convincing, and less objection-prone version of a theory. But it is also asked
in debates between proponents of diﬀerent approaches, in an attempt to assess
which kinds of account are most promising.
For our purposes, question 1. has the most relevance. Nonetheless, all four will surface,
to diﬀerent extents, in the coming discussion. Before going ahead, however, we need at
least a crude taxonomy of the families of theories proposed in the rich literature about
function. I do not purport that the taxonomy I am oﬀering is the only possible one,
or even the most satisfactory. All that matters for my purposes is that, with such a
taxonomy in hand, it will be possible more readily to determine which taxa correspond
to theories of function that the mechanistic view of concrete computation can use.
18`Perspectivalism' is Craver's (2013) term for the view, others, such as Bigelow & Pargetter (1987),
prefer to dub it `eliminativism'.
19See for instance Wright (1973).
20See Boorse (1976), Godfrey-Smith (1993, 1994).
21See for instance Garson (2011).
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The driving wedge between the two main families mentioned above  dispositional
and selected-eﬀects theories  is the kind of question they take the appeal to function
to answer22. Dispositional theories propose that functions are invoked when answering
questions about how a system, or a type of systems works. These accounts tend to
be ahistorical  they focus on the current properties and dispositions of systems, and
their components. On the other hand, the selected-eﬀects family of theories takes the
appropriate question to be: why is a component of a system there? These theories are
historical: they make reference to the past history of systems, and their components
in trying to explain how and why they persisted in time, within and across individuals
and generations.
To illustrate the distinction, take our running example of the heart. Dispositional
theories claim that the function(s) of the heart hinges on how that heart works, what
its causal powers are in the context of the system of which it is part. The heart has
the function of pumping blood (and perhaps other functions) because that is what it
is disposed to do in the context of the circulatory system, and of the whole organism.
In contrast, according to selected-eﬀects theories, the proper way of understanding the
function of the heart hinges on past instances of hearts, and what they did that made
them persist across generations of organisms  thus explaining why a particular heart
came to be there. A heart has the function of pumping blood because past instances
of hearts in the phylogeny were selected for, and thus persisted because they pumped
blood.
This rough distinction in hand, let us proceed to take a brief look at the two families
of theories of function in turn.
5.3.1 Dispositional theories
Dispositional (or causal-role) theories of function have recourse to the present causal
capacities and dispositions of systems in ﬁxing which functions these and their compon-
ents have. They oﬀer ahistorical notions of function. Dispositions are understood in
terms of counterfactual regularity  were certain conditions to hold, a component (or
a system) would manifest a certain behaviour23. Hearts have the disposition to pump
blood, for when they are introduced in a complex system with speciﬁc characteristics,
they display blood-pumping behaviour. In order to accommodate stochastic regularit-
ies, to be found for instance in the secretion of neurotransmitters by stimulated neurons,
the counterfactual regularities that deﬁne dispositions must be probabilistic.
Systemic functions play a central role in this family of theories. Roughly, systems
and their components have functions insofar as they contribute, or have the disposition
to contribute, to a capacity of a larger enclosing system. Their functions are the roles
they play, or are disposed to play, in the workings of enclosing systems24. Systemic
22Cummins (1975), Boorse (1976).
23Cummins (1975).
24As Cummins (1975, p. 741) puts it: For something to perform its function is for it to have certain
eﬀects on a containing system, which eﬀects contribute to the performance of some activity of, or the
maintenance of some condition in, that containing system.
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functions, in some theories of this family, are claimed to be the only functions to be
had, while other theories claim that they provide the basis for a notion of teleological
function.
A decisive aspect that distinguishes various species of dispositional theories is how
the enclosing system and its capacities are determined. For a component to have a
systemic function, it is necessary to have a way of ﬁxing what the overall system's
capacities, to which the component is disposed to contribute, are. I individuate three
main paths followed by proponents of dispositional theories in answering this question.
The analytic account
Cummins (1975) puts forward an inﬂuential dispositional theory of functions. Functions,
according to Cummins, arise when one takes what he dubs the `analytical strategy' to ex-
planation of dispositional regularities. The analytical strategy starts from a disposition
of a system that calls for an explanation, and decomposes it into further dispositions,
typically of components of the system. Put together, these dispositions explain the
overall disposition of the system target of the explanation. A capacity (disposition) of
a system is analysed in terms of the dispositions that give rise to it. These dispositions
thereby emerge as functions, insofar as they contribute to bringing about the overall
capacity of the system.
Importantly, function-ascription is dependent on an `analytical context', i.e. the
overall disposition, or capacity that one sets out to explain. To use Cummins' example,
the function of the heart is pumping blood in the context of an analysis of the capacity
of the circulatory system to transport nutrients to cells. In a diﬀerent analytical context,
the function of the heart may be diﬀerent. Hearts have the function of making throbbing
noises when the overall capacity of relevance are diagnostic procedures in hospitals, or
the capacity of mothers to soothe their babies25.
Function-ascription is relative to an analytical context. The selection of the analytic
context in each case depends on what capacities are singled out as worth investigat-
ing. That notwithstanding, functions can be seen as observer-independent features of
the world. That physical systems have several diﬀerent capacities, thereby leading to
diﬀerent functional analyses in terms of the dispositions of their components, is a fact
about the world independent of the aims and interests of intentional agents. The latter
come in only when it comes to selecting, out of the many capacities  and functional
analyses  of a system, the one that is most relevant for the purposes at hand.
It follows from this account that physical systems, be them biological, designed, or
else, have several functions. The heart has the function of pumping blood, of making
diagnostically useful throbbing noises, of making soothing throbbing noises, and po-
tentially others, since it appears in functional analyses of diﬀerent overall capacities,
playing in each a diﬀerent causal role  having in each a diﬀerent function. The case of
the heart is not special in this regard. Most physical systems can play diﬀerent causal
roles given the diﬀerent overall capacities to which they contribute, having therefore,
25Cummins (1975, p. 762.)
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by Cummins' lights, several functions. Cummins' analytical account makes the notion
of function extremely liberal.
Moreover, the account does not provide particularly stringent constraints on which
systems are appropriately subject to the analytical strategy26. It follows from this ap-
proach that any complex enough physical system can be explained by means of the
analytical strategy; not only biological or technological systems to which we are pre-
theoretically happy to ascribe functions27. If the water-cycle is the enclosing system,
evaporation acquires the function of contributing to the formation of clouds, while clouds
have the function of producing rain.
The liberality of the analytic account has two aspects: from one side, systems and
components in the world have several functions in so far as they contribute diﬀerently
to diﬀerent overall capacities; from the other side, most, if not all, complex systems are
good candidates for functional analysis, not only biological and designed systems. This
extreme liberality is problematic, if we want to use this notion of function to help ground
the mechanistic view of concrete computation. Though the objectivity of functions is
preserved, thereby satisfying the ﬁrst desideratum set out above, the liberality that the
view entails undermines its ability to help avoid pancomputationalism, and to respect
out pretheoretical intuitions about function ascription. Let us brieﬂy look at each of
these claims in turn.
The appeal to function plays an important role in constraining the domain of systems
in the world that can suitably be seen as computational, the idea being that only systems
that are teleofunctional are candidates for being computational. For this move to help
avoid pancomputationalism, the notion of function at play must be such as to exclude
a considerable number of systems from being functional, and thereby computational.
The extreme liberality of the analytical account makes it unsuitable for the task. Given
that most, or all complex physical systems can undergo functional analyses, it follows
that themselves and/or their components will come out as functional, and therefore as
candidates for computational nature. The analytical account can thus contribute very
little, if at all, to keeping pancomputationalism at bay. Moreover, the fact that the
foregoing account ascribes functions to components and systems that are not biological
or designed clashes with our pretheoretical intuitions about which types of systems in
the world are functional, thus ﬂouting one of the desiderata set out by the mechanistic
view.
A traditional objection to the analytical account has it that the notion of malfunc-
tioning becomes problematic, and with it the normativity of functions28. A circulatory
system that does not work due to damage or malformation still strikes us as having the
function of transporting nutrients and cell waste around the body. However, the ana-
lytical strategy denies that function to such a system, insofar as it lacks the disposition
to perform it. An analysis of a organism with such an ineﬀective circulatory system
26Some criteria to distinguish explanatorily useful from explanatorily useless applications of the
analytical strategy are put forth in Cummins (1975, p. 764).
27Neander (1991).
28For instance, Neander (1991), Buller (1998), Krohs (2009), Garson (2013).
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could not ascribe to it the function of transporting nutrients and cell waste, since it
lacks that disposition. It has all sorts of other dispositions that can be taken to be
functions in diﬀerent analytical contexts, but those cannot malfunction either. If they
were to lack the relevant dispositions, they would lack the ascribed function. Therefore,
the analytical account seems to fail the normativity desideratum as well.
In sum, the analytical account, though preserving the objectivity of functions, has
trouble with the other three core requirements on a theory of function put forward by
the mechanistic view of concrete computation. In consequence, it is unsuited to the
purposes of the mechanistic view. It is though worthwhile to investigate a recent, and
closely related view on the nature of functions, put forward by one of the founding
fathers of the neo-mechanistic approach: Carl Craver's perspectivalism. As will become
clear, many of the problems that aﬀect the analytical account also aﬀect perspectivalism.
Perspectivalism
Perspectivalism, sometimes dubbed `eliminativism', has been proposed most promin-
ently by Craver (2001, 2013). Its distinguishing claim is that the capacities of enclosing
systems that determine the function of their components are purely a matter of the
explanatory interests of human beings. Functions are observer-dependent properties of
the world, they are ascribed in light of a perspective taken by human beings in trying
to make sense of the causal structure of the world.
What determines what the enclosing system is, and what its capacities are, are
choices made in light of explanatory aims. Since enclosing systems and their capacities
are the factors that, on dispositional views, determine the functions of the enclosed
systems and their components, it follows that functions are relative to the explanatory
aims of human beings. As Craver (2013) claims, functions have no place in the ontology
of the world, they are conceptual devices used by us in order to delimit and simplify
parts of the causal structure of the world that we ﬁnd, for one reason or another,
interesting or useful.
Craver's perspectivalism owes much to Cummins' analytical account of functions.
Where it parts ways with the latter is in its insistence that overall capacities, which
determine analytical contexts, are mind-dependent properties, whereas in Cummins'
view they are observer-independent facts. As a consequence, for Craver functions are
interest-relative, rather than observer-independent properties of the world. This ac-
count denies functions objectivity. Once transposed into New Mechanism, this view
of functions brings with it the consequence, already pointed out in section 5.2.2, that
mechanisms themselves are observer-dependent.
A caveat : many neo-mechanists accept a sort of perspectivalism for what regards
mechanistic explanation29. Depending on which phenomenon is chosen as the explanat-
ory target, the same component may appear as playing diﬀerent roles in its contribution
to the overall functioning of the mechanism. If, for instance, one sets oﬀ to explain how
the circulatory system works in mammals, the heart will be seen as having the function
29For instance, Piccinini (2015, p. 142.)
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of pumping blood to the arteries, while if one sets oﬀ to explain doctors' use of the
stethoscope in diagnostics, the contribution of the heart will be the noises it produces
 something unlikely to be mentioned in an explanation of the circulatory system.
This sort of perspectivalism is closer to the analytical account than it is to Craver's
perspectivalism, falling thereby on the objectivist side of the debate about functions.
The point neo-mechanists want to make with this claim is akin to Cummins' point
about diﬀerent functional analyses falling from diﬀerent analytical contexts. For the
neo-mechanist, the same component can be part of several mechanisms at the same
time, and may even have diﬀerent systemic and/or teleological functions for each mech-
anism of which it is a part. A heart can be used as part of a device for tracking the
passage of time, even while still pumping blood to the rest of the organism (by means
of a sensor on the skin that counts heartbeats, for example). In this case, the heart has
the function of pumping blood when the circulatory system of the organism is the mech-
anism of reference, while its function is that of beating regularly when the time-keeping
device is the relevant mechanism. It does not follow that mechanisms or functions are
observer-dependent. Both the circulatory system, and the time-keeping device may be
objective features of the world  they simply share components. Perspectivalism about
mechanistic explanations merely presses the point that depending on the mechanism
of reference, the mechanistic and functional decomposition of a system may diﬀer. As
Piccinini (2015, p. 142) insists, this is an innocuous perspectivalism  one that does
not threat objectivity. It signals a diﬀerence of explanatory focus, but does not threaten
the objective nature of mechanisms, or functions.
In many cases involving biological systems or artefacts the diﬀerent functions ascribed
belong to two diﬀerent types: one or a few teleological functions, many current or po-
tential systemic functions. When the mechanism under consideration is the one that
explains the mutual gravitational attraction between me and the Earth, my heart plays
a role, has a function, insofar as it contributes to my mass, and therefore to my grav-
itational pull. However, such a mechanism is not a functional mechanism  it lacks
any purpose, as much as the water-cycle, or the solar system. There is nothing that
the mechanism behind my gravitational pull is supposed to do: it has no teleological
function. The function of contributing to my mass that the heart has in such a mech-
anism is thus a systemic function, it is merely a causal contribution to a non-functional
mechanism.
The case of the time-keeping device is more complicated. Let us suppose that the
device has been designed by humans to work as a more or less precise clock30. In this
case, the mechanism does seem teleofunctional: it has the function of keeping time to
some degree of precision. Given the design of the device, it is arguable that the heart
has the teleological function of beating suﬃciently regularly. This is the contribution it
makes to the teleological function of the overall mechanism. If the heart were to beat
too irregularly, it would malfunction, it would hinder the time-keeping capacity of the
30I take this case to be akin to the case of diagnostic procedures with stethoscopes, contra Pic-
cinini (2015, p. 103). However, it is arguable whether diagnostic procedures such as these qualify as
mechanisms.
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device. Contrast this with the previous example: there is no sense in which my heart
would be malfunctioning if it contributed more or less mass in the mechanism explaining
my gravitational pull. To push this point further, suppose that the time-keeping device
was not designed, but evolved through natural selection  perhaps because keeping
time to some precision proved to be advantageous to organisms in a particular habitat.
It would seem odd to deny then that the heart does not also have the teleological
function of beating regularly.
These examples illustrate that one can be a perspectivalist about mechanistic ex-
planation, while being an objectivist about both teleological functions, and mechanisms.
Perspectivalism about mechanistic explanation must be kept separate from perspectival-
ism about functions. While perspectivalism about functions entails perspectivalism
about mechanisms, perspectivalism about mechanistic explanation entails neither per-
spectivalism about mechanisms, nor about functions. If the mechanism under invest-
igation is the circulatory system, the heart has the function of pumping blood; if the
mechanism under investigation is that of time-keeping, be it artiﬁcial or biological, the
teleological function of the heart is beating regularly. Two diﬀerent mechanisms, two
diﬀerent teleological functions contributed by the same component. No threat to the
objectivity of either the mechanisms, or the functions follows.
As Piccinini (2015, p. 142) points out, objectivity would be in jeopardy only if, for
the same target capacity, diﬀerent and incompatible correct mechanistic explanations
could be provided  if, for instance, there could be two correct and incompatible
mechanistic explanations of the circulatory system. Therefore, the perspectivalism that
is common in the neo-mechanist literature should not be confused with the considerably
stronger, and non-innocuous type of perspectivalism put forward by Craver (2013).
Given the close relationship between functional and mechanistic explanation, an anti-
realist, perspectival view of functions leads to a non-innocuous perspectival view of
mechanisms. Mechanisms, on this view, are ways of carving nature in more or less
arbitrary ways according to our needs and interests. As Craver (2013, pp. 134-135)
puts it,
Mechanistic and functional descriptions ... presuppose a vantage point on
the causal structure of the world, a stance taken by intentional creatures
when they single out certain preferred behaviours as worthy of explanation...
[functions] are imposed from without by creatures seeking to understand
how a given phenomenon of interest is situated in the causal structure of
the world.
This fundamental diﬀerence between the analytical account and strong perspectivalism
nothwithstanding, when it comes to supplementing the mechanistic view of concrete
computation with a notion of function, the latter fails for reasons not dissimilar to
the ones that made the analytical account unsuitable for our purposes. Let us assess
perspectivalism in light of the four tasks that the notion of function is supposed to fulﬁl
in the mechanistic view of concrete computation.
The foregoing view of functions and mechanisms denies the objectivity of computa-
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tion to which the mechanistic view of computation wants to cling, beside bringing back
the spectre of pancomputationalism, which the computational mechanist is at pains
to avoid. The traditional objection to Cummins' analytic view of functions presented
in the last section also aﬀects perspectivalism. By relying on current dispositions of
components and systems for function ascription, it becomes mysterious how to make
space for malfunction. One possible path to follow is to argue that the normativity of
function is itself also imposed from without: when functional talk is appealed to in ex-
planation, its normativity is, as it were, included in the package. The `creatures seeking
to understand' a certain phenomenon may already have criteria for what they consider
as proper functioning as opposed to malfunctioning  they may already impose, that
is to say, a view on what the system under investigation, as well as its components, are
supposed to do. I will not pursue this line of reply, since it involves giving up objectiv-
ism about the normativity of functions, a consequence that is at odds with the aims of
the mechanistic view of concrete computation.
Finally, as for the analytical account, perspectivalism does not square well with our
pretheoretical intuitions about what kinds of systems in the world count as having tele-
ological functions. Non-designed and non-biological systems, such as planetary systems
or the water-cycle, can be analysed by means of the analytical strategy, yielding func-
tional ascriptions to their components. This ﬂouts our intuitions that functions apply
exclusively to artefacts and biological systems.
In sum, perspectivalism is clearly not suitable for fulﬁlling the needs of the mech-
anistic view of computation: it fails to satisfy all four desiderata set out above.
Propensity theories
The analytical account and perspectivalism are not the only available declensions of
dispositional theories of function. Propensity theories also have recourse to dispositions
of components and systems in accounting for function. However, instead of embracing
liberality of function, or making function hinge on explanatory interests and other
pragmatic factors, propensity theories individuate one or more special capacities, or
overall dispositions, that ground the possession of functions.
I will focus here on the version of the theory developed in Bigelow & Pargetter (1987),
targeted speciﬁcally at biological functions. According to their proposal, functions are
properties of organisms and their components that lead to a disposition that enhances
their capacity to survive. Survival is the privileged capacity that bestows functions
on biological systems and their components  only those dispositions that contribute,
or would contribute, to survival count as functions. Taking survival as the relevant
capacity for functional ascription is not supposed to depend on our explanatory interests,
thereby avoiding the observer-relativity that marks the perspectivalist position. There
are no competing choices of capacity that ground organisms and their parts possessing
functions.
Dispositions to contribute to survival are relative to particular habitats, as Bigelow
& Pargetter (1987) are quick to point out. Dispositions that enhance survival in one
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environment may hinder it in others. How to determine the habitat against which
to measure the survival value of a disposition? Bigelow & Pargetter (1987) admit
that this is not straightforward, and help themselves to a vague notion of `natural' or
`usual' habitat. It is against the backdrop of the natural habitat of a type of organism,
or of internal components of organisms, that biological functions can be determined.
Hence, the components of an organism that has always lived in a hostile, `non-natural'
environment, still have functions  for they would contribute to survival were the
organism to live in its natural habitat.
Let us apply this theory to our running example, the heart. The heart has the
function of pumping blood because in the natural habitat of organisms with hearts
it is the disposition of hearts to pump blood that contributes to the survival of the
organism. On the other hand, the disposition to produce throbbing noises does not
enhance survival in the natural habitats of such organisms. Against this latter point,
it may be argued that, in a habitat in which diagnostic procedures for cardiac health
involving stethoscopes are widespread, the noises generated by the heart do contribute
to survival. By allowing heart conditions to be discovered readily and treated, the
disposition to produce throbbing noises contributes to the survival of the organism.
It is at least arguable that there is a sense of `natural habitat' that would include
such diagnostic procedures. A case can be made that in contemporary societies those
diagnostic procedures, given how widespread and ingrained in our cultures they are,
make part of the natural habitat of humans as well as domesticated animals.
Much thereby hinges on how to deﬁne the notion of natural habitat. Too much
vagueness risks opening the doors to an overly liberal notion of function (e.g. if the
whole universe, or possible worlds could count as natural habitats). Nonetheless, even
a generous notion of natural habitat, one that for instance makes most contemporary
human societies count as such, can lead to a suﬃciently delimited account of biological
functions. It does not seem absurd to claim that in contemporary societies the throbbing
noise of hearts does have the function of communicating the state of the heart to medical
practitioners.
Bigelow & Pargetter (1987, p. 195) argue that the noises produced by hearts do
not count as teleological functions. For, they argue, heart-noises would be present
even if they made no contribution to survival. They are parasitic on the function
that actually explains the presence of hearts in organisms, namely their capacity to
pump blood  the noises being merely a by-product. I think, however, that Bigelow
and Pargetter cannot appeal to this kind of considerations, on pain of abandoning the
dispositional approach. Dispositional theories of functions are forward-looking  they
are concerned with the `how does it work' question, and not the `why is it there' one.
Heart-noises do contribute to survival in most contemporary human societies, insofar
as they contribute to widespread diagnostic procedures. Whether or not this is why
hearts are present in humans in most contemporary societies is a diﬀerent question,
one that has little to do with dispositions to contribute to survival. Much hinges on
how to deﬁne `natural habitats'. At any rate, it seems that, barring implausibly liberal
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construals of the notion, the foregoing account still leads to an objective and non-trivial
notion of biological function31.
I will not purport to assess the general merits of propensity theories as theories of
function32. My aim is much more limited, i.e. evaluating whether such theories can
provide a notion of function that the mechanistic view of concrete computation can use.
Let us then focus on the four requirements laid out above.
First, Bigelow and Pargetter's propensity theory seems to provide an objective
notion of function, insofar as no recourse is made to observer-dependent properties.
Though the notion of `natural habitat' is vague, the theory still delivers, barring excep-
tionally generous construals of that notion, non-trivial functional ascriptions. Not all
systems or their components would have the function of computing. Consequently, pan-
computationalism is avoided: since computational systems are functional mechanisms
with the teleological function of computing, and not all physical systems are functional
mechanisms with such a function, not all physical systems are computational.
Lacking a general theory that also subsumes functions of artefacts, it is impossible
to assess whether the theory accords with our pretheoretical intuitions. The scope of
Bigelow and Pargetter's theory is limited to biological systems, one of the domains
to which we tend to ascribe teleological functions. Whether it can be satisfactorily
expanded to the other domain, designed systems, is unclear. This introduces a note of
caution for the computational mechanist lured by the foregoing propensity theory.
Importantly, the theory fails the normativity requirement, for it has trouble with the
notion of malfunction in a way similar to perspectivalism33. Bigelow and Pargetter's
propensity theory entails that systems and components that we pretheoretically regard
as dysfunctional do not have functions at all. For these lack dispositions to contribute
to survival  given how they are constituted, they lack the disposition to do what func-
tioning ones do. A severely malformed or damaged heart does not have the disposition
to contribute to the survival of the organism, quite on the contrary. It follows from
the foregoing account that such a heart lacks any function  it could not pump blood
adequately in any circumstances, and therefore cannot and could not contribute to the
survival of the organism. This is an unfortunate result. We tend to regard such cases as
still involving functions: the said heart has the function of pumping blood, but fails to
perform it34. Bigelow and Pargetter's propensity theory fails adequately to capture the
normativity of function, an important requirement for the mechanistic view of concrete
computation.
31A complicated task that a full theory should address is that of justifying why survival, rather
than something else, should be the capacity of relevance for determining biological functions. Another
issue is whether this kind of theory can be expanded to include not only biological functions, but also
functions of artefacts. Bigelow & Pargetter (1987, p. 194) brieﬂy hint at such an expansion, suggesting
a general notion of function grounded on propensities for selection, be them natural or artiﬁcial. It is
worth pointing out how this general theory seems to be at odds with the theory for biological functions
just presented, which has no role for a notion of selection.
32For criticism, see Godfrey-Smith (1994, pp. 352-55.)
33 Millikan (1989b), Neander (1991), Piccinini (2015).
34This is so even in cases in which a heart never pumped blood. Think about infants born with
severe organ malformation  we still ascribe a function to the malformed organ, even though it never
performed it, and never could have.
129
The propensity theory just examined, in sum, meets the ﬁrst two requirements set
by the computational mechanist on a satisfying theory of function; but it fails the third,
and is silent on the fourth. In consequence, it seems unﬁt to complement the mechanistic
view of concrete computation.
Goal-based theories
The ﬁnal type of dispositional theory of function that I will examine, goal-based theories,
have been proposed by, among others, Boorse (1976) and Piccinini (2015). According
to these theories, teleological functions hinge on the goals of organisms and artefacts,
the latter perhaps being derivative on the former. More precisely, functions are held to
be contributions to the goals of organisms. A natural question arises: how to determine
the goals of organisms? In the case of conscious, deliberating agents such as human
beings, some goals are consciously entertained, intentions are had, and plans are made.
But in the great majority of function ascriptions we are not dealing with conscious
deliberating agents, even when we are concerned with human beings. The goal or goals
that hearts contribute to need not, and generally are not, consciously entertained by
organisms. Moreover, in the great majority of situations, hearts continue to perform
their functions regardless of conscious goals individuals might have.
Boorse (1976) oﬀers a goal-based theory in which the goals of organisms that help
determine functions vary from context to context. Functions, he claims, are relative to
system, goal, and time35. However, he gives no criteria for determining what the goals
of systems are at any point in time, opening the door to pernicious liberality of function
ascription. Moreover, making functions relative to time introduces further liberality.
As Boorse admits, at a certain moment a luckily placed book may contribute to the
goal of surviving by stopping a bullet from damaging vital organs. In this context, the
book will have had the function of stopping the bullet, thereby preserving vital organs
from damage, and contributing to the goal of the organism to survive.
This liberal, context-dependent account of functions is too generous in its function
ascriptions to be of any use to the mechanistic view of concrete computation. Almost
any physical system can be used at a certain point in time as a special-purpose com-
puter  a falling stone may be used to compute the height of a tower, or the value of
gravitational acceleration of the planet it is in. This would lead to limited pancompu-
tationalism, since almost any system can have the teleological function of computing
in speciﬁc circumstances. Though it arguably maintains the objectivity of functions,
since no observer-dependent properties are appealed to by the account, Boorse's view is
unsuitable to the mechanistic view of computation due to its liberality. Moreover, it is
liable to the same line of objection regarding normativity that plagues pespectivalism
and propensity theories.
Other goal-based theories are considerably less liberal, and hold promise as providers
of a robust notion of teleological function that helps make sense of objective, non-trivial,
and normative computation in physical systems. An alternative goal-based theory in
35Boorse (1976, p. 80.)
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which liberality is curbed has been proposed by Piccinini (2015). He focuses on what
he dubs objective goals of organisms: goals that organisms are organised in such a way
as to strive to attain. One of these goals is survival, understood as the maintenance
of processes and states that protect the organism from perturbations, and allow its
continuation. Another objective goal is what Piccinini calls inclusive ﬁtness: organisms
are organised in such a way as to allow the production and protection of new organisms
similar to themselves, either directly or indirectly (e.g. by protecting the oﬀspring of a
similar organism)36. Two factors justify the selection of survival and inclusive ﬁtness as
the objective goals of organisms: ﬁrst, if those goals were not fulﬁlled, organisms would
cease to exist, for they would be incapable of preserving themselves, and reproducing;
second, organisms expend energy in striving to fulﬁl such goals.
Objective goals form the basis of Piccinini's theory of teleological functions:
A teleological function in an organism is a stable contribution by a trait
(or component, activity, property) of organisms belonging to a biological
population to an objective goal of those organisms. (Piccinini 2015, p. 108)
Something analogous can be said of artefacts: their teleological functions are their
contributions to the objective goals of the organisms that created them37. This applies
to all or most artefacts created by animals, and at least to some artefacts designed by
humans  such as clothing, and spears. These contributions need not be direct, as in
those examples. Computers, for instance, contribute to complex analyses and planning,
which in their turn improve production of goods that contribute to the survival and
inclusive ﬁtness of human beings (at least in theory).
However, many human-created artefacts do not contribute to survival and inclusive
ﬁtness  think of lava lamps, selﬁe-sticks, or Tetris  and a surprisingly large number of
them actually hinder fulﬁlment of those goals  think of addictive recreational drugs,
cigarettes, contraceptives. Nevertheless, these artefacts are generally taken to have
functions, though it is arguable whether they have teleological functions, rather than
merely systemic functions. At any rate, such devices do seem to have purposes and ends,
they are designed for displaying a certain capacity, and can be said to be malfunctioning
when they fail to do so.
To accommodate these cases, though remaining neutral on whether they really in-
volve teleological functions, Piccinini introduces the notion of subjective goal38. Sub-
jective goals are goals that sentient, and rational organisms may have other than the
objective goals of survival and inclusive ﬁtness. They may relate to pleasure, interest,
avoidance of pain and boredom. A general theory of teleological functions takes into
consideration contributions to objective and subjective goals of organisms.
Let us see whether Piccinini's goal-based theory succeeds in furnishing a suitable
notion of teleological function to the mechanistic view of concrete computation, as it
was intended to do.
36Piccinini (2015, p. 105-6.)
37Piccinini (2015, p. 111.)
38Piccinini (2015, p. 116.)
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First, as with Boorse's account, the objectivity of teleological functions is guaran-
teed. No recourse to explanatory interests, or other observer-dependent properties is
made. Second, deﬁning what goals are, and determining which kinds of goal are rel-
evant to the ﬁxation of functions helps avoid pancomputationalism. The contribution
that most components and artefacts make to objective (and subjective) goals are not
computational in nature. Moreover, such contributions must be stable, and cannot be
accidental happenings as in the case of the bullet-stopping book. Even though com-
plex enough physical systems can be used to compute in speciﬁc circumstances, and
thus contribute to some subjective goal, their contribution is not stable or frequent:
it only takes place in very speciﬁc circumstances, while most often those systems con-
tribute a diﬀerent capacity to a diﬀerent objective or subjective goal, if any39. Third,
the foregoing account encompasses biological systems and artefacts, ascribing functions
exclusively to them, as our pretheoretical intuitions would want.
However, there is the risk that normativity will prove tricky to this theory as much
as it did to the ones analysed above: deformed or damaged components that do not
make stable contributions to objective (or subjective) goals would seem excluded from
possession of functions. It would follow that they have no function, rather than having
a function that they fail to perform. As for the propensity theory, malfunction appears
to be impossible, putting the normativity of function in jeopardy.
Piccinini's theory manages to dodge this problem, for the proposed deﬁnition of
function makes reference to biological populations  and more generally to types, thus
also covering functions of artefacts. Hearts in humans contribute to survival by pumping
blood. A token heart that does not is a malfunctioning heart, and not a heart deprived
of function, insofar as hearts in the overall population have the function of pumping
blood. Similarly, a computer that does not compute is malfunctioning inasmuch as
it belongs to a type that has the function of computing. In this way, the notion of
malfunction, and the normativity of function, are preserved.
There is one unfortunate consequence that makes the normativity that comes out
from this account clash with our pretheoretical function ascriptions40. Suppose that a
mutation causes most tokens of an organ to stop working properly, and thus cease to
contribute to the objective goals of organisms. By the lights of the foregoing theory, that
organ would cease to have a function, for most tokens of the type would not contribute
to survival and inclusive ﬁtness41. This is at odds with our pretheoretical intuitions:
if all kidneys were to cease ﬁltering blood due to a viral epidemic, we would say that
all kidneys became dysfunctional, not that they suddenly ceased to have a teleological
function. Piccinini (2015, p. 114) hints at a possible way out, i.e. counting as tokens
not only present instances of a type, but also past instances (within individuals). So
kidneys could still retain their function given the fact that they did in the past  before
the epidemic. This move introduces a historical element in the account, but only to a
39See Piccinini (2015, p. 112.)
40This point also applies to dispositional theories that appeal to statistical considerations, as versions
of Boorse's, and Bigelow and Pargetter's theories.
41Neander (1991, pp. 182-83).
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very limited extent. Selectional history is not brought to bear, but only the capacities
that the same token, now diseased, had before the disease. Thereby the account can
still claim to be largely ahistorical.
Counterintuitive results would still follow. Suppose further that the virus that dis-
eased existing kidneys also generated a genetic mutation that ensured that the oﬀspring
of diseased organisms would also feature dysfunctional kidneys. At some point in the
future, most kidneys would never have had the capacity to ﬁlter blood, and would thus
lack teleological functions. To avoid this problematic consequence, a stronger appeal
to historical considerations would be required, e.g. to the (deep or recent) selectional
history that led to the existence and persistence of kidneys in the phylogeny. This move
would turn the foregoing view into something much more alike historical, or backward-
looking, theories of function, which I will examine in the next section. The goal-based
theorist is thereby presented with a choice between a counterintuitive consequence of
the account, which is though considerably limited in scope, and may arguably prompt a
revision of the pretheoretical use of the term; or giving up the ahistoricity of the theory.
However goal-based theorists may go on this issue, a robust notion of normativity is
available.
Piccinini's goal-based theory respects all four requirements on a notion of function
that can suitably help compose the mechanistic view of concrete computation  perhaps
unsurprisingly, since it was tailored to do so. We therefore have the existence proof that
we needed to defend the cogency of the mechanistic view: at least one available, plausible
theory answers to the job description set out by the computational mechanist. Though
this is a suﬃcient result, I will go on and analyse the other broad family of theories of
function  based on the notion of selected eﬀects  to examine whether it can provide
notions of function that respect the four desiderata above as well.
5.3.2 Selected-eﬀects theories
The main alternative to dispositional theories appeals to history in bestowing teleolo-
gical functions. Selected-eﬀects theories have recourse to the selectional history of a
component or system in determining its functions42. This sort of theory takes the rel-
evant question that appeal to function answers to be: why is a certain component or
system there? The answer is given in terms of the capacities that past instances of the
component or system displayed that explains the existence and persistence of instances
today. The capacity that explains the existence and persistence of a component or sys-
tem today is the teleological function of that component or system. An early version of
a theory of this kind was put forward by Wright (1973). His proposal is the following:
The function of X is Z means
(a) X is there because it does Z,
(b) Z is a consequence (or result) of X's being there. (Wright 1973, p. 161)
42This terminological choice is not without problems, since there can be dispositional accounts based
on dispositions to be selected. Bigelow & Pargetter (1987) hint at such a view. I rely on the past tense
of `selected' to underline the historical dimension of the family of theories here examined.
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According to this view, what a component does, the eﬀects it has, explains why it is
there. Hearts are there because they pump blood, and pumping blood is an eﬀect of
hearts being there. Pumping blood is therefore the function of hearts. This formula-
tion is very general, and does not directly refer to selection processes, or to historical
considerations. The way the eﬀects of a component explain its presence in a system is
left open. This generality invites crippling objections.
Boorse (1976) considers the case of a leak in a hose that contains a poisonous gas.
The leak causes the release of the gas into the room, making so that anyone who tries to
ﬁx it falls unconscious due to inhalation of the gas. According to Wright's analysis, the
leak would have the function of releasing the poisonous gas, for the leak persists because
it releases the gas (knocking unconscious anyone who tries to ﬁx it), and the release
of the gas is a consequence of the leak. This shows how, without further constraints,
the foregoing view is overly liberal: it ascribes functions in cases in which function
ascription is inappropriate.
The best way to improve over the pernicious liberality that marks Wright's view is to
oﬀer more precise constraints on the processes underlying (a). In the case of biological
functions and non-human artefacts, natural selection is the main, but not the only,
candidate; while for human artefacts, intentions, as well as rational selection between
alternatives may play a role. What kinds of processes underlie (a), and whether there
is one type of such processes or many, are the main factors that tell apart diﬀerent
theories belonging to the selected-eﬀects family.
The basic structure oﬀered by Wright has been further developed in diﬀerent ways
by a host of theorists, among which Millikan (1984, 1989b), Neander (1991), Godfrey-
Smith (1993, 1994), Buller (1998), Garson (2011). Selected-eﬀects theories tend to be
less heterogeneous than dispositional theories. Many of the diﬀerences between distinct
views stem from the more or less general notion of selection employed, as well as the
temporal span of the selection history relevant for function ﬁxation (e.g. deep vs. recent
history). I will dedicate little space to the varieties of selected-eﬀects theories, since in
many cases their diﬀerences are subtle, and of little relevance to my present purposes.
The paradigmatic kind of selection process appealed to in these theories is natural
selection. A trait or organ has a function if it contributed to the reproduction of organ-
isms having it, causing the trait or organ to survive in organisms across generations.
Such contribution is its function. The reason why the trait or organ is (or was) present in
organisms is its having done something in past organisms that increased their reproduct-
ive success, and thereby caused the reinstatiation of the trait or organ in new organisms
in the same phylogeny. In some views, natural selection is taken to be the only kind of
selection that bestows functions on physical (biological) systems, e.g. Neander (1991),
Godfrey-Smith (1994). Other views tend to be more liberal, and allow other kinds of
selection processes to play a role in bestowing functions. Nevertheless, it is undeniable
that natural selection  and to a lesser extent sexual selection  have pride of place in
selected-eﬀects accounts of function. Natural selection putatively provides the means to
account for most biological functions, with other forms of selection covering relatively
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smaller domains, and sometimes being parasitic on it.
The weight given to natural selection, even in accounts more liberal than Neander's
(1991), risks neglecting the important role that other selection processes may play in
bestowing functions. As Garson (2011) points out, there are several cases in which
function ascriptions are made in biology that do not involve phenomena for which nat-
ural selection is a plausible selection processes. Biologists are happy to assign functions
to traits and behaviours that develop ontogenetically, such as neural and antibody se-
lection, as well as some forms of learning43. Natural selection, being eﬀective only
phylogenetically, cannot account for these cases. Moreover, such traits get selected by
means other than diﬀerential reproduction, on which natural selection is based. Ac-
counts that rely heavily on diﬀerential reproduction may be overly restrictive, failing to
cover some cases of function ascription in biology.
These considerations lead to the `generalised selected-eﬀects theory' proposed by
Garson (2011, p. 555):
The function of a trait consists in that activity that historically contrib-
uted to its being diﬀerentially reproduced or diﬀerentially retained within a
biological system.
Insofar as it encompasses most of the factors that play important roles in diﬀerent
accounts, I will take Garson's generalised theory as representative of selected-eﬀects
theories of function. Its broadness is welcome, as it provides an uniﬁed account supposed
to cover all biological functions. But there is a further factor that distinguishes selected-
eﬀects theories from each other, as already hinted. It hinges on how to understand
`historically' in the deﬁnition above.
Some views understand the appeal to history as an appeal to deep history, that is,
to the contributions to diﬀerential reproduction and retention that took place in the
remote evolutionary past of the phylogeny. This approach is more congenial to views
that adopt a narrow understanding of what selection processes are relevant, inasmuch
as deep history is not directly relevant to learning, and other selection processes that
happen in ontogeny, while it is relevant to natural and sexual selection. Other views
take the appeal to history to involve only recent history44. This position is compatible
both with narrow understandings of selection processes, such as Godfrey-Smith's (1994),
and with more liberal views, such as Garson's. Whereas in the former case the appeal
is to recent evolutionary history, in the latter it also includes ontogenetic and learning
histories of individual organisms.
Though I believe that views that rely on diﬀerent kinds of selection processes, such
as Garson's, are much more promising, I need not take sides. More relevant to my aims
is to assess whether the notion of function that comes out of selected-theories accounts





5.3.3 Assessing selected-eﬀects theories of function
Objectivity
Selected-eﬀects theories seem quite easily to respect the objectivity requirement set by
the mechanistic account of concrete computation. The selection processes they have
recourse to are independent of the cognitive states, and explanatory practices of hu-
mans. All the selection processes appealed to  natural selection, neural and antibody
selection, as well as some forms of learning  are objective features of the world,
taking place independently of the presence of observers. By grounding function on
such processes, selected-eﬀects theories yield objective, observer-independent functions.
Biological traits already had functions long before humans, or even sentient animals, ex-
isted. Relatedly, selected-eﬀects theories base functions on purely naturalistic grounds,
as the selection processes at work are bona ﬁde naturalistic processes. The scientiﬁc
credentials of the notion of function in the biological sciences are preserved.
Nevertheless, there are reasons for dissatisfaction regarding the way objectivity is
obtained in selected-eﬀects accounts. Objectors have insisted that this family of views
produces a notion of function that has little explanatory value inasmuch as it involves
only reference to past events, and not to the current causal dispositions of physical
systems. As Piccinini (2015, p. 102) puts it: the history of an organism's ancestors
cannot contribute to the causal powers of that organism's components or properties.
History, the claim goes, is irrelevant to the current causal powers of systems.
Take two identical connectionist networks. One has been trained to distinguish male
from female faces, training that led it to have the weighted connexions it has; while the
other was generated by a random process. Both have the power to distinguish male
from female faces, and can therefore be used in face-recognition software. But selected-
eﬀects theories would have it that while the former has a function, having undergone a
process of selection, the latter does not, as it has no such history45. This strikes many
as counterintuitive, as it fails to do justice to the present causal powers of systems.
For related reasons, selected-eﬀects theories are accused of making functions epi-
phenomenal. Since the function-bestowing selection processes happen in the past, they
are not directly connected to the causal powers of current tokens of the functional type46.
What function a system has is largely independent of its actual causal powers, being
ﬁxed by the causal powers of past tokens of the type which led to its selection. While
this helps the selected-eﬀects account to give an answer to the malfunction problem
that plagues dispositional accounts  as we will see in more detail below  it does so
by disjoining functions from current causal powers, thus arguably making the notion of
function epiphenomenal.
At the heart of this dispute lies the more fundamental debate regarding what ques-
tion the notion of function is supposed to answer. Proponents of dispositional theories
take the relevant question to be something akin to: what causal contribution does the
system make? On the other hand, friends of selected-eﬀects theories take the question
45This is a less fanciful version of the `swamp' argument. See also Eliasmith (2000).
46See Artiga & Martínez (2016).
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to be answered to be: why is the system or component there?
The latter are unlikely to be swayed by the causal explanatory value and epiphen-
omenalism objections. For these objections only grab a hold when it is the former
question the one considered to be central. There is no problem in answering a why-
question without having recourse to current causal powers of systems. On the contrary,
it is to be expected that questions about the reason why something is present will rely
on historical factors. Moreover, selected-eﬀects theories do provide a causal explana-
tion in answering such why-questions, for the selection processes appealed to are causal
processes. From the fact that there is no appeal to current causal powers it does not
follow that the explanation provided is not causal. The bite of this line of objection
to selected-eﬀects theories hinges largely on the more basic dispute about what role, or
roles, the notion of function plays is in our scientiﬁc pursuits. Unless this fundamental
issue is solved, the objections from epiphenomenalism and lack of causal explanatory
value lose much of their weight47.
In sum, selected-eﬀects theories can provide an objective, observer-independent,
notion of function. They do so by means of an appeal to selection processes that took
place in the past, partially disconnecting the notion from the current causal powers
of physical systems. Though this has led to charges of epiphenomenalism, and lack of
causal explanatory value, these only grab a hold once a stand on deeper issues about the
role of the notion of function in science is adopted  a stand to which selected-eﬀects
theorists are hostile. In the current state of play, those objections fail to motivate the
rejection of selected-eﬀects theories, and the objectivity of function that ensues from it.
Selected-eﬀects theories hence respect the objectivity requirement placed by the
mechanistic view of concrete computation.
Pancomputationalism
Selected-eﬀects theories also help avoid pancomputationalism. Only systems that have
undergone selection processes (of one or more kinds) are candidates for possessing func-
tions. Given that few types of processes qualify as selection processes, and that most
physical systems do not undergo those process, it follows that most physical systems
are not candidates for possessing functions. Since for the mechanistic view of concrete
computation only systems that possess functions can be candidates for being compu-
tational, and given that selected-eﬀects theories rule out most physical systems from
possessing functions, it follows that most physical systems are not computational. Pan-
computationalism is avoided.
As for propensity theories, selected-eﬀects theories are often limited to biological
functions, so that artefacts, such as artiﬁcial computers, are outside their purview. In
extending a selected-eﬀects theory to encompass functions of artefacts, two comple-
mentary paths seem to be available: (a) take artefactual function to be derivative of
biological function, artefacts being selected by processes such as natural selection due
47Pluralism about function, I submit, is the most promising approach, though I will not argue for it
here. See Tinbergen (1963), Milkowski (2016).
137
to their increasing the ﬁtness and survival chances of the organisms that used them;
(b) see artefactual function as stemming from a diﬀerent kind of selection process, in
which rational choice in light of the objectives and intentions of individuals or collectives
selects the most adequate artefact or artefact design.
The former path seems to be most suitable for artefacts built by non-human species,
such as beaver dams, ant mounds, and the sticks chimpanzees use to catch insects.
The second path ﬁts best human-built artefacts, which often go through processes of
individual or collective planning. During planning, design proposals that are judged to
be inferior to alternatives in light of set individual or collective goals are rejected, and
superior ones are selected. In either case, it is to be seen whether the resulting accounts
succeed in avoiding being too liberal in bestowing functions on physical systems, which
might open the doors for a limited pancomputationalism restricted only to non-biological
systems. I will not assess this possibility, as it would involve a lengthy diversion. Though
a non-liberal selected-eﬀects theory of artefactual functions does not seem particularly
diﬃcult to come by, it is worth keeping in mind that, as things stand, the risk of a
limited pancomputationalism remains present. That notwithstanding, there are good
prima facie reasons to believe that selected-eﬀects theories have the tools to help the
mechanistic view of concrete computation avoid pancomputationalism, while at the
same time encompassing both biological and designed computational systems.
Normativity
Perhaps the crucial advantage of selected-eﬀects theories in relation to dispositional
theories is how they handle the normativity of function. As we have seen in section 5.3.1,
dispositional theories have considerable diﬃculties in providing an appropriate notion
of malfunction. Selected-eﬀects theories, in contrast, have a ready way to account for
the normativity of function.
Recall that dispositional accounts have trouble because they cannot easily disjoin the
function of a system from its current causal powers, making it so that a system cannot
have a function if it lacks the appropriate causal powers. Selected-eﬀects theories avoid
this diﬃculty insofar as they do not appeal to current causal powers in grounding the
notion of function. A system has a function insofar as it or, more typically, its ancestors
were selected because of the eﬀects they had in the past. A malfunctioning system
lacks the causal powers required to bring about the eﬀects that led to it or its ancestors
being selected. But it has a function insofar as it has an appropriate selection history,
regardless of whether it is currently capable of performing it.
The appeal to past history of selection that characterises selected-eﬀects theories
gives them the tools adequately to respect the normativity of function, and in a way
compatible with scientiﬁc naturalism. Functions are bestowed by selection history,
regardless of the actual causal powers of token systems. In this way, systems that
for one reason or another do not have the appropriate causal powers still retain their
functions. They are malfunctioning insofar as they are incapable of bringing about the
eﬀects they were selected to bring about. A heart has the function of pumping blood if
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in the history of selection hearts were selected because they pumped blood, leading to
the instantiation of token hearts. If due to some congenital disease a heart is unable to
pump blood, it is a malfunctioning heart  if fails to perform its function insofar as it
is incapable of pumping blood, the eﬀect for which hearts were selected, selection that
explains the existence of that particular heart.
In sum, by severing the close tie between current causal powers and functions put
in place by dispositional theories, selected-eﬀects theories are able to account for the
normativity of function, and preserve an adequate notion of malfunction  as the
mechanistic view of concrete computation requires.
Intuitive appeal
Selected-eﬀects theories, as we have seen, are mostly thought to account for functions
of biological systems, one of the two kinds of physical systems which we tend prethe-
oretically to regard as teleofunctional. But unless theories of this family are broadened
to encompass artefacts, they clash with our intuitions, insofar as they deny that arte-
facts have functions in the same way that biological systems do. At any rate, there
are ways to broaden the scope of selected-eﬀects theories so as to make them account
for artefactual functions as well. If such attempts should succeed, as seems plausible,
selected-eﬀects theories would cover the two domains in which the common-sense notion
of function grabs a hold, namely biological systems, and artefacts.
Two outcomes of selected-eﬀects theories arguably clash with pretheoretical intu-
itions.
First, selected-eﬀects theories deny functions to systems that have the appropriate
causal powers to generate an eﬀect, but which lack a selection history. Two identical
systems, with identical causal powers, may diﬀer in the functions they possess depend-
ing on whether they are the products of selection processes, or merely of chance. This
result supposedly clashes with general intuitions about when function ascription is ap-
propriate, and explanatorily helpful48.
Second, ﬁrst instances of a certain trait or system do not have functions. As they do
not have appropriate selection histories, they have no function by the lights of selected-
eﬀects theories, even though their producing the eﬀects that they do leads to selection
and persistence of themselves, and perhaps of future instances. This outcome arguably
goes against our pretheoretical intuitions, as we would normally be happy to assign
functions to ﬁrst instances.
Even admitting that selected-eﬀects theories produce these counterintuitive results,
arguments based on pretheoretical intuitions have limited weight. Measured against
the theoretical virtues, and the explanatory fruitfulness of a theory, the alleged coun-
terintuitiveness of some of its tenets should not motivate its rejection, as the history
of science illustrates profusely. More important for selected-eﬀects theories is to make
sure that artefacts are also contemplated, given how useful and productive the notion
of artefactual function is. Proponents of selected-eﬀects theories may either broaden
48See Piccinini (2015, pp. 102-3.)
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the scope of their theories, as suggested above, or else embrace some form of pluralism
about function  e.g. by letting selection processes determine biological functions, and
contributions to objective and subjective goals determine artefactual functions. In the
latter case, it is crucial for the purposes of the mechanistic view of concrete computation
that all the theories of function employed respect the four requirements set above.
5.4 Concluding remarks
An objective notion of teleological function is crucial for the mechanistic view of concrete
computation to succeed in its attempt to overcome the shortcomings of rival theories.
The reliance on such a notion is controversial, and potentially problematic, for the
notion of function itself is to some extent an obscure concept awaiting a fully satisfactory
philosophical treatment. As I showed in this chapter, the prospects for the mechanistic
view of concrete computation are positive. There are plausible theories of function
available that can play the role required by the mechanistic view, thereby securing its
superiority in relation to competing views of concrete computation. In particular, two
families of views, goal-based theories and broadened selected-eﬀects theories, meet the
set requirements.
The aim of this chapter was not to defend or endorse a particular theory of function,
but was rather to provide a proof of existence: theories of function that have the
characteristics required by the mechanistic view are in hand49. As I have shown, there
are theories that are up to the task.
With the mechanistic view of concrete computation now thoroughly defended, it
is time to get back to the problems that exercised us in Part I. It is time, that is, to
come back to the issue of representation in the cognitive sciences, an issue that becomes
considerably more tractable, I believe, once we are armed, as we presently are, with a
suﬃciently robust notion of concrete computation.
49Partly for this reason, I have not attempted to provide an exhaustive survey of theories of function
put forward in the literature. Promising views that I have not tackled include Krohs' (2009) design-
based account, endorsed by Milkowski (2013), and Mossio et al.'s (2009) organisational account. These








It is time to take stock. In previous chapters, I have introduced and analysed found-
ational issues in the cognitive sciences, involving the notions of computation and rep-
resentation. Representation plays a central explanatory role in most of the cognitive
sciences, and is frequently appealed to in the scientiﬁc literature. It is an essential the-
oretical posit and, as such, it is often taken for granted in the empirical study of the
mind.
Philosophers interested in the foundations of cognitive science have worried about
the conceptual underpinnings of the notion, its naturalistic status, and its explanatory
role. As we have seen in Part I, the explanatory work that the notion of representation
is supposed to carry out in empirical theories requires that any philosophical account
of representation meet some requirements: it must explain how representations come
to be contentful; how they come to have the contents that they do; what makes them
into representations (Ramsey's job description challenge); and it must make space for
the possibility of misrepresentation. The philosophical quest to provide answers to
these challenges features a marked naturalistic leaning: all these requirements, the
mainstream lore would want, should be met by having recourse exclusively to natural-
istically acceptable entities and relations, so as to give the notion of representation a
respectable place in the scientiﬁc worldview1.
Part I of this work was dedicated to understanding the scientiﬁc importance of the
notion of representation, and has explored the most inﬂuential attempts at providing
a theory of representational content, together with the challenges they must overcome.
These challenges take diﬀerent forms, though most of them are underlain by the require-
ment of yielding fairly determinate representational contents, as well as to make space
for misrepresentation, in order to do justice to the explanatory role of representation.
I focused especially on a particularly promising, though ancient, theory of repres-
entation: structural representation (Swoyer 1991, Gallistel 1990, Cummins 1989, 1996,
Ramsey 2007). As we have seen, at the basis of such a theory lies the idea that rep-
resentations act as stand-ins for things in the world, thus enabling what Swoyer dubs
1How to understand what counts as naturalistically acceptable is of course a vexed question.
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`surrogative reasoning'. Though this theory has much to recommend it, as it fares reas-
onably well when confronted with the requirements on a satisfying theory of represent-
ation, it has a crucial shortcoming: it leads to wild non-uniqueness of representational
content, a form of indeterminacy of content. Proposed ﬁxes to non-uniqueness, e.g. by
Bartels (2006), Isaac (2012), Shea (2014), are promising, but not free of diﬃculties.
The idea that the mind is, or is to be explained as, a computing system was one of the
founding pillars of the ﬁeld of cognitive science in the 1950s, and is still today at the basis
of many research endeavours. Seeing the mind as a computing system has considerably
improved our understanding of the workings of cognitive systems. Explaining what
computing systems are, and how the mind can be said to be a computing system, or to
be usefully explained as one, is another foundational issue in the cognitive sciences. Part
II was concerned with the notion of concrete computation, or computation in physical
systems. By having a good understanding of what it is for a physical system, such as a
computer or a cognitive system, to compute, the hypothesis that computation plays an
important role in cognition can be clariﬁed and substantiated.
The notion of representation has traditionally come hand-in-hand with that of com-
putation. A very popular position is expressed by Fodor's (1981) famous slogan `no
computation without representation'. Computation, according to this view, relies on
semantically individuated states  it consists of a special kind of representation manip-
ulation. I examined this position, and argued that it is problematic. Views of concrete
computation that do not rely on semantic properties are more promising and should
be preferred. I presented and assessed alternative, non-semantic views of computa-
tion, such as Chalmers' (2011) sophisticated causal mapping view and, especially, the
rising mechanistic view (Piccinini 2007b, Milkowski 2013, Fresco 2014). I argued that
the mechanistic view, when properly amended, is particularly promising. It is able to
preserve the objectivity of computation, as well as its valuable explanatory purchase
 suitably carving up the domain of physical computational systems  while doing
justice to the practices of computer and cognitive scientists.
My aim in Part III is to provide a theory of representation and representational
content able to play the required explanatory role in the cognitive sciences, while steering
clear from the metaphysical diﬃculties to which existing theories of representation may
be liable. My approach will be deﬂationary. I will rely on the robust notion of concrete
computation provided by the mechanistic view to individuate computational structure
as one of the factors that carries the most load in explaining complex appropriate
behaviour. Ascription of determinate representational content comes on top of that,
and depends on the task at hand, and on the context the organism ﬁnds itself in.
In this, I will be accepting the invitation made by Piccinini (2004) to conjoin existing
theories of content, which have traditionally relied on a semantic view of computation,
with a non-semantic view of computation instead. I take that structural representation
is a particularly promising candidate for such a treatment. It is a notion of representa-
tion which arguably answers Ramsey's `job description challenge'2, and which is often
2Though see Morgan (2014).
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at work in empirical research. In this chapter, I present and examine a relatively un-
derrated theory of representation: interpretational semantics. This analysis is the ﬁrst
stepping stone building up to the deﬂationary view of representation I intend to defend.
Interpretational semantics is closely related to structural representation, as I show in
the next chapter, though it is considerably friendlier to the idea of doing away with ro-
bust reductionism about representation. By bringing the robust notion of computation
provided by the mechanistic view to the fore, I propose a middle way between robust
reductionism and full-blown pragmatism  a view of representation that populates the
nearly empty grey zones between the extremes, merging interpretational semantics and
structural representation into a hopefully more promising account.
I will begin with an analysis of interpretational semantics in its two main guises, one
put forward by Cummins (1989), the other by Ramsey (2007). As we will see through-
out the chapter, though Cummins' and Ramsey's accounts have many similarities, they
are also importantly diﬀerent. After brieﬂy presenting interpretational semantics in
section 6.2 and section 6.3, I turn in the following sections to examining some cru-
cial elements of the account. I analyse and criticise the notions of computation and
interpretation at play in the theory, which lead, in a way analogous to what happens in
structural representation, to non-uniqueness of content. I conclude that, as it stands,
interpretational semantics is unsatisfactory, though it provides some elements for a more
promising theory of representation in cognitive systems, which I will put forward and
defend in the following chapters.
6.2 Interpretational Semantics:
preliminary considerations
Interpretational semantics was defended by Robert Cummins in his book Meaning and
Mental Representation (1989), and developed in a somewhat diﬀerent direction by Ram-
sey (2007), in his book Representation Reconsidered. Interestingly, while other theories
of representation put forward in the 1980s, especially informational semantics and tele-
osemantics, enjoyed numerous adherents, and gave rise to intense debating and a ﬂurry
of papers and books, interpretational semantics ended up being a rather unpopular sib-
ling. It has been picked up by few, though important works in the ﬁeld (e.g. Stich 1992,
Ramsey 2007), and has even been abandoned by its own creator (Cummins 1996).
Part of the reason for this relatively limited interest in the theory may be due to
the clear delimitation of its scope. As Cummins (1989) repeatedly emphasises, inter-
pretational semantics is concerned exclusively with the notion of representation at play
in the Computational Theory of Cognition, which, according to him, is mostly silent on
issues concerning propositional attitudes and folk psychological states, such as beliefs
and desires. As in the foregoing, the focus is on providing philosophical foundations for
the cognitive sciences, rather than trying to vindicate common-sense psychology, and
everyday content-ascriptions. Some authors have even placed interpretational semantics
in the same group as putative pragmatist or instrumentalist theories of representation,
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such as Dennett's (e.g. Piccinini 2004)3.
The fact that interpretational semantics neglects propositional attitudes in favour
of representational phenomena that have been more closely tackled by the cognitive
sciences is of course no reason to reject it, or to underestimate it. We can distinguish
two types of representation, for which two diﬀerent accounts may need to be given:
representations as they ﬁgure in scientiﬁc theories of cognition, which generally focus
on subpersonal states; and representations as they ﬁgure in the propositional attitudes,
such as beliefs and desires. As I pointed out in Part I, there is no convincing reason to
believe that one and the same theory of representation is going to be able to account for
these two very diﬀerent sorts of cognitive phenomena  which I labelled, respectively,
`representational content', and `intentional content' 4. On the contrary, once their
dissimilarities are appreciated, just the opposite should be expected. Therefore, rather
than being a shortcoming, the insistence of interpretational semantics in restricting its
scope is laudable  it refrains from conﬂating two distinct phenomena, and treat them
as if they were one and the same. This is, alas, the exception, rather than the rule in
the literature on representation.
Most other theories of content on oﬀer fail to draw the distinction, and either tar-
get propositional attitudes (e.g. Dretske 1981, Stich 1983, Block 1986, Papineau 1987),
presupposing that giving an account of those exhausts the problem of mental representa-
tion; or attempt to give a uniﬁed account supposed to account for both representational
and intentional content (e.g. Millikan 1984, Dretske 1988). Often these theorists have
developed theories of content that were clearly of the representational kind, rather than
the intentional, and used them as stepping stones to providing an account of beliefs and
desires. At any rate, I suppose that the closer relationship these theories have to the
propositional attitudes, a traditional subject of philosophy of mind, is partly what has
earned them so much interest, leaving interpretational semantics mostly in the shadow.
The project that motivates the foregoing work is clearly on Cummins' side. As I
stated in Part I, I am here concerned with the philosophy of the cognitive sciences,
rather than with the philosophy of mind, if this distinction has any meaning to it. As a
consequence, the features that might have diverted the attention of philosophers toward
other theories of representation should hold little or no sway over us presently. Our
focus here is on representational content, not on the intentional content of propositional
attitudes.
Computational cognitive science is a rich and advancing research ﬁeld. Despite some
opposition from radical embodied cognition researchers (e.g. Van Gelder 1995, Hutto
& Myin 2013), most of cognitive science employs the computational framework with
considerable success. Some of the objections against computationalism, such as Searle's
(1980), target a stronger thesis, namely that the computational framework can exhaust-
ively explain intentionality, propositional attitudes, and consciousness. Computational




cognitive science need not endorse any of those explanatory aims5. Interpretational
semantics, or IS for short, is an interesting, though perhaps underdeveloped theory of
representation that is meant to capture the explanatory role of representation in the
cognitive sciences. Let us now turn to the view itself, as well as its merits and demerits.
6.3 Interpretational Semantics: the theory
As for structural representation, at the core of interpretational semantics lies the idea
that representations stand in for what they represent. More precisely, representation is
seen as falling out of what Cummins calls `simulations'. Simulations take place when
there is an interpretation of computational processes over computational objects that
maps computational processes and objects into processes and entities in the world 
that is, when there is a mapping of states and processes of the computational system
onto entities and their patterns of transformation in a certain domain. In this way,
those computational states and processes come to be representations of the entities and
their transformations onto which they are mapped.
According to Cummins, the ﬁrst step for a physical system to acquire representa-
tional properties is for it to compute a certain function f. In its turn, to compute a
function f is to execute a programme that gives the appropriate outputs given inputs;
that is to say, if f (i) = o, then the programme will produce output o on input i6. Pro-
gramme execution is understood in terms of going through the steps of an algorithm,
each step being the computation of a function, leading, step by step, from i to o. A
physical system satisﬁes a function g when the causal goings-on in the system can be
mapped onto the algorithmic steps in g7.
The second step for a physical system to represent is that there be an interpretation
mapping between the arguments and values of the function g that it satisﬁes, and
objects and processes in a diﬀerent domain. These processes and objects need not be
cognitive in nature. By satisfying g, the physical system instantiates function f over
those objects and processes to which the interpretation maps its arguments and values.
In the best scenario, the mapping is an isomorphism  there is a perfect one-to-one
mapping between g and f. The interpretation mapping, which for Cummins is purely
mathematical in nature, bestows on the elements and processes of g a representational
nature  they represent the elements and processes in f to which they are mapped.
To use Cummins' example, if g is a function isomorphic to the adding function +,
then the arguments and values of g can be mapped onto the arguments and values
of +. In this way, the physical system comes to be seen as an adding machine. As
a consequence, its inputs, outputs, and internal operations take on a representational
5On the limits of the computational framework when applied to these sorts of cognitive phenomena,
see Stich (1983), Fodor (2000).
6Cummins (1989, p. 91.)
7Systems may satisfy functions without computing them (e.g. Venus satisﬁes the Newtonian equa-
tions). This poses a problem for IS as presented by Cummins. He does not provide a criterion for
deciding which systems compute and which do not, if not for his problematic appeal to programme
execution. I will come back to this issue below, in section 6.4.
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character. Inputs and outputs become representations of numbers, and the internal op-
erations of the system become manipulations of numerical representations. As Cummins
(1989, p. 93) puts it, representation is just a name for the relation induced by the in-
terpretation mapping between the elements of g and the elements of +. In other words,
it is because the physical system mirrors or simulates, under a certain interpretation I,
a function in another domain that its elements and processes acquire a representational
coating. They become representations insofar as the system can be interpreted, given
the isomorphism between its elements and relations, and the elements and relations of
another domain, as simulating the latter. Importantly, that there be an interpretation
mapping between the computational physical system and another domain is suﬃcient
for bestowing representational status on the elements and processes of the former.
In the case of cognitive representations, the interpretation mapping assigns to ele-
ments and processes in cognitive systems the entities and relations that they represent
in another domain. As such, the interpretation mapping reveals the computational pro-
cesses going on in the cognitive system as realising a cognitive capacity; it provides a
linkage between the instantiated function, or `mere state crunching', and cognition8.
The task or cognitive capacity is the explanandum of cognitive science, and as such
it is the starting point for theorising  it is given. The central explanatory role of
representation in cognitive science, according to IS, is that of explaining how come
certain physical/computational goings-on are able to give rise to adequate behaviour,
or to a speciﬁc cognitive capacity. By means of the interpretation mapping, those
goings-on reveal themselves as simulating the target domain or, as Ramsey puts it,
as models of the target domain. As parts of a model, those physical/computational
elements and processes acquire representational status  they stand in for things and
goings-on in the world.
This account has been dubbed by Cummins (1989), quite ﬁttingly, `the Tower Bridge
picture'. The interpretation mapping I works as the towers in the famous bridge in ty-
ing together what goes on in the bottom span, the computational processes in the
physical system, and the top span, consisting of the function or cognitive ability under
analysis. Since by means of the isomorphism the elements and processes in the bottom
span track elements and processes in the top span, the physical system, by satisfying a
function g over its states, can be interpreted as simulating a function f over the tracked
target domain. In interpretational semantics, simulation under I has primary import-
ance, with representation coming as an instantaneous consequence. The primary role
of simulation in the resulting account led Cummins to dub this kind of representation
`S-representation', where the `s' stands for `simulation'9.
Interpretational semantics and its Tower Bridge picture apply not only to cognitive
representations and cognitive abilities. It also works for representations in non-cognitive
systems, such as designed calculators, as well as for scientiﬁc representation. In the case
of the latter, we have objects and processes in one domain, for instance geometry, being
mapped onto, and thus representing, objects and processes in other domains, for in-
8Cummins (1989, pp. 110-1.) See also Egan (2010).
9Cummins (1989, p. 97.)
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stance physical processes and quantities, such as velocity and distance10. Consequently,
the notion of representation that falls out from IS is deﬂationist sensu Burge (2010):
it fails to be a notion of exclusive interest to cognitive science, for there is nothing
intrinsically mental about representation  the notion is also appropriate to domains
that do not concern cognitive states11.
In sum, interpretational semantics is a theory of representation designed to ﬁt the
explanatory practices and needs of computational cognitive science, though it also illu-
minates the notion of representation in non-cognitive domains. It is based on the idea
that representation takes place when there is an interpretation which maps elements and
processes of a computational system onto elements and processes of another domain. By
means of this mapping, the computational system simulates the goings-on in the other
domain. Simulation is at the core of the account of representation oﬀered. It is thanks
to simulation, enabled by the interpretation mapping, that elements and processes in a
physical system are seen as stand-ins, as representations, of elements and processes of a
diﬀerent domain. By behaving in the physical system in a way functionally analogous
to the way things in a diﬀerent domain behave, elements of the computational system
acquire representational status.
As an aside, a caveat : Ramsey (2007, pp. 102-4) convincingly argues that Cummins
fails to distinguish two diﬀerent kinds of representation in computational cognitive sci-
ence. The Tower Bridge picture, according to Ramsey, captures not S-representation,
but rather a notion that he dubs `IO-representation' (from input-output representation).
The latter is only concerned with the inputs and outputs of the subsystems that a func-
tional decomposition of the overall system reveals. In order for these subsystems to be
seen as contributing to the capacity featured by the whole system, it is required that
their inputs and outputs be interpreted in light of the overall capacity. For instance, a
system capable of multiplication may have as one of its components a subsystem that
instantiates a certain function which, in order to explain its contribution to the capacity
to multiply featured by the overall system, needs to be interpreted as taking numbers
as input and delivering (repeatedly added) numbers as output. The subsystem's inputs
and outputs are thus interpreted as representations of numbers, for this is explanatorily
useful in accounting for the system's overall capacity to multiply. Arguably, no simu-
lation need be involved in this kind of representation, though Ramsey admits that it
is likely that most cases of IO-representation (especially those involving mathematical
functions) are also cases of S-representation. In sum, while IO-representations repres-
ent by virtue of the role they play in explaining the capacity of the system to which
they contribute, S-representation represents by simulating, or modelling, some target
domain.
Regardless of whether the distinction turns out to be actually signiﬁcant, I have
tried to introduce the notion of S-representation in interpretational semantics in such a
way as to keep it distinct from the IO notion, by stressing the importance that there be
an isomorphism between the function satisﬁed by the physical system, and a function
10See Cummins (1989, pp. 94-5.)
11For more on this sense of `deﬂationism', see chapter 8 below.
148
over the target domain. In my treatment of IS I will be mostly concerned with this
`corrected' understanding of S-representation.
Ramsey (2007) has endorsed most of the tenets of interpretational semantics in
his analysis of current projects in cognitive science, and of whether they retain and
make use of a robust notion of representation. His version of the theory features some
diﬀerences to Cummins' formulation, which are worth spelling out in some detail. I will
take a closer look at some of the crucial notions at work in IS, and show how Cummins
and Ramsey understand them, where they agree, and where they diﬀer. This perusal
will allow a better assessment of the advantages and shortcomings of interpretational
semantics, in its two guises.
6.4 Computation
The notions of computation, representation, and interpretation are enmeshed in an
intricate tangle in interpretational semantics. In this section, I will brieﬂy examine the
notion of concrete computation that underlies Cummins' and Ramsey's view, and in
the following sections I will turn to the other two notions. I will start with Ramsey
(2007).
Due to the nature of Ramsey's (2007) project, his remarks on concrete computation
are quite scant. His main concern is not to endorse one particular theory of cognition
(e.g., classical computationalism vs. connectionism), or of representation over another.
Rather, his interests lie in enquiring on which extant theories of cognition actually posit
a substantial notion of representation. His conclusion is that only an amended classical
computationalist approach, and the interpretational semantics that falls from it really
posit bona ﬁde representations. Ramsey (2007) is mostly non-judgemental on whether
we should keep to the notion of representation, and thus to the classical computationalist
approach, or adopt eliminativism though he sees the cognitive sciences moving toward
the latter option.
Ramsey endorses the view of concrete computation that has pride of place in classical
computationalism in cognitive science  the semantic view. As he recognises, most
philosophers in this tradition have passed over going into much detail about what it is
to implement a computation. They have generally endorsed the semantic view as the
most natural one, as it seems straightforwardly to allow the conceptual transition from
taking the mind to be a computational system to taking it to be a representational one12
 concrete computation involving, according to the semantic view, the manipulation
of contentful symbols.
Cummins has written more extensively on computation, but the picture he oﬀers,
though non-semantic, is congenial to the classical computational one (Cummins 1983,
1989, Cummins & Schwarz 1991). As we have seen in 6.3, Cummins takes computa-
tional processes largely to involve physical processes to which a systematic interpreta-
tion in terms of semantic properties can be provided13. However, according to Cummins
12Ramsey (2007, pp. 38ﬀ.)
13Cummins (1983, p. 34.)
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computation per se need not involve representational interpretation. Though compu-
tational processes in computational systems are normally carried out over objects with
semantic properties  symbols  having semantic properties is not a necessary condi-
tion for computation. The view of computation that Cummins defends is thereby non-
semantic, though he is quite willing to come to terms with proponents of the semantic
view. Cummins is ready to accept that in the most interesting cases of computation 
those involving designed computers and cognitive systems  computational processes
typically involve representations14.
At the core of Cummins' view of computation lies the notion of programme execu-
tion: to compute is to execute a programme (Cummins 1983, 1989, Cummins & Schwarz
1991). Computation is programme execution, and programme execution, in its turn, is
understood as ordered step satisfaction: the programme is analysed into a sequence or
network of component functions which are carried out in the appropriate order15. A
physical system implements a programme when there is a mapping between the argu-
ments and values of the functions called for by the speciﬁcation of the programme, and
the causal structure of the system. For Cummins, functions satisﬁed by [a physical
device] d specify causal connections between events in d , and a system executes the
program if that causal network [speciﬁed by the programme] gives the (or a) causal
structure of the system16. We have thereby a version of the causal mapping view of
concrete computation, analysed in its Chalmersian version in section 3.3.1.
Let us get back to the example of the calculator computing the addition function +.
According to interpretational semantics, + cannot be directly computed by a physical
system, insofar as it involves abstract entities, such as numbers. The only way for a
physical system to compute + is to satisfy a function g from physical inputs to physical
outputs that can be mapped onto +. An adding machine computes addition when its
causal structure, its satisfying g, can be interpreted as carrying out the steps involved
in the addition function  whereby the elements and processes of the machine become
representations of numbers and of numerical operations17.
There are many problems with this view, for reasons familiar to us from Part II.
First, equating computation with implementing a programme either excludes from
having computational status systems, such as ﬁnite state automata or connectionist
networks, that are not normally seen as executing programmes; or blurs important
distinctions in computer science by making programme execution ubiquitous18. Cum-
mins' view of programme execution as step satisfaction leads to the latter horn of the
dilemma. Finite state automata, connectionist networks, and other computational sys-
tems execute programmes on this generous understanding of programme execution 
they do satisfy functions that count as steps in algorithms. Therefore, they count as
computational systems; a welcome result. This liberal notion of programme execution
14See Cummins & Schwarz (1991, p. 62.)
15Cummins (1989, pp. 93-4.)
16Cummins (1989, p. 92.)
17Cummins (1983, pp. 36, 42.)
18Piccinini (2015, pp. 14-15.)
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allows Cummins' view to capture the domain of computational systems19.
However, as Piccinini (2015) points out, such a liberal notion does not ﬁt well with
distinctions that are made in computer science between diﬀerent kinds of computational
systems. Computers that have and execute stored programmes (in the traditional, non-
liberal sense) are seen as more ﬂexible than computational systems, such as ﬁnite state
automata and connectionist networks, that lack stored programmes.
In contrast to Piccinini, I do not think that there is much weight to this objection
from descriptive adequacy. What seems to be doing the job in distinguishing more
ﬂexible from less ﬂexible computational systems is not programme execution per se,
but rather the presence or absence of stored programmes. Finite state automata and
connectionist networks are less ﬂexible not because they do not execute programmes, but
rather because they can only execute one programme (unless they are reprogrammed).
They cannot switch to other programmes stored in memory, as can stored-programme
computers. What is crucial for the ﬂexibility of stored -programme computers is not
programme execution, but rather their capacity to store several programmes in memory,
and employ them as need and user dictate. Cummins' view does make space for the
relevant distinction, contra Piccinini.
A second objection from descriptive adequacy moved by Piccinini is, I believe, more
successful, though far from decisive. Piccinini (2015, pp. 157-8) notes that Cummins'
account does not consider primitive computational devices, such as AND-gates, to be
computational, for their operations cannot be divided into further function-computing
steps. Since primitive computational devices do not execute programmes  insofar as
their workings cannot be explained in terms of step satisfaction  they do not count as
performing computations by Cummins' lights. This ﬂies in the face of the practices of
computer science, in which primitive computing devices such as logic gates are routinely
claimed to compute (logical) functions.
It is debatable, however, whether the mechanistic view that Piccinini advocates is
superior to Cummins' on this regard. For Piccinini, logic gates, when not part of an
enclosing computational system, compute only trivially20. They cannot be explained
computationally insofar as their behaviour cannot be broken down into more primit-
ive computations. Explanation is here purely mechanistic, not computational  i.e.
involving physical properties, such as voltage levels, rather than digits and operations
on digits21. But when part of an enclosing computational system, Piccinini argues,
primitive computing devices become computational insofar as they acquire the func-
tion of computing a certain logical function in the context of the whole system22. The
mechanistic view has it that logic gates, when components of a computational mechan-
ism, compute. Thus at least to some extent the mechanistic view is more descriptively
adequate than Cummins'.
Descriptive adequacy considerations are at any rate of secondary importance, and
19Though it fails to capture exclusively the domain of computational systems, as I will show presently.
20Piccinini (2015, p. 156.)
21Piccinini (2015, p. 155.)
22Piccinini (2015, p. 156.)
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may be compensated by theoretical virtues elsewhere. The crucial argument against
Cummins' view of concrete computation derives not from his claim that computation
is programme execution, but rather from his claim that step satisfaction is a matter of
causal mapping between physical system and abstract computational description. This
claim makes Cummins' view fall prey to trivialisation arguments as much as Chalmers'
causal mapping account.
I brieﬂy rehearse here some of the arguments already moved against Chalmers (1995,
2011) in section 3.3.1.
First, no criterion for how to group physical states, and their causal relations is
oﬀered by Cummins. This opens the doors to charges of triviality, since it is always in
principle possible to group the physical states, and the causal relations of a complex
enough physical system in such a way as to make them be mappable into any sequence
of algorithmic steps. It follows that the causal goings-on in any complex enough physical
system can be mapped onto potentially any programme, making performing concrete
computations a trivial matter.
Second, as for Chalmers, limited pancomputationalism ensues. If having a certain
causal structure is all that is needed to execute a certain programme, as Cummins
(1989), Cummins & Schwarz (1991) claim, then any physical system with a causal
structure executes a speciﬁc programme. Moreover, given the many diﬀerent levels of
causal description to which any physical system is subject, the same physical system ex-
ecutes diﬀerent programmes at the same time. Even if a criterion for grouping physical
states and processes should be provided, thus avoiding the unrestricted pancomputa-
tionalism that undermined the simple mapping view of computation, Cummins' account
still entails limited pancomputationalism, making concrete computation into something
nearly ubiquitous. This is of course a problematic outcome for a theory of concrete
computation, insofar as we fail to drive a useful wedge between physical systems that
are computational, and those that are not.
Cummins (1989) and Cummins & Schwarz (1991) are well aware of this problem.
Simple causal mapping, they readily admit, leads to triviality23. They try to steer clear
from that outcome, but their solutions are far from satisfactory.
Cummins & Schwarz (1991) claim that the causal structure of a physical system is
distinct from its computational structure, if it has any. As they admit, there are lots
of causal processes, and only some of them are instances of function computation24.
They hold that algorithm (or programme) execution provides the means to distinguish
computational from causal structure  only some causal processes count as computing a
function, namely those that follow an algorithm. However, since executing an algorithm
is, by their lights, a matter of step satisfaction, which in its turn is a matter of causal
mapping, they fail to oﬀer a principled way to distinguish mere causal processes from
processes that are, in addition, computational. Every sequence of causal processes can
be interpreted as carrying out the steps in an algorithm. Limited pancomputationalism
still ensues.
23See for instance Cummins (1989, pp. 102ﬀ.), and Cummins & Schwarz (1991, pp. 63-64.)
24Cummins & Schwarz (1991, p. 63.)
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A further attempt made by Cummins (1989) and Cummins & Schwarz (1991) is to
appeal to semantic interpretability. Only those causal structures that can be interpreted
as representations count as computational. This move draws the view considerably
closer to semantic accounts of concrete computation25. A semantic constraint is added
to the simple causal mapping view: causal mappings that reveal computations are those
that allow representational interpretations of the goings-on in the computational system.
There is a clear tension here. Insistence on the non-semantic nature of concrete
computation is often followed by reliance on semantic interpretation in order to indi-
viduate computations. For instance, Cummins & Schwarz (1991, p. 62) claim that
the objects of computation needn't be representations of any sort; just to go on and
say on the following page that a computational explanation of a device's capacity to
multiply must start by identifying representational states internal to the device, and the
algorithms deﬁned over them26. Though the matter is far from clear27, it would seem
that a semantic constraint comes in only given an explanatory target, which leads to
semantic interpretation of the objects of computation in terms of the target explanatory
domain, but is not necessary for computation per se.
Even if we take the foregoing view to involve a semantic constraint, the appeal
to interpretation is nonetheless problematic. Without a properly constrained notion
of semantic interpretation, states and processes of a physical system can always be
interpreted semantically, and in consequence, transitions between those processes can
be seen as function computations. Lacking a robust notion of semantic interpretation,
the processes internal to any physical system are compatible with an indeterminate
number of diﬀerent interpretations, and thus compute  simulate  many diﬀerent
functions. It follows that implementing a programme is trivial, and so by Cummins'
lights, concrete computation is trivial28. This is so, at least, if no robust account of
interpretation is given, which would allow one to distinguish acceptable, computation-
bestowing interpretations from those that are not. In order to make sense of the notion of
concrete computation at play in interpretational semantics we need closely to investigate
the notion of interpretation. This will come as no surprise, I am sure. We will turn to
that in the next section.
For now, note that the need for a robust notion of interpretation falls from the weak
view of computation that is oﬀered. It is because the causal mapping view is remarkably
liberal that interpretation must be invoked in order to avoid triviality charges. The
notion of concrete computation with which Cummins is working in his treatment of
interpretational semantics leaves gaps that further factors must ﬁll. In the next section,
I will show that interpretation, as Cummins (1989) understands it, is not an adequate
ﬁx. Ramsey's (2007) version is more promising, though not free from problems.
In the coming chapter, I will argue that if interpretational semantics is to aspire
25See section 3.3.2.
26Perhaps they have in mind a hybrid view, such as Rescorla's (2013), though this is not made
explicit.
27Indeed Milkowski (2013) considers the view put forward by Cummins & Schwarz (1991) to be a
version of the semantic account of concrete computation.
28Milkowski (2013, n. 4, p. 204) presses a similar point.
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to become a good theory of representation and representational content, an alternative
notion of computation must ground it. I will propose that the mechanistic view of
computation is the one most suited to the task. It allows IS to embrace its deﬂationary
tendencies on content in a more satisfying way, giving rise to a theory more robust than
extant versions. For, I argue, the explanatory role of representation and representational
content, as well as the objective nature of their substrates are preserved. But so much
for anticipation. Let us tackle without further delay the notion of interpretation in
interpretational semantics.
6.5 Interpretation
I have argued that Cummins' appeal to interpretation is partly due to the insuﬃciently
robust notion of computation which underlies his account. His invocation of the notion
of interpretation is motivated, I take it, by the worry that only interpretation mappings,
with their accompanying ascription of representational content, can make determinate
the computations performed by physical systems. The hidden assumption is that com-
putational structure cannot be pinned down if not by assigning representational status
to the elements and processes of physical systems. Even though Cummins' view is
non-semantic, being a kind of causal mapping account, it still requires that states be
semantically individuated when applying the computational framework to the mind (as
well as to other domains)29.
In Cummins (1989), the notion of interpretation at work is merely mathematical
 it consists of a mapping of the causal goings-on in the physical system into the
arguments, values and steps of a function f, and the processes that allow its computa-
tion. Even in the simple, non-cognitive case of instantiation of mathematical functions,
representational contents, i.e. numbers, are ascribed to the elements of the physical sys-
tem. In this basic case, the elements of the physical device are ascribed mathematical
content30.
As Cummins readily admits, further constraints are needed. A simple-mapping view
of interpretation leads to function instantiation being trivial. As previous chapters have
shown, the easy availability of one-to-one mappings makes concrete computation into a
trivial matter, and representational content into a wildly non-unique aﬀair. Given that
there is a mapping between addition and multiplication, any adding machine would
be interpretable as a multiplication machine as well. There is a mapping between the
elements and processes in the physical system and the addition function +, which would
make the physical system into an adding machine. But there is also a simple mapping
between + and the multiplication function ∗, and thus, given the transitivity of one-
to-one mappings, the physical system also instantiates ∗. If interpretation is a matter
of one-to-one mappings, then adding machines are also multiplication machines (and
much else, since other mappings can be found)31. Taking interpretation to be purely
29See Cummins & Schwarz (1991).
30For a similar view, see Egan (2010).
31See Cummins (1989, pp. 102-3.)
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a matter of simple mapping is a non-starter: any physical system would instantiate all
sorts of diﬀerent functions, making function instantiation, and concrete computation,
trivial.
Relation-preserving isomorphism is a step toward less liberality, as interpretations
must additionally preserve the relationships between the elements and processes in the
physical system in mapping them into the arguments and values of f. An instantiation
of + would not be interpretable as an instantiation of ∗, given that addition and mul-
tiplication are not isomorphic. Though this move helps, it is not enough, according to
Cummins. There are still an inﬁnity of functions that an adder could be interpreted as
instantiating. The adding function + is isomorphic to functions such as 2(y + z ). Given
the transitivity of isomorphism, the elements and processes in the physical system are
also isomorphic to 2(y + z ), whereby the system can be interpreted as computing that
function as well (and all the other isomorphic functions)32. Even when taken to involve
relation-preserving mappings, the notion of interpretation is still much too liberal.
Cummins recognises that these notions of interpretation will not do. He also recog-
nises that he has no solution to the problem. He hopes that a principled account of what
he dubs `direct interpretation' will be forthcoming. Direct interpretation would include
principled ways to avoid trivialisation, with requirements on the lines of: not having
the instantiated function be already included in the interpretation, in which case all the
work would be done by the interpretation rather than by the structure of the physical
system; and that the causal goings-on in the physical system not be ignored by the inter-
pretation mapping33. Admittedly, without a satisfactory notion of direct interpretation,
Cummins' version of interpretational semantics is in deep trouble. If interpretations are
(almost) trivial, any system simulates an indeﬁnite number of domains, causing IS to
become an useless theory of representation for the cognitive sciences. If simulations are
trivial, explanations of behaviour in terms of them are always possible for any minimally
complex system, from pebbles to walls, computers, brains, and galaxies.
Moreover, lacking a robust notion of direct interpretation, the view of concrete com-
putation oﬀered by Cummins falls victim to limited pancomputationalism, as we have
seen above. As the discussion in Part II suggests, it is extremely diﬃcult to fend oﬀ trivi-
ality objections by relying exclusively on some form of mapping. Even Chalmers' (2011)
demanding requirement that the abstract computation be mapped onto the causal to-
pology of the system leads to limited pancomputationalism. If we should want to adopt
that demanding requirement, the problem of triviality of IS would not go away. If
pebbles and walls are to be seen as implementing computations, albeit uninteresting
ones, that will suﬃce to allow interpretation, and thus ascription of representational
properties by interpretational semantics' lights (barring a robust and principled no-
tion of direct interpretation). Moreover, if a pebble or a wall compute some function,
they also compute all functions isomorphic to it, and, as uninteresting as they might be,
32Cummins (1989, p. 103.)
33Cummins (1989, p. 104.) Thus formulated, these constraints are admittedly not satisfying, whence
the `on the lines of'. As Cummins points out, there are ways of getting around them (e.g., by making
the interpretation consist of a look-up table).
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there will be multiple possible interpretations leading to multiple instantiated functions.
Even pebbles would be victims of the liberality of Cummins' version of interpretational
semantics.
The core notion that Cummins' version of IS requires to get oﬀ the ground, i.e.
direct interpretation, is a promissory note, and one unlikely ever to be paid. But what
about Ramsey's story? It is time to see whether the notion of interpretation in Ramsey's
IS, which is considerably richer than Cummins', is able to bear the required theoretical
load.
In Ramsey's picture a physical system implements a simulation, and its elements
and processes hence acquire representational status, only under the interpretation(s)
which are explanatorily apt, given the cognitive capacity under investigation. The
explanandum determines which interpretation is the relevant one: the one that maps
states and processes of the cognitive system onto the phenomenon that scientiﬁc research
has determined as the one in need of explanation.
Put this way, it may seem that Ramsey is proposing a pragmatist view of represent-
ation. After all, he is appealing to the explanatory purposes of scientiﬁc investigation
in order to ﬁx the content-determining interpretation. This may raise the suspicion
that the content-determining interpretation is chosen by us, on grounds of explanatory
usefulness. Representation and content would depend on other intentional states, the
goals and aims of cognitive scientists.
This is not, however, what Ramsey has in mind. On his account, the explanatorily
relevant interpretation is determined by how the cognitive system uses the (computa-
tional) structure. The embeddedness of the cognitive system in an environment, its
organismic needs and physical capacities, come to inform the cognitive task of relevance
 the one we are interested in explaining. In the context of a speciﬁc task, the cognitive
system makes use of the structure as a model, as a simulation, of the target domain
with which it is presently at grips. Even though that same structure can be interpreted
as simulating all sorts of diﬀerent target domains, only one of those interpretations is
relevant for the organism's interaction with its environment in a given context. Only
this interpretation, grounded in the use of the structure by the cognitive system, endows
its elements and processes with representational content. All other possible interpreta-
tions, which map the structure at hand into other target domains, are irrelevant, and
play no role in content-ascription.
In other words, the use to which the structure is put by the cognitive system ﬁxes its
target, i.e. what it is simulating. And, as the story goes in interpretational semantics,
it is the fact that a structure is simulating a target domain that makes its elements and
processes acquire representational content. It is in virtue of being part of a structure
that simulates, or models, something else, that the elements of the structure are mapped
onto entities and relations in the target domain, thereby becoming representations of
those entities and relations. In brief: representational content is ﬁxed by an exploited
second-order resemblance between representational vehicle and target domain34.
34For a similar picture, see Shea (2014). Ramsey (2007, p. 95, and passim), as is usual in the
literature, talks of isomorphism. But, as already noted previously, this is a somewhat imprecise use of
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The explanatory burden shifts thereby to the use a structure is put to by the cognit-
ive system. Use is constrained by the embeddedness of the organism in an environment
 its needs, goals and causal interactions with its surroundings. Embeddedness, thus
understood, reveals the cognitive task the organism is performing: e.g., navigating a
terrain in order to pick food at a certain location and bringing it back to the hive; or
escaping from potential predators to a safe place. The task determines the target of the
simulation the cognitive system carries out in order to generate appropriate behaviour.
The structure comes by this means to be endowed with representational properties.
In Ramsey's words: the content of S-representation can be ﬁxed by the target of the
model, and the target of the model is ﬁxed by the cognitive activity we want explained
... [which] is typically dependent upon the way the system is currently and causally
engaged in the world35. A satisfying account of the use of a structure is thus called
for. I will postpone discussion of this issue to section 6.6.2.
6.6 Non-uniqueness of content
6.6.1 Cummins on non-uniqueness of content
Recall that according to liberal versions of structural representation, defended for in-
stance by Cummins (1996), representations represent everything that they structurally
resemble. Given the liberality of structural resemblance, representational vehicles struc-
turally resemble many diﬀerent entities in the world. It follows that representations have
wildly non-unique contents, jeopardising the explanatory value of appeal to represent-
ation, as well as the possibility of a useful notion of misrepresentation.
A similar dynamics is at work in interpretational semantics. By basing represent-
ation on second-order resemblance  on which the notion of simulation is grounded
 IS leads, in a way analogous to structural representation, to wild non-uniqueness of
content. Furthermore, the appeal to interpretation mappings composes the problem.
For not only collections of vehicles represent anything they structurally resemble, but
interpretations may map elements and processes of the physical system into functions
over a target domain for which there is no perfect resemblance36. Unless, at any rate,
principled constraints on which interpretations are acceptable are provided.
The problems of IS with non-uniqueness of content seem as serious as those that
structural representation has to face. This is not surprising, as both views rely on
second-order resemblance  non-uniqueness of content being a consequence of the re-
liance on such a liberal notion. The version of interpretational semantics championed
by Cummins (1989) is at odds with the one defended by Ramsey (2007) on this regard.
While Cummins embraces the view that S-representations have non-unique contents,
Ramsey tries to provide the tools to make their contents unique.
the term, since it is generally meant to cover less strict forms of second-order resemblance as well.
35Ramsey (2007, p. 96.)
36This is also analogous to a problem with structural representation. Since perfect structural map-
pings are too much to ask of representations, on pain of making representational correctness extremely
rare, structural representationalists must appeal to some form of approximate, less-than-perfect struc-
tural mapping. See Shea (2014).
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For Cummins, S-representation must always be relativised to a target by means
of an interpretation mapping37, but the availability of diﬀerent interpretations makes
representational content cheap38. Cummins holds that interpretational semantics leads
to wild non-uniqueness of content because a structure S s-represents the arguments and
values of any function it simulates39. In other words, S represents everything it can be
interpreted as representing, it simulates every target domain to which the function g that
it satisﬁes is (to some degree) isomorphic. Such an approach to S-representation leads
to wild non-uniqueness of representational content, given the liberality of interpretation
mappings  especially in the absence of a robust notion of direct interpretation.
Any function g satisﬁed by a physical system can be given diﬀerent appropriate
interpretations. That is to say, any function g can be mapped, by a suitable interpret-
ation I, to all sorts of diﬀerent functions over diﬀerent target domains. In a scenario
that should be familiar from Part I, the multiplicity of available interpretations leads to
non-uniqueness of representational content. Under diﬀerent interpretations, the phys-
ical system simulates diﬀerent target domains, and thus its elements take on diﬀerent
representational contents. Since, by Cummins' lights, representational content is de-
termined by every interpretation, we end up with wild non-uniqueness of content.
Cummins (1989) does not take the liberality that follows from his account to be
pernicious to representational explanation in the cognitive sciences. He claims that, in
the end, all that matters for cognitive science is that there be a notion of correct or
incorrect representation given an interpretation I. The strategy is to try and save the
explanatory adequacy of the theory by appealing to the ways the notions of simula-
tion and representation are used in the sciences. The main role of representation is to
provide a conceptual connexion between what goes on in the physical system, and a
target capacity, be it purely computational (e.g., computing addition), or cognitive (e.g.
generating behaviour appropriate to a certain situation). The fact that explanation is
carried out with a target explanandum in sight  in the typical case, a cognitive capa-
city, or successful complex behaviour  narrows down which interpretation mappings
I are explanatorily relevant.
It does not matter that the physical system under scrutiny satisﬁes a function g
which can be mapped by means of some In to other target domains. All that the
cognitive scientist needs care for is that, under a ﬁxed interpretation Ia, the physical
system instantiates a function that simulates the capacity of interest (e.g. navigating
Paris). All the other interpretation mappings are explanatorily irrelevant. The fact that
that same function g could be mapped by a suitable interpretation to a simulation of
navigating Tianducheng  a Chinese city designed to copy the spatial layout of Paris40
 is silent on how the system was able to successfully navigate Paris. Tianducheng
would come into the picture only in case the explanatory purpose were that of explaining
the system's capacity to navigate Tianducheng, or perhaps its capacity to navigate both
37Cummins (1989, pp. 92-3, 101.)
38Cummins (1989, p. 106, and passim.)
39Cummins (1989, p. 136.)
40I am assuming, unrealistically, that the spatial layout of Tianducheng is identical, or at least very
similar, to that of Paris.
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Paris and Tianducheng.
In this way, misrepresentation is arguably accommodated by interpretational se-
mantics. Representation and misrepresentation are always relative to an explanatory
target (Cummins 1989, p. 101). It is only with respect to the function that I picks
out as the one simulated that it is possible to assess representational correctness. Thus
my map of Berlin, when interpreted as a map of Paris, is a case of misrepresentation.
Moreover, though the choice of explanatory targets is partly dependent on the domain
of investigation of the particular scientiﬁc subﬁeld, it is not unconstrained. As Ramsey
(2007, p. 95) underlines, in the case of organisms capable of cognition, their embedded-
ness in an environment, their causal exchanges with their surroundings, their needs and
goals, help delimit the nature of the cognitive capacities that call for explanation41.
Once we have a reasonably good idea of what the capacity to be explained is, cog-
nitive science looks for its (possible) physical/computational realisers, and ties back
the relevant entities and processes to the target capacity by means of a suitable in-
terpretation mapping. If this endeavour is successful, and an appropriate mapping is
found, an explanation of how the organism behaved appropriately in a given situation
is made available: internal states and processes simulate, or model, the target domain
 S-representation is at work.
The hypothesised physical/computational entities and processes may fail to sustain
the proposed mapping  if there is no (good enough) mapping between the functions to
be connected by the interpretation, the hypothesis that one system simulates the other
will have to be reconsidered. The proposed entities and processes will fail to represent
the target domain, even though, under another interpretation, they may successfully
represent other target domains. What matters is that, under an interpretation, the
simulation is not accurate, making the elements and processes of the simulation mis-
representations.
Cummins' account seems prima facie to have the tools to keep the explanatory
value of representation and misrepresentation in explaining cognition unscathed by the
liberality of simulation, and of the consequent non-uniqueness of content. The guiding
idea is to embrace non-uniqueness of content, but focus on speciﬁc interpretations when
assessing representational correctness and error. However, there are problems with this
move.
It is unclear how to home in on the relevant interpretations  the ones under which
to assess representational correctness and error, and thereby adequacy and inadequacy
of behaviour. A possible strategy is to rely on the aims and interests of cognitive
scientists, who individuate the relevant interpretations in light of their explanatory
purposes, and perhaps other pragmatic considerations. This line partially abandons
the naturalistic project in explaining representation and content, and will be further
explored in section 8.1.
The diﬃculty of picking out the relevant interpretation for each case is rendered more
acute by the failure, admitted by Cummins, of providing a satisfactory, naturalistically
41Note though that on Ramsey's own view these epistemological considerations play a secondary
role. See next subsection.
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acceptable account of direct interpretation, as we have seen in section 6.5. Without
such a notion, systems instantiate functions trivially, thus composing the problem of
non-uniqueness of content  not only any structure can be interpreted as representing
many entities, but any structure can be interpreted as representing potentially any
entity or set of entities, given that there are no criteria on what counts as an acceptable
interpretation. It is doubtful that an account of direct interpretation can be provided
without having recourse to factors that would endanger the naturalistic status of the
theory.
Furthermore, Cummins' version of interpretational semantics de facto eliminates the
role played by the interpretation mapping in the account. To claim that S-representations
have as their contents the appropriate entities in every possible target domain simulated
by the system is to claim that what matters for content-ﬁxation is merely second-order
resemblance. Structures would simulate everything to which they are resemblant, mak-
ing the appeal to the notion of interpretation mapping largely idle. Or else, and this is
the path I believe Cummins takes, the interpretation mapping is being taken as the iso-
morphism itself. The appeal to interpretation is an attempt to determine the functional
structure of the physical system that is relevant for computational ascription. Without
the needed notion of direct interpretation, however, this attempt does not succeed. We
are therefore left with a liberal appeal to isomorphism, analogous to the liberal appeal
to structural resemblance typical of structural representation.
In sum, Cummins' approach to interpretational semantics is extremely liberal about
representational status and representational content. But interpretational semantics
need not follow Cummins' liberal view. Content can be ﬁxed by one or few interpret-
ations, provided that a naturalistic means of selecting them is provided. This is the
strategy preferred by Ramsey (2007), to which we now turn.
6.6.2 Ramsey on non-uniqueness of content
For Ramsey (2007), content is not non-unique. Representations arise only thanks to a
particular interpretation mapping, understood not as merely mathematical, but rather
in terms of the use to which a representation is put. Even though there generally are
diﬀerent possible interpretations, or uses, that map a computational structure to dif-
ferent target domains, content-ascription is relative to each interpretation. Under an
interpretation, representational contents are fairly determinate. Given the constraints
on the interpretation of interest, motivated by the organism's embeddedness in the en-
vironment and, derivatively, the purposes of the explanatory endeavour, interpretation
mappings tend to be fairly unique  only one interpretation is going to be relevant for
content-ﬁxation.
Interpretational semantics, under this reading, can avoid wild non-uniqueness of
content because second-order resemblance is not doing all the content-ﬁxing work  as
happens, in contrast, in Cummins' version of the account, as well as on pure structural
representation. There is, so to speak, a crucial diﬀerence in timing between Cummins'
and Ramsey's versions of the theory. The explanatory interpretation mapping in Cum-
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mins' IS comes, as it were, after, or on top of, content-ﬁxation  representations are
already endowed with (wildly non-unique) contents by then. In the foregoing approach
to IS, on the other hand, it is one particular interpretation mapping that helps give rep-
resentational status to the elements and processes of the cognitive system, and thence
endow them with content  the one dictated by the use the organism makes of the
cognitive structure in dealing with its current situation42.
Since each interpretation normally maps elements and processes of the system onto
unique entities and processes in the world, representational content is not non-unique.
All possible interpretations taken together, content in IS would be as non-unique as in
structural representation  the same structure can be used, with reasonable degrees
of success, in many diﬀerent situations. However, there is no reason, in IS, to consider
all interpretations together (contra Cummins 1989)  typically only one (or a few) are
relevant, and thereby eﬀective in determining representational content. In consequence,
non-uniqueness of content would be avoided.
As representational content gets ﬁxed only under one interpretation at a time, and
as Ramsey (2007) urges, only one interpretation (or a few) is generally relevant to
explaining a cognitive capacity, the fact that there are other possible interpretations
available  which ascribe diﬀerent contents to the same vehicle  should not impress
us. However, this comes at a price: the notion of interpretation at work is much richer
than the purely mathematical one (morphism) used by Cummins. And while a purely
mathematical notion of interpretation can safely be part of a naturalistic account of
representation, a more loaded version may put at risk the naturalistic standing of the
theory.
For Ramsey, interpretation is based on the use to which a certain computational
structure is put by the cognitive system. That use helps, together with second-order
resemblance, determine representational content. Out of the many mapping relations
that cognitive structures sustain, only one is relevant for the use the organism makes of
it. This is the one that determines representational content. Therefore, representational
content is typically unique, and misrepresentation can be accounted for. Cases in which
representations are used in a way that is inadequate to the task at hand count as
instances of misrepresentation.
Use selects the relevant resemblance relation, thus ﬁxing what the computational
structure is a simulation of, and consequently what its elements and processes are
mapped onto  what their representational content is. By having recourse to cognitive
use, Ramsey keeps at bay the worry that his view might be merely instrumentalist, or
that representation is an observer-dependent aﬀair, or an artefact of our explanatory
interests. His constant appeal to explanatory considerations is of an epistemological
sort, rather than metaphysical  it concerns the problem of how theorists can get a
grasp on what the cognitive task at hand is, and thus what the target of the simulation is
supposed to be. Once we know (or have a good guess of) what the simulation is targeted
at, we know (or have a good guess of) what the cognitive system is representing43.
42Ramsey (2007, pp. 95-6.)
43This constant appeal to explanatory considerations has led Morgan (2014, p. 224) to hold that in
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Ramsey's strategy is, I believe, promising, and it keeps interpretational semantics
ﬁrmly wedded to the naturalistic project, eschewing any role for pragmatic factors in
content-ﬁxation. However, the notion of use to which he appeals in cashing out a
richer notion of interpretation risks reintroducing traditional worries about naturalistic
theories of content, which we have examined in section 1.5.
First, in order for the notion of cognitive use to help pin down the content-ﬁxing in-
terpretation mapping, we need a principled, naturalistic way of individuating cognitive
tasks, and what counts as success (or failure). Teleosemantics may be a candidate for
providing these conditions44. As we have seen, there are potential problems with such a
move. Functional indeterminacy may creep in, making unambiguous task individuation,
as well as success conditions for its performance, diﬃcult to get in a principled way.
Second, even if a naturalistic way of uniquely individuating cognitive tasks were at hand,
Burge's (2010) objections to teleosemantics may then come into force. Given that beha-
vioural success is arguably independent from representational correctness, appropriate
behavioural use seems to be an inadequate criterion for helping ﬁx representational
content. A representation may be put to successful behavioural use by the cognitive
system, even though it is inaccurate.
In spite of these challenges, I think that versions of interpretational semantics
vaguely in the spirit of Ramsey's hold promise.
In a more satisfactory version of the theory, I take, teleology should not be directly
connected to content-ﬁxation as it is in teleosemantics. Using teleological functions to
help determine what the tasks facing organisms are, and what would count as success,
need not involve acceptance of teleosemantics. We need not, that is, endorse the view
that teleological functions are the main factor in content-ﬁxation. Rather, indetermin-
acy can be resolved once we admit to the set of content-determining factors a host of
other considerations, some of which of a non-teleological nature. We should moreover
accept that, in some cases, if not quite often, our incapacity to take into account that
host of factors may make content ascription epistemically undecidable. These epistemic
limitations would not impact negatively on our cognitive sciences, I take. These consid-
erations will be further explored soon, as they lie at the basis of the mild reductionist
view of representational content that I will put forward in section 8.2.
Another way of individuating cognitive tasks and their success conditions involves
pragmatic factors. As scientists, or in our everyday dealings with the world, we are
interested in explaining some pieces of behaviour as instances of performance of some
previously identiﬁed cognitive task; where the identiﬁcation depends on our explanatory
interests and aims, or on our pretheoretical intuitions. We can then assess representa-
tional use, and thus correctness, in light of its enabling successful (or else) accomplish-
ment of the pragmatically-individuated task. This abandons the naturalistic project,
Ramsey's view representational content ends up being `radically observer-dependent'. I disagree with
this interpretation of Ramsey, as I believe that the cognitive use of a structure has pride of place in his
picture of content-ﬁxation, something that Morgan (2014) seems partially to recognise.
44Indeed, Millikan occasionally sees teleosemantics as simply providing the normative dimension to
a mapping- or resemblance-based theory of content (e.g. Millikan 2004). See Shea (2013a) for critical
discussion.
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yielding a version of interpretational semantics that makes use of a notion of interpret-
ation cashed out in pragmatic terms. This view is very close in spirit to the pragmatic
deﬂationary path I will examine in section 8.1.
In sum, Ramsey's version of interpretational semantics calls for further elaboration,
and points to some interesting directions in which theories of representation and content
can be developed. One may, as Ramsey himself, try to cling to the naturalistic project,
providing perhaps a theory in which teleology plays a role, though not the one teleose-
mantics would want. Alternatively, one can partially reject the naturalistic project, and
embrace content pragmatism about cognitive representations. These considerations will
lead me to explore, in chapter 8, two ﬂavours of deﬂationism about representation and
content.
6.7 Concluding remarks
Interpretational semantics is a promising proposal for understanding the explanatory
role played by representation and representational content in the cognitive sciences.
Despite the critical attitude I took toward the view in this chapter, I am, as will be-
come clearer in following chapters, largely sympathetic to its approach to representation
and content. I think, however, that IS mistakenly tries to play a game to which it is
not suited, namely that of naturalising content in robust reductionist terms. Interpret-
ational semantics is better employed in the deﬂationary project that I will defend in
the next chapters. In order for it to shed its robustly reductionist metaphysical chains,
and at the same time keep its explanatory power, I argue that IS must embrace a
stronger notion of concrete computation. I believe indeed that many of the issues with
interpretational semantics stem from the weak and unsatisfactory notion of concrete
computation that it employs. In the next chapter, I will conjoin IS with the mechan-
istic view of concrete computation. This move brings IS and structural representation
close together. Most importantly, such an amendment makes space for a notion of
representation that is deﬂationary in its metaphysical commitments, while nonetheless





Interpretational semantics is a promising framework for understanding representational
content in the cognitive sciences (short of beliefs and desires). However, extant versions
of the theory feature shortcomings that cannot be ignored. The notion of interpretation
is ill-deﬁned, and at any rate insuﬃcient to avoid triviality of computation; and non-
uniqueness of content looms, as well as the risk of falling prey to some of the traditional
arguments against theories of content. I believe that the problems with IS have an iden-
tiﬁable origin: the employment of an unsatisfactory notion of concrete computation. It
is partly due to the weak notion of computation at play that appeal to interpretation and
representation becomes necessary to individuate computational structure. Endorsing a
stronger notion of concrete computation, such as the one provided by the mechanistic
view explored in Part II, makes it possible to explore an alternative explanatory route:
using concrete computation, mechanistically understood, to make sense of representa-
tion.
Metatheoretical considerations recommend such a path. A satisfying theory of rep-
resentation has eluded philosophers despite the decades (or centuries1) of focused eﬀorts.
It looks like the notion of representation is a bad candidate for being part of the ex-
planatory basis of phenomena such as concrete computation. Hence, if we are to take
seriously the proposal that the mind is a computing system, it might be worthwhile
to investigate alternative theoretical paths  paths that do not have as their starting
point the notion of representation, but that may perhaps lead to it. In particular, I will
enquire into whether the mechanistic view of concrete computation can help provide a
satisfying theory of representation.
The bases for my proposal have been laid out in previous chapters. It is though
worthwhile to go into more detail on the workings of the picture I am putting forward,
so as to see how the many topics we have touched upon so far mesh together to provide
what I take to be a satisfying theory of representation for the cognitive sciences. This




7.1 Starting with mechanism
Let me brieﬂy recapitulate some of the features of the mechanistic view of concrete com-
putation that will be relevant for the coming discussion. For a more detailed treatment,
I refer the reader to Part II.
First, recall that the states and processes of computational mechanisms are individu-
ated non-semantically2. They are not individuated by their representational contents,
but instead by their functions, i.e. the roles they play in enabling the mechanism of
which they are part to have computational capacities  capacities that in their turn are
one of the teleological functions of the system. A (digital) computational capacity, on
its turn, is not a matter of manipulating semantically interpretable symbols, but rather
of processing sequences of input, output, and intermediate strings of digits according to
a set of rules sensitive only to some degrees of freedom of the vehicles.
Second, the mechanistic view does not rely on interpretation (neither mathematical
nor cognitive) in order to characterise a mechanism as computational. If the system
is a mechanism that has the teleological function of sporting computational capacities,
understood as the manipulation of strings of digits according to rules, then the system
is computational. The problems that surfaced above with the notions of interpretation
and computation in interpretational semantics do not apply here. In opposition to
Cummins (1989), direct interpretation plays no role, let alone an `absolutely central'
one3, in concrete computation.
Some degree of something similar to interpretation is required. Insofar as a physical
system normally features many diﬀerent capacities, mechanistic explanations can be
provided for each of them. For instance, laptop computers have capacities such as
to heat up, to provide light, to make noises, etc. Mechanistic explanations for these
capacities carve the components and processes of the mechanism in diﬀerent ways. For
instance, the electrical goings-on in the processor unit play the role of dissipating energy
in the form of heat. This is an innocuous perspectivalism, as we have seen in chapter 4.
The fact that a physical system may have many diﬀerent capacities is unsurprising, as is
the fact that those capacities require diﬀerent explanations. What matters is that once
the computational capacities of the system are the ones in focus, only one mechanistic
explanation of those capacities is correct.
Embracing the view that computational systems are teleofunctional mechanisms
deﬂects the risk of triviality, or excessive liberality of concrete computation. Since
computational mechanisms have as their teleological function that of computing, their
computing capacity is the relevant one. The other capacities the system can be said
to have are parasitic, or secondary  provided, of course, that they are not additional
teleological functions of the mechanism. Those capacities are not what the mechanism
is for and, as such, may depend on interpretation to come to surface. The teleological
2Piccinini (2008b).
3Cummins (1989, p. 105.)
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function of the mechanism, on the other hand, is independent of interpretation, as it
is ﬁxed by the objective processes that determine bestowal of teleological functions to
physical systems according to the suitable theories of function that we have examined
in section 5.3. Nothing detracts from the objectivity of computational mechanisms
and of computations.
Third, the mechanistic view succeeds in avoiding limited, and a fortiori, unlimited
pancomputationalism. It drives an appropriate wedge between physical computational
systems, and physical systems such as walls, pebbles, and planetary systems, which,
though computationally describable, do not qualify as computational. The latter sys-
tems are not bounded mechanisms that have computational capacities as we have here
deﬁned them: their components and processes do not involve digits, and there is no
ordered manipulation of digits according to rules. Crucially, they lack the appropriate
teleological function that marks out computational physical systems. Computational
descriptions of such systems are possible, but that does not make them into computa-
tional mechanisms. The triviality objections against the notion of computation, which
feed on the threat of pancomputationalism, do not take a hold4.
These three features of the mechanistic view of concrete computation give us the
initial tools for informing a theory of representation. Concrete computation, being non-
semantically individuated, does not involve representation. It is thus in a good position
to ground an account of representation5. The fact that concrete computation is ob-
jective makes the computational structure of cognitive states something objective, out
there in the world rather than in the eye of the beholder. Finally, the mechanistic view
is not vulnerable to the Putnam-Searle triviality objections. Concrete computation is
not only objective, but it is also non-trivial. Most physical systems are not computa-
tional systems, and computational systems do not compute any possible function. It
follows from the mechanistic view that a computational system typically has uniquely
deﬁnable computational structures  the structures responsible for enabling the overall
computational capacities of the system6.
In brief, the mechanistic view of concrete computation provides a robust notion of
computational structure. Computational structures are non-semantically individuated,
objective (observer-independent), and determinate. With this notion of computational
structure in our hands, it is time to reassess structural representation, as well as its
relationships with interpretational semantics.
7.2 Mechanistic computation
and Structural Representation
The robust notion of computation and thereby of computational structure that the
mechanistic view of concrete computation provides plays a crucial role in the account
4See Piccinini (2007b).
5Piccinini (2004, 2008b).
6At least insofar as the argument against multiplicity of computations presented in section 4.4
succeeds.
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I want to put forward. The picture involves complementing structural representation
with the notion of computational structure mechanistically individuated  a move that
brings structural representation and interpretational semantics close together.
My proposal is that we go back to the core insight of interpretational semantics, and
especially of structural representation, that systems of representational vehicles enable
successful complex behaviour by instantiating the relational structure of a target do-
main. I propose to complement that insight in two ways that are at odds with extant
versions of IS and structural representation: ﬁrst, a) I claim that the structures that
play the explanatory representational role are computational structures mechanistically
individuated; second, b) I argue that representation is less central for a theory of cogni-
tion than generally thought  computational structure carries most of the explanatory
burden, with the notion of content having its metaphysical importance downsized.
The ﬁrst claim distances the foregoing picture from interpretational semantics, and
brings it closer to structural representation. The second claim, on the other hand,
does the opposite. For a) posits interpretation-independent structures and processes
that play the explanatory role of representations, giving us, in contrast to Cummins'
IS, a principled and objective way of carving up the cognitive system, as well as well-
deﬁned computational and representational vehicles. Meanwhile, b) rejects the robust
reductionism about representational content that underlies structural representation.
In my view, the internal states leading to successful complex behaviour are not primar-
ily individuated by their representational contents, but rather by their computational
structure. I will come back to b) in the next chapter.
Structural representation is based on the idea that representations represent by vir-
tue of instantiating the same relational structure, i.e. by being structurally resemblant,
to what they represent. I propose that the proper way of cashing out the relevant
relational structure of systems of representational vehicles is in terms of their compu-
tational structure. Collections of vehicles represent the entities in the world that share
their computationally-individuated structure. Importantly, this introduces strong con-
straints on what internal states are candidates for representational status, and it also
provides a deﬁnite way of individuating the relational structure that helps establish the
content-ﬁxing second-order resemblance relation.
First, only states that have a computational structure mechanistically individuated
may attain representational status. This is a demanding requirement. The structure, to
count as computational, must be such that it plays a role in the overall computational
capacities of the cognitive system, such as, for example, computing the route back
to the hive. This rules out structures that do not contribute in the appropriate way
to the computational capacities of the whole system. For instance, while a battery
in a laptop plays a role in enabling the system to compute insofar as it provides the
system with energy, the role it plays is not itself computational. It does not carry out
manipulations of strings of digits that are part of the overall computational capacity.
Rather, it contributes by providing energy to those components of the laptop that do
carry out computations (as well as to other noncomputational components, such as the
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fan and the screen). In the cognitive case, structures formed by blood vessels, glia cells,
neuronal organelles  and ad hoc hodgepodge structures  are excluded. Though
these entities play vital roles in the cognitive system, they do not play a computational
role (to the best of my knowledge7).
Viewing the cognitive system as a computational mechanism, as mainstream cog-
nitive science does, allows the non-semantic individuation of its relevant functional
structure. The elements and processes of the system are carved according to their
computational roles8. It follows that the cognitive system has objective computational
structures, i.e. relational structures over those of its elements and processes that play
a computational role, and stand in computational relations to each other. Describing
this structure is an empirical matter: it is an aim for the empirical branches of cognitive
science.
Neurons, assemblies of neurons, and their activities  the realisers of computational
and representational vehicles in the brain  stand in many sorts of physical relations
to other parts of the cognitive system, many (or most) of which have no bearing on the
cognitive capacities of organisms. Appeal to computations mechanistically individuated
helps constrain the physical properties and relations that are relevant for cognitive
abilities. Without such constraint, we lose sight of which subset of the complex physical
goings-on in the system are cognitively relevant.
It is unlikely that looking for a full description of the computational structures of
the whole cognitive system is going to be a feasible scientiﬁc enterprise, at least in the
near future. More promising in the short-term is an approach that focuses on speciﬁc
capacities of organisms, and tries to individuate the computational structures that en-
able it. The cognitive system most likely involves nested mechanisms  computational
structures in the cognitive system have components that are themselves computational
mechanisms, and whose computational structures may, on their turn, have components
that are also computational mechanisms, and so on. This will bottom-down in primitive
computing components9, such as logic gates are for computers. In the case of the brain,
it is less clear what the primitive computing mechanisms are. They might be realised
by the activity of single neurons, or even single dendritic trees10.
Philosophy cannot decide these empirical matters (though it can likely help). At
any rate, the cognitive sciences are still far from having the tools to make hypotheses
regarding the computational mechanisms, the computational structures, and the com-
putational primitives of the cognitive system that are not highly speculative11. What
7Glia cells are perhaps the best candidates for having a yet-to-be-discovered computational role.
8There may be cognitive abilities that exploit in part non-computational processes, such as random
processes. The foregoing account does not rule this out, but rather focuses on those abilities, arguably
the majority, that either in part or fully employ computational processes. Note moreover that the
deﬁnition of generic computation oﬀered in section 4.2 leaves open the possibility that some cognitive
processes compute analogically.
9See Piccinini (2007b, p. 510.)
10See for instance Ryder (2004), who develops a theory of representation based on dendritic compu-
tation, and second-order resemblance. It is a good illustration of one of the shapes the philosophical
picture I am here advocating may come to take if future empirical work vindicates it. I do not buy
Ryder's theory of content though, as will become clear.
11But some headway has been made. See, for a review, Carandini & Heeger (2012), and section 8.4
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philosophy can do, at this point at least, is to enquire on whether the foregoing frame-
work has good prospects of solving issues in the philosophical foundations of the cognit-
ive sciences. The mechanistic view of computation is a big step ahead in the foundational
project, insofar as it provides an objective, robust account of concrete computation. I
believe that, in its turn, this robust notion of concrete computation helps with one of
the other foundational, and deeply problematic, notions in the cognitive sciences 
representation.
The mechanistic view of concrete computation provides a deﬁnite, objective notion
of concrete computation, and of computational structure. By itself, this does not tell
us anything about representation, since computation and computational structure are
non-semantically individuated, and need not be interpreted as playing a part in any
kind of model or simulation. However, this view of computational structure can be
integrated in a theory of representation for cognitive science.
In the theory I am putting forward here, computational structure comes to take
the place of physical structure in structural representation. It is computational struc-
ture that helps establish the second-order resemblance between internal vehicles and
target domain. This move solves some of the problems with liberality that confronted
structural representation. It introduces demanding constraints on what structures are
candidates for representational status. Moreover, it accepts as candidates only those
structures that are cognitively relevant, insofar as they play a computational role in
enabling the computational capacities of the whole system under examination. Nev-
ertheless, the liberality due to reliance on second-order resemblance is still present.
Computational structures bear resemblance relations to many diﬀerent target domains
 Paris, Tianducheng, an indeﬁnite number of mathematical operations, and so on.
Modifying structural representation by placing computational structure mechanistic-
ally individuated at its core helps, but does not solve the problem of non-uniqueness of
content. Representations still have as their contents many disparate things.
My proposal is to learn to live with this consequence by deﬂating the notion of
representation. It might seem that denying robust reductionism about representation
will hurl the theory in the throes of instrumentalism, or outright eliminativism. But this
need not be so. Given the robust non-semantic account of concrete computation that the
mechanistic view oﬀers, it becomes possible to deﬂate the notion of representation while
keeping to objectivism about, at least, representational vehicles, i.e. computational
states and processes. This bring us back, once again, to interpretational semantics.
7.3 What about Interpretational Semantics?
The foregoing modiﬁcations to structural representation lead to a position according
to which it is computational structure that carries much of the explanatory burden
in an account of cognition. It is thanks to the fact that computational structures
internal to the cognitive system bear resemblance relations to things in the world that
below.
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the cognitive system is able to exploit them as models, as stand-ins. These structures
allow the cognitive system to have the structure of the world at [its] computational
ﬁngertips12. The second-order resemblance relation between computational structures
in the cognitive system, and things in the world is, at least in many cases, responsible
for enabling appropriate complex behaviour.
The computational structure of internal states and processes lies at the basis of
ascriptions of representational content. Content is to be seen as what explains the
successful use of an internal state in the context of certain task domains, in which
mechanistically individuated computational structure plays a central role. Cognitive
systems are computing mechanisms, and (some) representations are those computational
structures that, by instantiating the same relational structure of entities in the world,
play a guiding role in complex behaviour.
Partially shifting the explanatory burden to computational structure is a move that,
among the accounts on oﬀer in the literature, only the mechanistic view of concrete
computation allows, for the reasons we saw above. Such burden-shifting, in its turn,
allows us to lift much of the weight traditional theories of cognition place on the notion
of representational content. Representational content is not needed to individuate the
relevant explanatory states, nor is it required to avoid triviality of concrete computation.
This clears the way for a deﬂated notion of representation, one in which, as Egan (2010)
puts it, content-ascription allows us to build a nexus between computational goings-
ons, and the cognitive task at hand. This is in the spirit of interpretational semantics.
Representations are invoked in order to reveal computations as cognitive processes 
computations are interpreted, in light of the situation at hand, as simulating entities
and processes in the world.
Given this deﬂated understanding of representation, the problem of non-uniqueness
of content does not arise. As for interpretational semantics, the fact that a compu-
tational structure can be interpreted as modelling disparate target domains does not
detract from its being explanatory for the cognitive task under investigation (however it
is individuated). It is the suitability of the computational structure employed as a model
of the target domain that provides us an explanation of why the organism behaved ap-
propriately in a certain circumstance. Supplementing structural representation with the
mechanistic view of computation leads to a form of interpretational semantics superior
to the original versions of the theory advocated by Cummins (1989) and Ramsey (2007).
These claims will be further substantiated in the next chapter, in which I will ﬂesh
out with care the shapes my deﬂationary approach can take. This revamped interpret-
ational semantics opens up two paths worth investigating: pragmatism about repres-
entational content, à la Egan; or a sort of `mild reductionism', inspired by Dennett. I
will explore each path in turn.
12Cummins (1996, p. 93.)
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Chapter 8
Two Paths to Deﬂationism
It is time to take a look at how the type of deﬂationism about cognitive representation
I propose can be cashed out in detail. A deﬂationary theory of representation on the
premises that I have taken pains to lay down in the course of this work may take
diﬀerent forms. I will focus on two of them  pragmatism and mild reductionism 
which strike me as more plausible, and more closely related to positions already found
in the philosophical literature. There may be other deﬂationary paths to be explored,
and even diﬀerent ways in which pragmatism and mild reductionism may be cashed
out. I will though limit myself to one version of each of the latter approaches.
Before proceeding, it is important to be clear on what is meant by `deﬂationism'
in the foregoing. The term has recently been used with a diﬀerent meaning by Burge
(2010), and thus, lest there be confusion, I want to contrast his use of the term with
the one of most relevance here.
Burge (2010, pp. 293ﬀ.) dubs `deﬂationary views about representation' those the-
ories that do not make representation a distinctively psychological notion  theories
that thereby belong to the `Deﬂationary Tradition'. Most theories of representation
developed in the literature  and all that were examined in the present work  qual-
ify as deﬂationary sensu Burge. For the notion of representation they end up with is
such that it encompasses non-psychological phenomena: e.g. magnetotactic bacteria,
thermometers, bug detectors in the frog tongue-snapping reﬂex, rudimentary maps in
artiﬁcial and simple biological systems, circadian clocks in plants1.
Burge sees this feature of theories in the Deﬂationary Tradition as deeply unsatis-
fying. The term `deﬂationary' has for him a clearly negative connotation. Deﬂationary
theories are too liberal about representation, detaching the notion from its explanat-
ory role in cognitive science. This, Burge claims, seeds confusion, for it obscures the
distinction between a liberal, non-psychological notion  which could be replaced by
other terms, such as `causal co-variation', `structural resemblance', and so on  and
a notion of representation that is proprietary to cognitive science, which is properly
psychological2. Deﬂationary theories mislead by using a term that should apply only
1See also Morgan (2014).
2As Morgan (2014) points out, in a similar vein, both indicator representations and structural
representation are in no way distinctively `mental'.
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to psychology to domains that have no relation to it. The notion of representation,
Burge holds, is thereby overstretched, and applied to phenomena that are not genuinely
representational, that do not call for explanation in representational terms.
According to Burge, moreover, the whole idea that representational content must
be naturalised in order to secure the foundations of cognitive science is misguided3.
In contrast, he argues that the crucial role played by the notion of representation in
a successful science, i.e. cognitive science, which has produced fruitful theories and
explanations, is enough to make the notion scientiﬁcally respectable. Representation
is to be seen as a scientiﬁc primitive in cognitive science, an irreducible explanatory
notion4. Burge's primitivism about representation in cognitive science is in clear op-
position to the project I am pursuing. The tradition this work inscribes itself in is
that of attempts to naturalise representational content, namely to explain content in
naturalistically-acceptable terms.
I will not assess the merits and demerits of Burge's primitivism about representation.
Suﬃce to say that representation seems to be the wrong candidate for an irreducible
scientiﬁc notion. For one, representation may turn out to be an unneeded posit in
explaining behaviour, if anti-representationalism should in the end prevail, and displace
representationalism as the mainstream position in the cognitive sciences5. Moreover,
by taking representation for granted, cognitive science is making its life easier than
it should be: it is helping itself to a notion that carries a considerable explanatory
burden, without worrying about whether that notion is naturalistic, or brings with it
non-naturalistic commitments that may undermine its scientiﬁc credentials.
That said, it is important to keep in mind that my use of the term `deﬂationary'
applied to theories of representation, and in particular to the theory of representation
that I am here developing, is in no way related to Burge's. What I mean by `deﬂationary'
and `deﬂationism' has little if anything to do with the breadth of application of the
notion of representation. Deﬂationism in my sense has to do with the following three
features.
First, it concerns theories that see representation as carrying less of the explanatory
burden in theories of cognition than is normally held, and thereby downsizing the meta-
physical worries connected to the notion. If representation and content play a smaller,
or at any rate, a diﬀerent role in the explanation of cognitive capacities on the lines
that I propose, their explanatory importance as well as their metaphysical import are
deﬂated, and as a consequence at least some of the traditional problems with theories
of content disappear  or so I argue. Let us call this aspect `explanatory deﬂationism'.
Furthermore, the account of representation I put forward is deﬂationary inasmuch
as it eschews the somewhat classical view, famously espoused by Fodor (1987), that
the explanatory states in cognitive science are primarily individuated by their contents
 a crucial component of what Egan (2014b) has dubbed `Hyper representationalism',
3Rescorla (2013, p. 693) shares this view to some extent.
4Burge (2010, p. 308). Chomsky (1995) can also be interpreted along these lines.
5Ramsey's (2007) aim is exactly to argue that this is already the case in current cognitive science,
appearances notwithstanding.
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and Dennett (1991) has called `industrial-strength Realism'. In contrast, I hold that
cognitive states are not primarily individuated by their contents  the properties they
possess that play a primary explanatory role in the cognitive sciences are not semantic
properties, but computational ones. I will dub this aspect `content deﬂationism'.
Finally, the view I propose is deﬂationary insofar as it rejects the requirement that
a set of necessary and suﬃcient conditions for determining representational content be
provided. This is akin to the ﬁrst feature that Suárez (2004) includes in his `deﬂationary
strategy' toward scientiﬁc representation. As for Suárez (2004), my deﬂationary theory
of cognitive representation involves individuating some general and non-exhaustive fea-
tures that characterise representational content in cognitive systems  which I will call
`individuation deﬂationism'.
These three forms of deﬂationism are independent of each other. Being a deﬂationist
about representation in one or two of these ways does not entail being one in the
remaining sense(s). My account, nonetheless, embraces all three forms of deﬂationism6.
One motivation for pursuing this deﬂationary path comes from the suspicion that
the complexity and ﬂexibility of the abilities sported by cognitive systems require that
several diﬀerent notions of representation and content be employed, on pain of leaving
out of the explanatory purview some relevant cognitive phenomena. Views of repres-
entation closer to informational semantics may be relevant for explaining what feature
detectors in sensory systems represent, and how they contribute to informing simple
behaviour. They may also help explain the construction of more complex, structural
representations that account for higher cognitive capacities, such as navigation, plan-
ning, and reasoning7. Pluralism about representation and content ﬁxation is part and
parcel of my deﬂationary approach.
Pluralism does not entail the rejection of necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
representational content. It only entails that there may be several independent sets of
suﬃcient conditions, each set deﬁning a diﬀerent type of representation. The disjunction
of sets of suﬃcient conditions may be taken as a necessary condition for something to
represent. The deﬂationary picture of representation I want to oﬀer goes further. It
sees representation as being strongly dependent on context; diﬀerent contexts leading
to diﬀerent factors playing a role in the ﬁxation of content. There is no list of relevant
naturalistic factors for the ﬁxation of content, no set of sets that includes all the suﬃcient
conditions deﬁning the plurality of processes that determine content.
Let us now move to the examination of what I take to be two main paths to which
a deﬂationary view of representation leads. As long as terminological confusion with
Burge's independent use of the term is avoided, I believe that `deﬂationism' suitably
describes the view of representation that I will now turn to explore in more detail.
6It is arguably also deﬂationist sensu Burge.
7Johnson-Laird's (1983) theory of mental models, based to a large extent on second-order resemb-
lance, is an example of how explanations of complex, typically personal-level cognitive capacities in
terms of structural representations may go.
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8.1 A walk with the pragmatist
The ﬁrst path, the one recommended by content pragmatists, is guided by the idea
that the notion of representational content grabs a hold only in light of our explanatory
interests. Representation and misrepresentation are notions invoked relative to speciﬁc
explanatory purposes, and to measures of behavioural success dictated by the interests of
theorists. The term `representation' does not (necessarily) capture anything objective,
out there in the world independently of our purposes and practices. Rather, it provides
us with an explanatory handle adequately to describe the contribution of computational
processes to the successful behaviour under investigation.
Frances Egan (1999, 2009, 2010, 2014b) has been a compelling advocate of such
a view. Talk of representation in (computational) cognitive science, for her, is part
of an `explanatory gloss' that allows cognitive scientists to connect the computational
goings-on with the cognitive task at hand. Representational content is an artefact
of our investigation and theorising, not (necessarily) something really in the minds
of cognitively complex organisms. Nevertheless, the view avoids eliminativism about
content by insisting that representation plays a crucial role in cognitive science  an
epistemic, rather than ontological one.
Let us brieﬂy explore Egan's view, which inspires, but does not fully coincide with,
the deﬂationary path that I want to put forward.
8.1.1 Egan's content pragmatism
Egan's analysis has as its starting point the role of the notion of representation in the
cognitive sciences, rather than the more traditionally philosophical problems about rep-
resentation that have exercised philosophers of mind. Her project consists in describing
and making sense of the commitments and workings of our best sciences of the mind,
with special attention to their apparently more promising (and mainstream) branch:
computational cognitive science. According to Egan, computational explanations in
cognitive science are function-theoretic in nature  they unveil which mathematical
functions are computed by cognitive systems that help explain their behavioural suc-
cess.
One of Egan's favourite examples is Marr's theory of how the early visual system
detects edges, by calculating the rate of change in the intensity of light across the ret-
ina8. According to Marr, the early visual system sports this capacity because a part of
it computes a mathematical function, the Laplacean convolved with the Gaussian. This
mathematical function is general, inasmuch as inputs need not be light intensities and
outputs edges, and is applicable to several other domains; it belongs moreover to a class
of well-understood mathematical tools. Egan claims that this is the primary charac-
terisation of cognitive mechanisms in computational cognitive science: what cognitive
scientists look for in their explanations are mathematical, function-theoretic character-
isations of the computations carried out by cognitive systems, or parts thereof.
8See Egan (2010, 2014b), Marr (1982).
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The function-theoretic characterisation does not involve distal content. The sys-
tem is explained, and its parts individuated, in terms of the algorithms they imple-
ment in computing the relevant explanatory mathematical function. Distal representa-
tional contents are not mentioned in the theory itself, the latter being characteristically
`environment-neutral'9. The computational cognitive mechanism that computes the
Laplacean convolved with the Gaussian does so regardless of the environment it ﬁnds
itself in, and therefore regardless of the causal connexions that input systems have with
things in the world. Were the inputs to the mechanism transduced from sound waves
rather than light intensities, the mechanism would still compute the same mathematical
function over those inputs. These features are not restricted to this particular example,
but are supposed to generalise to most, if not all endeavours in computational cognitive
science10.
Crucially, the relations between cognitive mechanisms and the environment, which
typically are relied upon to determine representational content  according at least
to mainstream theories of content, which are externalist  play no role in individuat-
ing the cognitive mechanism. Computational cognitive science individuates cognitive
mechanisms not by their representational contents, but by their mathematical, function-
theoretic, environment-neutral characterisation11.
A place for representational content is nonetheless preserved, for appeal to content
is unavoidable in explanations in cognitive science. The explananda of cognitive science
are typically tasks that are pretheoretically characterised in distal terms, i.e. in terms of
capacities sported by organisms in their interactions with their environments. Success
in those tasks is assumed. In order to make clear how the mathematically-individuated
mechanisms unveiled by computational cognitive science can be the explanantia of those
distally-individuated explananda, an interpretation of the computational goings-on in
terms of distal features of the environment is called for. That interpretation typically
involves representational content: states and processes of the computational mechanism
are seen as representing entities and processes in the world. In this way, a connexion is
established between the computational mechanism, and the cognitive task it is meant
to explain. Such interpretation is not part of the computational theory proper, which
is environment-neutral, having no role for distal representational content. Rather, the
representational interpretation of cognitive mechanisms is part of what Egan variously
calls the `explanatory' (2014b, 2014a), `cognitive' (2010), or `intentional gloss' (2014b).
The gloss, by including reference to distal content, allows us to see how computing
certain mathematical functions in a certain environment constitutes the performance of
a cognitive task.
Beside playing the role of `connective tissue' between computational story and pre-
9Egan (2014b, p. 122.)
10Egan (2010, 2014b) draws on several other examples from computational cognitive science, such as
Shadmehr and Wise's (2005) theory of motor control.
11In her more recent work, Egan (2014b) argues that computational states have one kind of content
essentially, i.e. mathematical content. I think this move introduces considerable and unnecessary
complications, and should therefore be rejected (cf. Piccinini 2015, pp. 137-8). I will thus stick to
formulations of the view that do not posit this new kind of content. See section 8.1.2.
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theoretical explanandum, the gloss has also a heuristic value. It allows theorists more
easily to grasp what the computational processes in the cognitive system are doing,
and how the information ﬂow inside the system proceeds. By seeing those processes
as being carried out over states with distal representational content, the computational
goings-on in the system become easier to understand, and synthetically to describe.
In sum, representational content, though not part of the purely function-theoretic
characterisations that constitute the theory proper, plays a pragmatic role in allowing
us to understand how cognitive computational systems work, and how their workings
amount to the performance of pretheoretically characterised cognitive tasks. Content
is ﬁxed not only by means of natural relations between certain cognitive states, and
processes and entities in the world, but also by a host of pragmatic considerations
motivated by the explanatory aims and practices of theorists12.
Ascribed contents must be salient and tractable, and should not be unwieldly dis-
junctive or opaque. The representational interpretation may not perfectly match the
computational description of the system  one-to-one mappings between computa-
tional states and contents may be given up  provided that such idealisation increases
expository clarity. Moreover, depending on the level of generality that is supposed
to be achieved by the cognitive gloss, more or less general contents may be ascribed.
The same computational system may contribute to diﬀerent cognitive tasks, involving
diﬀerent types of input and output (e.g. visual vs. auditory), in diﬀerent contexts. De-
pending on explanatory aims and interests, content ascription may try to capture the
speciﬁc contributions made in the diﬀerent contexts, ascribing visual contents in one
type of case, and auditory contents in another; or it may strive for greater generality
by ascribing disjunctive contents, e.g. both visual and auditory; or it may strive for yet
greater generality by ascribing more proximal representational contents, e.g. changes
in intensity of the signal.
Misrepresentation is possible in content pragmatism, though it grabs a hold only
relative to a choice of ascribed content13. It is only given a certain pragmatic background
in which a choice has been made of what content to ascribe to a certain computational
state that questions about representational correctness and misrepresentation can be
evaluated.
Take the (in)famous example of frogs' tongue-snapping reﬂex. In some explanatory
contexts, e.g. when the behaviour of interest is the ability of the frog to feed itself,
internal states of the frog may be ascribed the content that there is food at x,y. Every
instance in which the reﬂex behaviour is produced in absence of food, but, say, in
presence of dark moving pellets of inedible material, will count as instances of misrep-
resentation. In a diﬀerent explanatory context, e.g. when the explanatory aim is that
of understanding how the visual system of the frog works, pragmatic considerations
may lead to ascribing to internal states the content that there is a small dark moving
spot at x,y14. Those instances that counted as misrepresentations in the context of
12Egan (2014b, pp. 125ﬀ.)
13Egan (2014b, p. 127.)
14Egan (2015).
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explaining frogs' ability to feed themselves are, in this context, instances of correct rep-
resentation instead. What remains unchanged with the change in explanatory context
is the mathematical function(s) that the reﬂex-generating mechanisms in the frog com-
pute (whatever they are). The function-theoretic description remains constant, while
the computational states and processes have diﬀerent contents ascribed to them in the
diﬀerent cognitive glosses.
This latter point further clariﬁes in which way the computational states and pro-
cesses are not individuated by the contents they bear. Individuation in computational
cognitive science involves primarily the function-theoretic characterisation, which re-
mains constant with change of explanatory context, embedding environment, diﬀerent
weight given to diﬀerent pragmatic considerations, and so forth. Representational con-
tent, on the other hand, may vary with changes in each of the latter factors. These
diﬀerent content ascriptions do not aﬀect the individuation of the computational states
and processes that are the explanantia of computational cognitive science. What is
essential to those explanantia is the mathematical function they compute, not the rep-
resentational contents that may be ascribed to them.
Egan's approach is in the spirit of the deﬂationism that I advocate. Indeed, she has
recently labelled her view `deﬂationary'15. As she puts it, her deﬂationism is objectiv-
ist about the explanatory vehicles in cognitive science, i.e. computational states and
processes, whereas it is pragmatist for what regards representational content16. As it
stands, I believe that Egan's view has trouble doing justice to the former claim. Given
her allegiance to an unsatisfactory view of concrete computation, she has trouble se-
curing a non-trivial, observer-independent notion of concrete computation, and thereby
of computational vehicles. The mechanistic view of concrete computation that I have
presented and developed in Part II can providentially come to the rescue.
8.1.2 Content pragmatism and concrete computation
Egan seems to17 be working with a notion of concrete computation akin to that put
forward by Cummins (1989)18. She seems to subscribe to the view that computation
involves a mapping between steps of an algorithm, and states of a physical system
 computational descriptions providing `a formal characterisation of a device'19. It
is not clear whether, at least in her early work, Egan rests contented with a simple
mapping view of concrete computation with the addition of pragmatic constraints, as
15Egan (2015).
16More precisely, Egan (2015) claims to be an objectivist about representational vehicles, and a
pragmatist for what regards representational content. I ﬁnd this phrasing puzzling, for it is not clear
how there can be objective representational vehicles part of the computational theory proper, whose
content is though observer-dependent and not part of the computational theory. To be fair, the vehicles
can count as representational, for Egan, in light of the mathematical content they have, but not
of their cognitive content. Since I reject Egan's more recent semantic view of computation based
on mathematical content, I will phrase the claim in terms of computational vehicles, rather than
representational ones. Ramsey (2015) presses a similar point, though not directed at Egan.
17I use `seems to' throughout this paragraph given that it is not always transparent what Egan's
commitments are regarding concrete computation.
18See Egan (1999, 2010).
19Egan (1999, p. 181.)
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examined in section 3.2; or whether she also wants to include causal constraints. As
argued in section 3.1, endorsing the simple mapping view leads to triviality of concrete
computation, and unlimited pancomputationalism. Adding pragmatic constraints on
computational individuation would jeopardise Egan's commitment to objectivism about
computational vehicles. More recently, Egan (2014b, p. 116) has more openly appealed
to causal constraints on the mappings relevant for determining computations. Since
causal mapping views are stronger and more plausible than simple mapping views, I
will stick to the more charitable reading in this section, and take Egan to endorse a
causal mapping view on the lines of Cummins'20.
Though non-semantic, computations are typically semantically-interpretable, ac-
cording to Egan. Concrete computation involves two mapping functions: fR and fI.
The former is the realisation function, which maps computational states and processes
onto physical states and (causal) processes in the physical system. The latter is the
interpretation function, which maps computational states and processes onto contents.
Egan's views have changed with regards to fI in the course of the years. In her (1999),
what is crucial is fR, while fI is not essential to concrete computation, computation
being non-semantic. This view, indistinguishable from Cummins', brings with it the
problems presented in section 6.4. I will not rehearse those arguments again here.
Suﬃce to point out that this view, unless constrained by further factors, leads (at least)
to limited pancomputationalism, thereby failing appropriately to capture the domain of
physical systems pretheoretically considered to be computational.
Furthermore, though it preserves objectivism about computation, this view makes
concrete computation into a trivial matter, and the existence of computational vehicles
ubiquitous and uninteresting. For Egan's objectivism about computational vehicles to
be a less trivial claim, pragmatic constraints would likely have to be appealed to in
order to select, out of all the computational physical systems, the ones that can be
fruitfully computationally explained. And, out of the latter, which of the computa-
tions they perform are explanatory of their behaviour. In the case of cognitive science,
pragmatic considerations would be invoked twice: in determining which concrete com-
putations are explanatory, and in determining the representational content ascribed to
those computations, which appears in the explanatory gloss.
I think that such a view is coherent, and perhaps defensible. But it leaves ample
margin for improvement. Its treatment of concrete computation can be bettered by hav-
ing recourse to the robust mechanistic view defended in Part II, which is non-trivial and
does not entail pancomputationalism. Embracing the mechanistic view avoids the need
for pragmatic considerations in determining which concrete computations are explanat-
ory. As we have seen, the mechanistic view narrows down considerably the domain of
physical systems that compute, and provides the tools to individuate the computational
structures of computational mechanisms.
More recently, Egan (2010, 2014b) has defended a heterodox semantic view of compu-
20Her indebtedness to Cummins' view of computation is clear in her (2014b), as well as in her early
work. In her (1999) she refers to Cummins (1989) as one of the theorists providing the more accepted
theory of concrete computation.
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tation. According to her new view, both fRand fI are essential to concrete computation.
However, in contrast to traditional semantic theories, fI does not map computational
states onto distal representational contents, but rather onto `mathematical contents',
i.e. abstract mathematical objects such as numbers, and mathematical operations.
Computational states essentially represent, though what they represent are numbers,
mathematical operations, arguments and values of mathematical functions. A further,
cognitive interpretation, maps mathematical contents onto representational contents
(which she dubs `cognitive contents'). This latter interpretation function is though not
part of the computational theory, but rather of the explanatory gloss. So pragmatism
about representational, or cognitive, content is still in force.
I take this move toward a semantic theory of concrete computation, albeit of a
non-traditional kind, to be misguided. The diﬃculties pointed out in section 3.3.2 that
semantic theories have to face apply, with the added worry of having to make sense
of the notion of mathematical content itself. Which kind of relation must there be
between physical states and processes for them to represent abstract mathematical en-
tities? Egan does not oﬀer an account, though she sees the prospects of coming up with
a naturalistic explanation of that representational relation to be dim. The lack of a
clear account of how computational states get their mathematical content is problem-
atic, since as Piccinini (2015, p. 138) points out, computational states and processes are
compatible with diﬀerent assignments of mathematical content21. Mathematical con-
tent would thereby be non-unique, and since mathematical content helps individuate
concrete computations, the upshot is a semantic version of the multiplicity of computa-
tions problem. The same physical goings-on can have diﬀerent mathematical contents,
and thus implement several diﬀerent concrete computations simultaneously.
Egan's more recent view of concrete computation is at best crucially incomplete
and, as it stands, deeply problematic. The same can be said of her previous view. In
both ﬂavours, Egan's theory is ill-equipped to do justice to one of its own aims: being
objectivist, in a explanatorily helpful way, about computational vehicles.
The mechanistic view, for the reasons already rehearsed at length, is up to the task
of securing what Egan's theory requires. This is one of the main contributions that
the foregoing work makes to the pragmatist version of deﬂationism about content: it
provides a robust notion of concrete computation much more adequate in ensuring that
some physical systems have states and processes that are computational in an objective,
non-trivial way. Since computational vehicles, in the content pragmatist picture, are
supposed to carry most of the explanatory burden in cognitive science  representation
being part of a helpful gloss  it is crucial that they be objective and non-trivial.
Otherwise, their explanatory role and theoretical importance would be jeopardised, and
the content pragmatist would be in dire straits.
The deﬂationary path recommended by content pragmatism is made more cogent
by incorporating the mechanistic view of concrete computation in the account. Let us
now look at how such an amended content pragmatism looks like.
21See also Rescorla (2013, pp. 687-8.)
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8.1.3 Content pragmatism amended
I will refer to this pragmatic, deﬂationary theory of content based on interpretational
semantics as `pragIS'. The interpretation function that maps computational states and
processes onto representational contents is not purely mathematical, as for Cummins
(1989), but is determined by pragmatic considerations. The relevant interpretation
function, the relevant mapping, is the one that allows explaining the success of the
organism in the task at hand in an explanatorily illuminating and interesting way. As
we have seen, Egan (2014b) dubs it `cognitive interpretation'. PragIS is not a naturalistic
theory of content, for it does not explain representation in naturalistic, non-intentional
terms. The notion of interpretation at play is itself intentional  it depends on the
purposes and interests of cognitive scientists. This fact is not particularly problematic
as long as we keep the ambitions of the theory suitably constrained. Recall that we are
here concerned with a theory of representational content, and not of intentional content,
as deﬁned in Part I. Accounting for these two diﬀerent notions of representation and
content may well be largely independent projects, involving quite diﬀerent factors and
considerations.
The pragmatist ﬂavour of IS makes explanation of representational content parasitic
on intentional content. The former depends on the latter. However, this is no strong
objection to the foregoing  it may well be that there is no naturalistic, objectivist
account of representational content. Whether there is one for intentional content is
another, plausibly much more complicated, question. The content pragmatist need not
take a side on this further debate, though non-robustly reductionist options are available
22.
The pragmatist-ﬂavoured interpretational semantics I propose is objectivist about
concrete computation and computational structures, courtesy of the mechanistic view
of concrete computation, but it is deﬂationist for what regards representational con-
tent. The view does not invoke mind-dependent notions to account for computational
structure, but it does invoke them for what regards ascription of content. The foregoing
account is able to make space for the possibility of misrepresentation. Misrepresent-
ation takes place when the computational structures driving a speciﬁc behaviour fail
to lead to successful behaviour in the task at hand. Misrepresentation may be due to
interference, malfunction, inadequate circumstance, etc. What the task is, and what
counts as success depend on pragmatic considerations  the explanatory interests of
scientists.
We start with behavioural success in a task, and look for an explanation for it.
Success, as Ramsey (2007) and Egan (2014b) point out, is presupposed  it is the ex-
planatory target we start with, and is thus dependent on pragmatic considerations. Rep-
resentational success is, as it were, an explanatory consequence of behavioural success
(of a certain kind). The deﬂated notion of representation at work in pragIS involves an
inversion of sorts of the relations between representation and successful behaviour. Ap-
22For instance, (Dennett 1971, 1987a). Though Dennett's position, especially in his early work, was
close to instrumentalism or pragmatism, later versions of his view are open to a more naturalistic
reading. I will explore such a reading in section 8.2.
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propriate representations explain behavioural success; but behavioural success is what
makes the representations appropriate. Computational structures explain how come the
organism behaved as it did, and content-ascriptions connect those structures to things
in the world, making clear why those structures enabled the behavioural feat. Beha-
vioural and representational success go hand in hand in this explanatory strategy, and
so Burge's (2010) point about the independence of representational and behavioural
success does not apply. It concerns only attempts at naturalising content, for which
the need to distinguish representational and behavioural success is required so as to
avoid the putatively wrong-headed reduction of the former to the latter. However, the
pragmatist ﬂavour of interpretational semantics is not a naturalistic theory of content,
and therefore need not worry about picking an inadequate reduction basis.
PragIS puts into question the assumption that only accounts of representational
content that are naturalistic are on the right track. Rather, it claims, the need for
naturalisation of representation  at least of the subpersonal kind  disappears once
we take a diﬀerent approach to what representation is, and what we require the notion
to achieve in our scientiﬁc theories. The approach pragIS recommends partly turns the
metaphysical problem of content into an epistemological one. Ascription of content to
computational structures is based on the fact that those structures are responsible, given
the resemblance relations in which they stand with things in the world, for the successful
behavioural outcome. A large part of the burden of explanation is on computational
structures and their causal powers, representation being a way to connect computational
goings-on with the cognitive task to be explained.
Appeal to representational content plays an important explanatory role, inasmuch as
it equips us with a way of grasping the relevance of computational processes in making
successful behaviour possible. But ascription of representational content fundamentally
depends on the interpretation given by theorists of what the task at hand is, and of how
the computational structures allow it to be successfully carried out. There is no question
of internal states essentially bearing semantic properties. In the foregoing picture, what
is essential to the relevant states is their computational structures.
Cognitive representation is nothing mysterious, nor in need of metaphysical vin-
dication. And wild non-uniqueness of content does not pose a threat. The deﬂated
notion of representational content at hand is not harmed by the degree of liberality
of second-order resemblance that remains, for it is unproblematic that the same com-
putational structure can bring forth successful behaviour toward many diﬀerent target
domains. Liberality is not a problem for the explanatory project of which the notion of
representation is an important part  all that should concern the theorist is that those
structures are playing a role in successful behaviour toward the target domain at hand,
regardless of their potential role in other behavioural domains. Once those structures
are individuated, and their role in enabling successful behaviour is established, repres-
entational content can be ascribed to the elements in the structures as a way to reveal
how those elements, and the computational processes they partake in, are relevant to
the behaviour under investigation. The fact that the same computational structures
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could equally lead to successful behaviour toward diﬀerent target domains is irrelevant
for the explanatory purposes at hand, and will thus not call for additional contents to
be ascribed to the structures.
In sum, representational content plays an explanatory role in the pragmatist ﬂavour
of IS, albeit a secondary one  that of an explanatory or cognitive gloss over what is
doing the work, i.e. computational structures mechanistically individuated. The fact
that the same computational structures may be eﬀectively employed to solve diﬀerent
tasks is unsurprising. Moreover, it does not detract from its explanatory role in ex-
plaining speciﬁc behaviours. Second-order resemblance comes in to help account for
why on certain occasions computational structures lead to successful behaviour, whilst
in others they do not. In the former case, there is a second-order resemblance between
the computational structure and the target domain, while in the latter there is not, or
not enough.
Content pragmatism has the tools to avoid indeterminacy of content. First, inde-
terminacy of content is a problem only if there is a commitment to there being cognitive
states that essentially bear content. The content pragmatist can deny that represent-
ational content is an objective property of cognitive states, and reject the view that
cognitive states are essentially individuated by their contents. Second, representational
content, being part of the explanatory gloss, is ascribed with pragmatic considerations
in view. Depending on explanatory aims and interests, diﬀerent speciﬁc contents may be
ascribed to the same cognitive state. Determinacy is achieved if and to the extent that
it is explanatorily useful relative to the relevant pragmatic considerations. Misrepres-
entation is similarly handled. It is only given a certain pragmatic background in which
a choice has been made on what content to ascribe to a certain computational state that
questions about representational correctness or misrepresentation can be evaluated.
A further source of liberality that was problematic for theories of representational
content based on second-order resemblance  namely, that we should allow approx-
imate resemblances to count, as perfect resemblance is too demanding a requirement
 is innocuous on pragIS. The second-order resemblance is good enough to the extent
in which it enables the behaviour under investigation to be successful. The elements
of the relevant structures have determinate contents, for the connexion of relevance is
that between the computational structures, and the target domain. There is no sense in
ascribing slightly inaccurate contents just because the pertinent second-order resemb-
lance is not perfect. Computational structures drive appropriate behaviour because the
resemblance is good enough, and that is good enough for determinate content-ascription.
8.1.4 Content pragmatism assessed
In recent years, partly due to the frustration felt in some philosophical quarters with
the project of naturalising content, and partly thanks to Egan's compelling advocacy,
content pragmatism has attracted considerable attention, as well as criticism. The
most vocal direct opposition has been put up by Ramsey (2015), Neander (2015), and
Bechtel (2016). Ramsey and Neander make use of a similar strategy in arguing against
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content pragmatism. The view is supposed to provide an alternative path in the philo-
sophical attempt of understanding representation and content, eschewing reductionism,
eliminativism, primitivism (and dualism)  the traditional positions, often taken to
be exhaustive of the conceptual landscape23. Neander and Ramsey argue that this is
an illusion: content pragmatism does not oﬀer a coherent position, and thus ends up
collapsing into one of the traditional views.
Bechtel, on the other hand, focuses on content pragmatism's putative inability to
capture the way cognitive scientists use the notion of representation in their theories. I
will start with Bechtel's critique, and then move on to Neander's and Ramsey's.
Bechtel's critique
A ﬁrst worry concerning pragmatism about content in general, and therefore also pragIS,
is that it is radically revisionary of the practices of cognitive scientists. It would seem
that cognitive scientists make use of representations not as explanatory glosses to be
provided once their theories are complete, but rather as hypotheses about states and
processes that objectively exist in cognitive systems. Bechtel (2016) examines one case
study, the discovery and development of theories of spatial representation in the rodent
brain  which came to be known as `cognitive maps' (Tolman 1948, O'Keefe & Nadel
1978). In the decades that followed the original discovery of place cells, grid cells,
head-direction cells, and other processes that play a role in spatial representation and
navigation have been found24. Bechtel's aim is to show, contra Egan, that the positing of
representations, rather than working as a mere gloss, actually involves strong ontological
commitments, drives new discoveries, and deeply informs theorising in cognitive science.
... treating brain processes as representations is foundational to these re-
search projects as they have been pursued. The research pursuits are focused
on identifying what neural processes serve as representational vehicles and
especially determining what they represent. The research eﬀorts are de-
signed to answer these questions and it would be diﬃcult to understand
why the researchers pursue these projects if their goal was not to identify
representations and determine what they represent. (Bechtel 2016, p. 1289)
Bechtel describes in great detail the process of discovery and theoretical development
that have marked the work on place cells, grid cells and head-direction cells for the past
four decades. He uses this careful reconstruction of scientiﬁc progress in this area, what
motivated it and what it was directed at explaining, to argue that a commitment to the
objectivity of representations was essential for the scientiﬁc project to go on. The whole
process would have seemed absurd and meaningless were talk of representation to be
taken as merely providing an explanatory gloss, rather than as capturing objective states
and processes in the rodent cognitive system. Though Bechtel's careful treatment of
this case study is historically and philosophically interesting, I think that he fails in his
23See section 1.3.
24Moser et al. (2008).
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attempt to, by means of this case study, undermine pragmatism about representational
content.
Bechtel is probably right that prima facie content pragmatism is revisionary. As
he correctly points out, most of cognitive science traﬃcs in representational talk. How-
ever, more must be shown if his line of objection is to be successful: he must establish
that talk of representation is justiﬁed and substantive, and not a mere matter of sci-
entiﬁc heritage. Ramsey (2007) investigates this question, and concludes with a largely
negative answer: according to him, most of contemporary cognitive science employs a
notion of representation based on mere causal correlation, what he dubs the `receptor
notion'25. The receptor notion of representation, he then argues, fails to distinguish
representations from mere causal relays. Most talk of representation in the cognitive
sciences could be replaced with talk of causal relays, or mediating causal states, without
loss of scientiﬁc value26. Appeal to receptor-representations, for Ramsey, does not buy
us anything explanatorily useful in comparison to appeal to causally mediating states,
and should thereby be excluded from theorising in cognitive science. Ramsey takes
S-representation to be the only robust notion of representation on oﬀer.
Ramsey's sceptical results about the presence of a substantial notion of represent-
ation in contemporary cognitive science have been compellingly countered by Sprevak
(2011) and Shagrir (2012c), at least for what regards some domains of enquiry. At any
rate, the cautious note that Ramsey urges on us remains in force: talk of representa-
tion in the cognitive sciences, though widespread, may be largely empty, and we must
examine in each case whether it is playing its proper explanatory role. The fact that
cognitive scientists routinely deploy the term `representation' should not lure us into be-
lieving that they are actually positing the objective existence of robust representations
in cognitive systems  they might be simply talking about causal relays.
Most importantly, Bechtel's case study is fully compatible with the tenets of content
pragmatism. As the content pragmatist points out, the notion of representation plays a
crucial role in cognitive science inasmuch as it allows us to connect the computational
explanantia with the distally-individuated explananda of cognitive science. It is natural
for cognitive scientists to start with the cognitive task they want to explain, which
is individuated in terms of the relationships between organism and environment  in
the case at hand, the ability of rodents to navigate space. That choice of explanatory
target plays a central role in directing scientiﬁc research toward the discovery of the
computational mechanisms behind the feat.
The fact that an `early and integral step' in cognitive science is that of using in-
25This is indeed how Sullivan (2010) deﬁnes the notion of representation at play in cognitive neur-
oscience and neurobiology. She then goes on to argue that in many cases talk of representation only
plays a minimal, heuristic role in research and explanation.
26Markman & Dietrich (2000) hold that causal mediation is the core of the notion of representa-
tion. Their account is thereby extremely liberal, and fails to explain what is special about appeal to
representation in the cognitive sciences, as opposed to other sciences in which causal mediation also
plays an explanatory role, but there is no talk of representations. By Ramsey's lights, this view does
not capture what cognitive representations are supposed to be in our scientiﬁc explanations, therefore
misusing the term as much as those that subscribe to the receptor notion of representation.
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vestigations of content to help identify the vehicles27 is in harmony with content prag-
matism. Identifying behavioural success in an distally-individuated cognitive task is
typically the ﬁrst step in research in cognitive science: it is the choice of explanandum
that then constrains the scientiﬁc investigation that follows. This does not mean that
talk of representation must be taken as ontologically committing; it may well be, as the
content pragmatist urges, a useful way of connecting goings-on in the cognitive system
with the behaviour to be explained: an explanatory gloss.
After determining the explanatory target, cognitive scientists go on and try to ﬁgure
out what internal computational processes can explain behavioural success, what the
computational vehicles are, e.g. in spatial navigation. This involves ﬁguring out which
stimuli neurons respond to, as well as their causal relationships with other neurons and
networks. This allows cognitive scientists to individuate the neurons and networks that
are good candidates for being the computational mechanisms behind the successful per-
formance of the cognitive task. Once plausible candidates are found, it is only by taking
them to be representing (or, more weakly, carrying information about) entities and pro-
cesses in the environment that the connexion between the computational mechanisms,
and the cognitive task target of the explanation can be established.
The fact, repeatedly appealed to by Bechtel (2016), that cognitive scientists are
interested in ﬁnding out what neural states represent is perfectly in line with what the
content pragmatist holds. It is a crucial step in trying to individuate the computational
mechanisms that explain successful cognitive behaviour. The content pragmatist does
not deny the importance of the notion of representation in the `context of discovery'28.
The gloss that representation provides not only allows keeping the explanatory target
always in view, but it also makes simpler for scientists to understand the role that
computational goings-on in the cognitive system play in bringing forth successful com-
pletion of the task. However, this does not entail that in the `context of justiﬁcation'
an ontological commitment to cognitive representations is necessary. It does not follow
from anything that Bechtel says about how research in rodent navigation has proceeded
that such an objectivist position about representation needs to be taken to do justice to
scientiﬁc practice. That practice is compatible with the tenets of content pragmatism
as well. Therefore, I submit, the content pragmatist escapes Bechtel's objection.
Pragmatism and primitivism
The second line of attack against content pragmatism involves claiming that the view
is too unstable, its instability making it collapse onto one of the traditional views of
representational content. Neander (2015) worries that content pragmatism might fall
into some form of dualism, or rather primitivism29. For the content pragmatist, the
27Bechtel (2016, p. 1291.)
28I am using the term, and its usual companion, in a somewhat loose sense.
29Neander, as well as Egan (2015), conﬂate dualism and primitivism, which strikes me as odd.
Primitivism in the lines of Burge (2010) can be compatible with naturalism  it takes representation
to be a scientiﬁc posit in no need of naturalisation, as much as fundamental entities posited in physics
do not call for naturalisation insofar as they are part of successful and fruitful sciences. This view need
not lead to dualism.
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argument runs, content-ascription depends on explanatory aims and interests which
are ultimately based on the intentions of organisms (humans). However, intentions are
intentional states with content. For the account to work in a non-circular way, the
content of the intentional states grounding the aims and interests of humans seems to
have to be taken as primitive.
Egan insists that her account is targeted only at representational content (short
of beliefs and desires), and not at the intentional content of propositional attitudes.
She can hence avoid falling into primitivism, leaving open the question of the nature
of intentional content. The content of cognitive states short of beliefs and desires is
parasitic on intentional content, for it is the latter that helps determine the content
of the former. But then, Neander presses on, content pragmatism accounts for only
a part of the problem of content, being completely silent on intentional content, on
which representational content depends. The content pragmatist would thus fail to
give a full account of how content in general is possible in our world. Moreover, they
would have to subscribe to a heterodox view of how the naturalisation project should
go. The strategy typically considered to be more promising has been to try and give
a naturalistic account of simpler cognitive states, short of beliefs and desires, to then
later build the account up, perhaps by adding extra factors, to also encompass more
complex, intentional states, such as propositional attitudes.
These are fair worries, I believe, but they fall short from undermining content prag-
matism, let alone make it collapse into dualism or primitivism, or even perhaps robust
reductionism about intentional content. The view does not collapse into dualism or
primitivism because the kind of content it appeals to in helping to determine repres-
entational content is intentional content. Being a diﬀerent kind of content, intentional
content is plausibly to be explained by a diﬀerent theory, targeted to that domain of
phenomena30. Moreover, the content pragmatist need not endorse robust reductionism
about intentional content. As I have already hinted, non-robustly reductionist views
of intentional content are available. Dennett's (1981, 1987a) Intentional Stance view
is supposed to account for the intentional content of propositional attitudes, without
oﬀering a straightforward reduction of the latter31. The game is still open as to which
kind of approach to intentional content will eventually prevail32.
Pragmatism and eliminativism
Content pragmatism and content eliminativism share one crucial element: both views
deny objectivity to representational content. However, content pragmatism and content
eliminativism are at odds in another crucial point: while the latter advocates elimina-
tion of the notion of representation from cognitive science as lacking explanatory value,
the former claims that cognitive science cannot do without it. According to the content
30Cummins (1989, pp. 12-13, 88.)
31In a reply to Neander (2015) during the MindsOnline 2015 Conference, Egan seemed attracted to
a view on these lines. A related account, also compatible with this line of argument, is the measure-
theoretic view of propositional attitudes put forward by Matthews (2011).
32See Haugeland (1990) for a only partially out-dated overview of the options.
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pragmatist, the explanatory gloss that accompanies computational explanation in cog-
nitive science cannot be eliminated. For that gloss in terms of representational content
plays an essential role in allowing cognitive science to explain what it sets out to explain:
distally-individuated successful behaviour.
As Neander (2015) points out, content pragmatism would collapse into eliminativism
were the pragmatist to hold that future advancements in the cognitive sciences may
discharge the need for the gloss. In that case, the explanatory gloss would be a non-
essential epistemic device that we now need because of the early stage of development of
the cognitive sciences. In the future, with a fuller picture, and a better understanding
of how it all works computationally and neurally, the explanatory gloss, with all its
representational baggage, would be done away with. If content pragmatism amounted
to that view, then it would indeed be a species of eliminativism.
But on the contrary, content pragmatism sees the explanatory gloss as essential
to cognitive science, something that further scientiﬁc developments cannot eliminate.
Though representational content is not part of the computational theory proper, it is an
essential part of the explanatory gloss, without which it would be impossible to connect
the explanantia and explananda of cognitive science. Therefore, content pragmatism
does not give way to eliminativism.
Pragmatism and robust reductionism
The most insidious challenge to content pragmatism is avoiding its collapse into some
form of robust reductionism about representational content. I will examine two argu-
ments that purport to show that content pragmatism, in some way or another, fails
to provide a principled alternative to robust reductionism about content. Since it is
the objectivism that marks robust reductionism that underlies the crucial points in the
discussion, I will mostly focus on the former. I will try and defuse these arguments,
securing the coherence and interest of content pragmatism as a genuine competitor in
the search for a satisfying theory of the nature and role of representational content.
Ramsey against the argument from environmental neutrality An argu-
ment that plays an important role for Egan in motivating content pragmatism is the
argument from environmental neutrality of computational explanation. Egan (2009,
2014b) shows that computational mechanisms that contribute to a cognitive task in one
type of organism in one type of environment (say, computing shape from shading) can
be transferred to a diﬀerent environment or a diﬀerent organism and play a diﬀerent
role (say in audition), despite the fact that they still compute the same mathematical
function. Thus diﬀerent representational contents are ascribed to one and the same
computational mechanism when embedded in diﬀerent organisms and environments.
This fact, Egan believes, argues against objectivism about content  it would show
that representational contents are not essential to computational mechanisms, since
ascription of the the former varies wildly when the latter are kept ﬁxed, and only the
embedding context is changed.
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Ramsey (2015) has recently argued that this argument will not do. I believe that
he is right  as it stands, Egan's argument does not provide reasons to prefer content
pragmatism over objectivism. The fact that the same computational mechanism, by
computing the same mathematical function, can have diﬀerent contents when embed-
ded in diﬀerent organisms and diﬀerent environments does not jeopardise its having
fairly determinate contents in the actual organisms it is embedded in. Computational
mechanisms have been plausibly selected for the functions they compute because they
contributed to successful behaviour of members of a species in one or more types of
environment  alternative contents they might have had given diﬀerent evolutionary
stories or diﬀerent embedding contexts are irrelevant.
To avoid the objection, the content pragmatist must be more radical in their claims.
They must claim that representational content is ascribed to diﬀerent computational
states and processes, and diﬀerent combinations thereof, given diﬀerent contexts and
cognitive tasks in the same type of organism, and the same types of environment; and
this due to heuristic and pragmatic reasons tied to our interests and practices33. If this
is so, then content is not essential to computational states even in the same organism
in the same environment  an outcome diﬃcult to square with robust reductionism
about content, given the considerable indeterminacy of content and of vehicle individu-
ation across contexts that follows34. This is largely an empirical hypothesis, which only
empirical work can vindicate or prove wrong35. It is also a warning: unproblematically
endorsing the robust reductionist view of representation and vehicle individuation can
skew theorists' and scientists' interpretation of the available data, generating puzzles
and questions that would be misplaced given a more ﬂexible view of the role of repres-
entational content in cognitive science.
Glossing reality The ﬁnal argument against content pragmatism that I will ex-
amine is, I believe, also the most threatening. It tackles heads-on a crucial diﬃculty that
content pragmatism has to face, namely providing grounds for seeing representational
content as explanatory, whilst withholding objectivity to the notion. The content prag-
matist must answer the pressing question: if talk of representational content cannot be
eliminated from cognitive science, even after future progress, why then reject the idea
that content ascription is capturing something objective about cognitive systems?
Critics of content pragmatism argue that it cannot justify the fracture between
explanation and ontology that lies at the heart of the view36. Importantly, this fracture
is not a general one; it does not apply to every, or even most, scientiﬁc posits 
33See the example of pragmatist treatment of the frog's tongue-snapping behaviour in section 8.1.1.
34This is not incompatible with content objectivism per se, but it is incompatible with mainstream
robust reductionism about representation, which sees representations as stable and repeatable cognitive
structures. Non-robust reductionist views are in the cards, and I will put forward one such view in
section 8.2. At any rate, the pragmatist's insistence that such variety of content ascriptions stems at
least partly from heuristic and pragmatic considerations is incompatible with objectivism tout court.
35Such a hypothesis is in line with neural reuse theories. For a review of the theories and the evidence
for them, see Anderson (2010). See also section 8.4 below.
36I thank an anonymous reviewer to Topoi for framing the criticism at hand in this clear and pointed
way.
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a position characteristic of full-blown scientiﬁc pragmatism. By content pragmatism
lights', the fracture comes in for representational content, but not for other scientiﬁc
posits, such as computational vehicles and processes. The guiding idea is to cling to
objectivism about the latter, while shifting to pragmatism about the former. Content
pragmatists must provide principled reasons to hold that a notion that is explanatorily
ineliminable from cognitive science  representational content  should not be seen
as ontologically committing; whilst other putative explanatorily ineliminable notions
 such as computational mechanisms  should be so seen. Unless such principled
reasons are provided, the critic presses on, content pragmatism is unjustiﬁed. Why set
the pragmatism/objectivism border there, rather than somewhere else, or not at all?
I think there are good, albeit defeasible motivations for placing the border right
there. Cognitive science aims at furnishing a fully naturalistic account of what cognition
is, and how it works. Notions whose naturalistic credentials are dubious should not
compose the theory proper, on pain of endangering the scientiﬁc status of the ﬁeld.
Representation and content are clearly problematic on this regard. It is both due to
their apparent resistance to naturalisation, and to their explanatory role in cognitive
science, that philosophers have been so keen on trying and giving robust naturalistic
treatments of those notions.
It is an open question whether representation and content will ever be naturalised,
at least in the way robust reductionism would want. This provides some justiﬁcation for
a guarded scepticism toward an objectivist take on those notions. It also provides some
justiﬁcation for quarantining representational content in a pragmatically-motivated,
non-naturalistic explanatory gloss. Perhaps future work will give us the much sought
naturalisation of representational content37. If this should be so, content pragmatism
would lose most of its motivation. However, until that happy day arrives, if it does,
content pragmatism is justiﬁed in its project of pursuing a diﬀerent path  an altern-
ative way of seeing the role played by representational content in the cognitive sciences,
i.e. not as part of the naturalistic theory proper, but as part of a supplementary non-
naturalistic explanatory ediﬁce, built by us, for us, in light of our interests, capacities,
and aims.
This is just the ﬁrst step of the rejoinder. I have so far showed only that, given
our current knowledge, representational content possibly lies outside the border of what
we should take to be objective features of the world. Similar considerations suggest
that, as content pragmatism would want, computational mechanisms are to be found
on the inner side of that border. For concrete computation, i.e. computation in phys-
ical systems, seems a more promising candidate for naturalisation than representational
content. Despite some early scepticism about the prospects of naturalising computation
(e.g. Putnam 1988, Searle 1992), recent proposals are much more robust, in particular
the mechanistic view (Piccinini 2015, Milkowski 2013, Fresco 2014), as we have seen in
Part II. If concrete computation is a natural phenomenon, there is no impediment to its
appearing in scientiﬁc theories. The fate of content pragmatism thus hinges on whether
37And perhaps even the present work. See section 8.2.
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concrete computation, in contrast to representational content, will be satisfyingly nat-
uralised.
In sum, there are plausible, though defeasible reasons to believe that computational
states and processes are acceptable components of a naturalistic, objectivist story about
cognition. And there are equally plausible, and equally defeasible, reasons to believe
that representational contents are not. This is justiﬁcation enough to hold, at the
current state of play, that the localised fracture between explanation and ontology may
fall where content pragmatism claims it does. Though this may prove to be wrong given
future developments, it is not an incoherent or ungrounded position.
Even conceding that there are cogent reasons to uphold the localised fracture between
explanation and ontology that content pragmatism advocates, the critic may still not
be satisﬁed, and rightly so. For now content pragmatism seems to ﬂirt dangerously
with eliminativism. The burning question thus becomes: if representational content is
a bad candidate for ﬁguring in a naturalistic theory of cognition, why not get rid of the
notion entirely, as the eliminativist recommends?
To assuage that worry, the content pragmatist reminds that representational con-
tent can never be eliminated from the explanatory gloss because of the nature of the
explananda in cognitive science. Since those explananda are characterised as cognitive
abilities having to do with robust successful interaction between organism and environ-
ment, the only way to make the computational explanantia cogent as explanations of
those abilities is to see their components and processes as representations of the body
and environment. A commitment to objectivism about content does not follow, but
neither does an elimination of the notion from explanation in the cognitive sciences.
Content becomes explanatorily ineliminable once we see physical systems as cognit-
ive systems, bringing thus to bear our explanatory interests in making sense of their
behaviour, understood in their turn as cognitive abilities. It is only when we take a spe-
ciﬁc perspective  a `stance'  toward physical systems that representational content
becomes something we cannot do without in making perspicuous how the computational
goings-on explain behaviours characterised as cognitive. Taking such a stance brings
with it a host of pragmatic factors that inform content ascription, according to the prag-
matist picture. The fact that, as the content pragmatist claims, the explanatory gloss
in representational terms will never be eliminated from cognitive science (though it may
undergo changes as the science progresses), does not entail that content corresponds to
some property that cognitive systems, and their internal states objectively possess.
Thus the collapse into content objectivism and robust reductionism is avoided. At
the same time, collapse into eliminativism is also averted: the explananda of cognitive
science require that content be ascribed to (some) of their explanantia in order to make
intelligible to us how the latter enable the former. We get what the critic feared was not
to be had: explanatory ineliminability of content, without ontological commitment 
i.e. the localised fracture between explanation and ontology that content pragmatism
champions.
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8.2 The way of the mild reductionist
There are accounts that are deﬂationary about content in my sense, but that do not lead
to content pragmatism. I will present here one of these. It keeps to objectivism about
representation and content, but rejects many of the assumptions behind the robust
reductionist approach. I call it mild reductionism, or mildIS for short.
Mild reductionism, as I will be using the term, is closely related to the mild realism
of Dennett (1981, 1987a). Dennett tries to steer a middle course between what he
called the industrial-strength Realism about propositional attitudes of Fodor, Dretske,
and others, and the eliminativism of Stich and the Churchlands (Dennett 1991) 
whilst, contra Egan, attempting to keep allegiance to naturalism and objectivism. He
claims, brieﬂy, that it is an objective fact that cognitive systems entertain propositional
attitudes, such as beliefs and desires. However, and here he departs from industrial-
strength Realism, he holds that it is only by taking a speciﬁc stance or perspective
toward physical systems  the Intentional Stance  that the existence of propositional
states becomes discernible (Dennett 1981). Taking the Intentional Stance is justiﬁed
due to the fact that it enables relatively easy and accurate predictions of the behaviour
of some physical systems; ease and accuracy that are obtained by seeing those physical
systems as intentional systems  systems that act rationally in their environment in
light of what they believe about the world, and what their goals are. Descriptions of
such systems  i.e. systems to which the Intentional Stance proves to be predictively
adequate  in terms of their physical properties, or their design, are possible. But such
descriptions are unwieldy and unhelpful when it comes to predicting their behaviour, as
they miss higher-level patterns of behaviour that allow capturing useful generalisations
in terms of beliefs, desires, and intentional content.
Dennett has been mostly interested in vindicating folk psychology and intentional
states through his mild realist view38. Given that his target is what I have been calling
intentional states and intentional content, Intentional Systems Theory has a marginal
bearing on my project. I will not thereby discuss it any further. I will rather apply
some of Dennett's insights in developing his mild realist theory of propositional atti-
tudes to the realm of subpersonal states, to the realm, that is, of cognitive states and
representational content39.
Two notions Dennett appeals to and develops in his account are particulary helpful:
abstracta40, and real patterns41. Let us examine each of these in turn.
The foregoing notion of abstractum stems from the work of Reichenbach (1938). I
will however use it in an idiosyncratic way, without much regard for how it is cashed
38Despite an early adoption of the label `instrumentalism' to describe his position, with all its prag-
matist overtones, Dennett (1987c, pp. 71-81) has later on rejected such a label in favour of `mild
realism'. Dennett (1991, p. 51) has expressed some discontentment with the limiting and misleading
power of labels.
39Dennett (1995, p. 528) claims that the interpretation principles of the Intentional Stance apply
also to subpersonal states. However, content-ascription to subpersonal states, by his lights, is parasitic




out in Reichenbach's philosophy. As I understand it in the foregoing, abstracta capture
a complex of objects, states-of-aﬀairs, properties, and processes, and how they are
organised  I will call the components of abstracta, following Reichenbach (1938, p.
98), their `internal elements'. Examples of abstracta include the political state, and the
character of a person42. These are (abstract) entities composed of a set of elements of
often very diﬀerent nature, some of which may be abstracta in their own right: e.g. laws,
and their application, government, and their members, citizens, their rights and duties,
etc., as well as the complex behaviours and interactions of all of these  and this is
admittedly a gross understatement of the complexity of the political state abstractum.
The abstracta that ﬁgure as internal elements need themselves be reduced to a set of
internal elements that have ﬁrm naturalistic credentials, i.e. states-of-aﬀairs, events,
and processes in the world43.
Abstracta can be reduced to the elements that compose them, normally by means
of a conjunction (or, to use Reichenbach's term, a `coordination') of those elements,
and the relations between them. The meaning of an abstractum is equivalent to the
meaning of a conjunction of propositions regarding only the internal elements, and
their relations. Interestingly, in many cases abstracta are composed of a disjunction of
coordinated internal elements. This is a consequence of the fact that some abstracta are
realised by several diﬀerent suﬃcient combinations of elements. The abstractum `good
weather', for instance, has many diﬀerent concrete realisations, and therefore can be
captured only by a disjunction of coordinated elements. What counts as good weather
varies depending on context  e.g. season, latitude, closeness to the coast  and even
though perhaps it must be sunny in every instance of good weather, how sunny it must
be depends on the other coordinated elements, e.g. quantity and amount of clouds,
wind, temperature, etc.
Abstracta have as much claim to objectivity as the elements that compose them,
being complex, often disjunctive arrangements of the latter. The mild reductionist
view of representational content that I propose has it that representational contents are
abstracta. Moreover, they are abstracta that bear some resemblance to the abstractum
`good weather', in that they are complexes which can only be captured by a disjunction
of coordinated internal elements. The claim is that each representational content can
be reduced to a (plausibly long, even indeﬁnitely so) disjunction of internal elements,
i.e. sundry states-of-aﬀairs and processes in the world. I will come back to what types
of internal elements compose representational contents below. For now, suﬃce it to
hint at their motley nature. They include, among others, mechanistically-individuated
computational structures in the cognitive system, causal relations between the cognitive
system, the body and the environment, environmental and bodily context, the history
of past causal exchanges with the environment, the evolutionary history of such causal
exchanges, and potentially other factors. What the internal elements of each content
complex are vary case-by-case, and are strongly context-sensitive.
It is in this sense that `content' and `good weather' are alike: there is a large number
42Reichenbach (1938, p. 93.)
43The nominalistic drive here is clear.
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of sundry ways in which a certain content complex can come to exist. Contra robust re-
ductionism, there is no privileged exhaustive type of coordination of states-of-aﬀairs and
processes such that that type of coordination  e.g. in terms of causal-informational
relations between cognitive states and the world  and no other, gives rise to repres-
entational content. On the contrary, a variety of factors may come into play in diﬀerent
situations and contexts. One factor though must always be there: mechanistically-
individuated computational structures internal to the cognitive system. This is the
`narrow', internal factor that must always be present for there to be an instance of rep-
resentational content. It can never, though, stand alone. And, importantly, the ways
in which the computational structure is put to work  i.e. which computational states
and processes, and combinations thereof play a role in the content complex  may vary
considerably when surrounded by diﬀerent coordinations of other elements, even though
these diﬀerent coordinations give rise to the same instance of the content abstractum.
Representational contents are abstracta, and abstracta are as objective as their in-
ternal elements. The internal elements of the content complex, of the content ab-
stractum, are objective features of the world  states, processes, and relations such
as behaviours and interactions across time, resemblance relations, cognitive, environ-
mental, and historical context. Therefore, representational content is an objective fea-
ture of the world.
Robust reductionists are on board with the claim that representational contents are
abstracta. What sets apart the foregoing from robust reductionism, and what thereby
justiﬁes the qualiﬁer in `mild reductionism', is the way in which content is objective. For
robust reductionists, there is a non-disjunctive (or at most very limitedly disjunctive)
composition of states-of-aﬀairs and processes that come to compose the content complex.
There is, that is to say, a limited and non-indeterminately-disjunctive set of suﬃcient
conditions which, when in place, give rise to representational content.
On the mild reductionist view that I propose, on the other hand, content is determ-
ined by a variable, and indeterminately long disjunction of diﬀerent conjunctions of
sundry factors, each giving rise to the same content in diﬀerent ways. Given the varied
role played by the internal factor, computational structure, in this account, there are
no identiﬁable internal states across contexts that bear content essentially. Diﬀerent
combinations of computational states and processes play the part of the internal factor
in the content complex depending on the other internal elements that compose the lat-
ter. Here, as for the pragmatist view examined above, the primary way to individuate
cognitive states is by means of their computational structure. What content structures
bear depends on a host of sundry factors, and is thereby too variable and disjunctive
to be helpful as the primary means of individuating cognitive states and processes. In-
dividuation by content, though secondary, does play an essential role, again as per the
pragmatist: it captures abstracta of great complexity, abstracta that become scientiﬁc-
ally relevant and useful once some physical systems are seen in their active present,
ontogenetic, and phylogenetic embeddedness in a changing world.
It will not have slipped the attentive reader's attention that I helped myself to more
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than I am entitled to in this last claim. I have put forward so far the view that rep-
resentational contents are abstracta reducible to an indeterminately long disjunction
of combinations of factors, or internal elements. However, I have said nothing about
what makes those various coordinations of internal elements be part of content com-
plexes. Abstracta can be created by sheer stipulation, such as the bona ﬁde abstractum
`all bushes in Italy where a rabbit is currently hiding'44. But the mild reductionism
I advocate would be jeopardised by making representational contents into stipulative
or conventional abstracta. The content complex would then hinge on the intentions of
human beings; it would be an arbitrary way of grouping entities and processes that
has no observer-independent foundation. It is crucial for the strand of objectivism that
I am exploring that representational contents be non-arbitrary, non-conventional ab-
stracta. There must be observer-independent grounds for tying together the variegated
and varying factors that give rise to the content complex.
Here the notion of `real pattern' comes to assistance45. `Pattern' is itself not an easy
term to deﬁne. One way of understanding patterns is in terms of types of (typically
complex) regularities; another closely related one is in terms of relationships between
quantities of two or more variables across conditions and over time46. Regardless of
the best way to characterise patterns, a good criterion to decide if a pattern is at play,
following Dennett (1991), is to see whether information about the arrangement of states-
of-aﬀairs at hand can be compressed in comparison to a full description of each part of
the arrangement. An antonym to `pattern' is `randomness'  there is an order to pat-
terns that allows them to be more synthetically described than the disorderliness that
marks randomness. An empty chessboard is eﬃciently described by saying something in
the lines of: `8x8 grid of equally-sized squares, alternatively dark- and light-coloured'.
A grid of randomly-sized, ramdomly-coloured geometric shapes could never be so eﬃ-
ciently and straightforwardly described  a much longer description would be required
in order to capture the nature of that grid, due to its lack of order, due to the absence
of a pattern.
To get back to the terminology we have been using, patterns are abstracta composed
of internal elements tied together by some kind of order or rationale. If they are real
patterns, the order or rationale that brings together their internal elements is non-
conventional, non-stipulative  it is an observer-independent order or rationale found
in the world.
It may be countered that patterns are observer-dependent in at least one way: they
must be recognised. Dennett (1991, p. 32) admits that the idea of an indiscernible
pattern sounds like an oxymoron47. However, this is an innocuous type of observer-
dependence. What matters is not that patterns be recognised for them to exist, which
44I avoid here one of Dennett's (1991) favourite examples  namely the abstractum `the centre of
the smallest circle that circumscribes all socks that Daniel Dennett ever lost'  since it is not clear
which would be the internal elements of the complex. I do not take abstracta, as Dennett (1987c, p.
53) does, as calculation-bound entities or logical constructs.
45See Dennett (1991), Nelkin (1994), Haugeland (1998), ter Hark (2001), Burnston (forthcoming).
46See Burnston (forthcoming).
47In his treatment of real patterns, Haugeland (1998) puts considerable stress on the importance of
recognition for the existence of patterns.
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would entail strong observer-dependence, but only that they be candidates for pattern
recognition48. Patterns are candidates for pattern recognition precisely because there is
an order to them, an order that can be grasped by appropriate observers. Most patterns
may never be actually recognised by any observers, due to conceptual and perceptual
limitations, or because they are not interesting, or signiﬁcant to them. Nonetheless,
this would make them no less real. As Dennett (1991, p. 34) puts it: Other creatures
with diﬀerent sense organs, or diﬀerent interests, might readily perceive patterns that
were imperceptible to us ... the patterns would be there all along, but just invisible to
us.
The order or rationale that grounds a real pattern may only be grasped, thus making
salient the pattern, by means of taking a speciﬁc perspective or stance toward the world.
By taking that perspective, the hidden order that groups the sundry elements into one
abstractum is revealed, and the pattern is thus recognised. The only way to recognise
some events in the world as instantiating the Caro-Kahn Defence is by seeing them
on the backdrop of the rules and strategies of chess. The rules and lore of strategical
knowledge of chess is the order or rationale that allows seemingly diﬀerent physical
events in the world  e.g. in diﬀerent games, chessboards, with diﬀerent pieces, etc.
 all to count as members of the same pattern, or abstractum, the Caro-Kahn Defence.
My claim is that representational contents are not only abstracta: they are real
patterns. They are abstracta put together in consequence of an order or rationale in the
world. In contrast to the rationale behind the Caro-Kahn Defence pattern, in the case of
representational contents that order is non-conventional: it is a mind-independent fact
about the world. Once the right perspective to grasp that order or rationale is taken,
sundry collections of states and processes, current and historical, despite their wildly
disjunctive and variable nature, reveal themselves as patterns, as orderly arrangements
of elements: as representational contents.
The question then invites itself: what order, and whence?
The phenomena in the world that representational contents capture are the robust,
successful interactions between complex organisms and their ever-changing environ-
ments, over time and across contexts. Representational contents are the abstracta that
explain how those robust, successful interactions are made possible by the complex con-
junction, in each case, of several diﬀerent and, at a ﬁrst glance, unrelated factors of
sundry natures  e.g. current causal interactions, onto- and phylogenetic history, and
so on. What makes those real patterns of behaviour become salient, and reveal them-
selves as the content pattern is taking the perspective of seeing organisms as largely,
though not perfectly, adapted to their historical environments49. It is by taking phys-
ical systems to be adapted to their environments that their behaviours are revealed as
conducive to their maintenance and perpetuation, that their goals become clear, and
thereby their success (or lack thereof) in satisfying them50. It is the assumption of ad-
48Dennett (1991, p. 32.)
49I remain neutral on how to identify historical environments. Any plausible way of identifying and
type-individuating them will be compatible with the foregoing.
50Dennett (1987b). The appeal to adaptivity in the foregoing plays an analogous role to the appeal
to rationality in Dennett's Intentional Systems Theory.
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aptivity that reveals the pattern of robust, goal-directed, successful interaction between
organism and world. It is that assumption that makes discernible the objective or-
der, the rationale, that brings together current and historical internal states, causal
exchanges, environmental contexts, and yet other factors, to come and compose the
content patterns.
In this sense mild reductionism can be seen as a version of interpretational se-
mantics, though it pushes the boundaries of the view considerably. Interpretation here
comes from the perspective, or stance, of interpreting the goings-on in the cognitive
system under the assumption of adaptivity. Interpretation here is not intentional, as in
pragmatism, and neither is it purely mathematical, as in Cummins' interpretational se-
mantics. The interpretation mapping is objective, relying on a rationale that underlies
a real pattern in nature, be it recognised or else. Moreover, the interpretation mapping
is vastly richer than a mathematical mapping: it takes into account a host of diﬀerent
factors that contribute to internal computational structures being endowed with con-
tent in each case. This conception of the interpretation mapping is closer in spirit to
Ramsey's than it is to Cummins'. But in contrast to Ramsey's picture, it does not lie
at the basis of a robust reductionist account, and it does not cash out interpretation
purely in terms of cognitive or behavioural representational use.
In sum, the basic idea behind the mild reductionist ﬂavour of interpretational se-
mantics is to view representational content as capturing certain patterns in nature.
These patterns are normally rather complex  they may involve the current state of
the cognitive system, its relations with the surroundings, perhaps past interactions that
the organism (and its ancestors) had with the environment, and possibly other factors
still. Representational contents are abstracta that embrace the complicated regularit-
ies involving the interaction between organism and world  across contexts, despite
disturbing conditions, and so on. It integrates disparate, and apparently independent
contributions into a whole that is explanatorily fruitful  it is, as it were, a high-level
regularity that makes sense of the coming together of the low-level regularities that
compose it.
Representational content, according to mildIS, is a real pattern. It plays an explan-
atory role in the cognitive sciences, but not as a mere explanatory gloss, as for the
pragmatist. By shifting much of the burden of explanation to computational structure,
the mildly reductionist version of interpretational semantics I defend deﬂates repres-
entational content, but does not make it dependent on our pragmatic purposes. Some
internal states, representations, are contentful to the extent that they help compose
content abstracta by standing in cognitively exploitable relations to things in the world,
on the backdrop of other content-relevant factors. That this is so, for the mild reduc-
tionist, is an important observer-independent fact about cognitive systems. However,
it is, as it were, a `soft' fact. Representational content does not individuate in a de-
terminate way structures and processes in the cognitive system; it is rather strongly
externally context-sensitive  strongly dependent on the environmental embeddedness
of the organism at a certain time, as well as on onto- and phylogenetic history  and
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strongly internally context-sensitive  strongly dependent on internal cognitive, and
bodily context.
The embeddedness of the organism in its environment, its organismic needs, sensory
sensitivities and motor capabilities, as well as the state of the environment, determine
what the task at hand is, and thus help ﬁx representational content. Those factors
are part of the pattern that content is meant to capture. Computational structure
mechanistically individuated is another of such factors. What factors come to form the
pattern is a matter that may have to be decided case by case. When these (and/or other)
factors come together, they give rise to a regularity in nature: the organism behaves in
a similar way in structurally similar circumstances. Such a regularity, invisible when we
examine the factors responsible for it separately, is brought into sharp focus by having
recourse to representational content, in its turn made salient by taking the perspective
of adaptivity.
By accepting that the cognitive system deploys such and such representations at
a certain point in time, the complex nexus of factors that makes the context-sensitive
regularity possible is adequately captured in an eﬃcient and explanatorily powerful
manner. It makes clear how (and why) certain computational structures in the cognitive
system are deployed in certain situations, and most importantly, it makes clear how
come those structures are appropriate to the task  i.e. due to the fact that they
stand in speciﬁc relations with things in the environment, e.g. structural resemblance.
Representational content reveals the relational nature of cognitive states, relational
nature that underpins their capacity to lead to successful behaviour. Such relational
nature is captured only when we bring the many factors behind the pattern to the fore.
Now, I have said little about what those factors are, though I have given some
suggestions above. I think that we should not try and produce a list of those factors,
which would amount to suﬃcient conditions for representation, and thus lead to a more
robustly reductionist theory of representation than what I am willing to embrace51.
Diﬀerent factors may be bringing forth the `representation' pattern in diﬀerent cases.
The same computational structure may have diﬀerent contents in diﬀerent contexts,
and the same content may be ascribed to diﬀerent computational structures in diﬀerent
contexts. Nonetheless, that a state has a certain content in a particular situation is
a fact about that state, not merely an explanatory gloss. It follows from mildIS that
representational content is not the adequate way for the cognitive sciences to individuate
internal states  computational structure is. Determinate content-ascription comes on
top of that in light of the task at hand, the particular context, and all the others factors
forming the content pattern in each case. Computational structures of internal states
are deﬁnite and context-insensitive, while representational content is ﬂuid, context-
sensitive, and variable, as context, broadly understood, is a crucial factor that comes
51Nicholas Shea (in progress) is working on such a theory, and hence is keenly interested on delimiting
and individuating the factors behind the pattern. Though such an approach is fruitful, I believe that we
should be laxer about the relevant factors (and about reductionism), forgoing any attempt to provide
a determinate exhaustive list supposed to cover every case. The nature of representational contents as
abstracta composed of an indeterminately long disjunction of compositions of internal elements, if this
mild reductionist view is true, frustrates that attempt.
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to form the pattern.
A crucial diﬀerence between pragIS and mildIS is that pragmatic considerations
play no role in the latter. Among the factors that give rise to the content pattern the
interests and aims of cognitive scientists are not to be found. The liberality of second-
order resemblance is curbed not by cognitive interpretation, but by context, by the
embeddedness of the organism in the environment, and by the other factors, some of
which historical, that come to compose the content abstractum from case to case.
The mild reductionist about content does not share the deep concern of robust
reductionists with indeterminacy problems. In some cases, indeterminate contents will
be ascribed due to our epistemic limitations  due to the fact that we lack a full picture
of all of the factors composing the pattern, which could decide the matter. In other
cases, however, there will be no fact of the matter about which of a series of possibilities
is the determinate content of a state  this, I presume, will be more often the case with
less complex cognitive systems52. In the latter cases, the whole pattern will not justify
determinate content ascriptions, though the coming together of the factors forming the
content complex will nonetheless be explanatory of behaviour.
For instance, there may be no fact of the matter about whether states in the frog's
early visual system represent `prey there', `ﬂy there', `frog food there', or `dark moving
spot there'. But the assumption of adaptivity, and the factors that come to compose the
content pattern in this case, are suﬃcient to explain frogs' behaviour. All of the above
content ascriptions are explanatory of their behaviour in their historical environments,
and contra most of the literature, there is no reason to uphold one over the others.
There is no fact of the matter to decide between them, because the content pattern in
this case, given the relative simplicity of the cognitive systems of frogs, does not allow
(and does not require) such speciﬁcity.
Misrepresentation takes place when most, but not all, of the elements of a content
pattern are present, and this leads to maladaptive behaviour. For instance, the environ-
ment may not be the historical environment for that organism, or some computational
error leads to processing mistakes that reﬂect negatively on behaviour. In this case, the
behaviour that will be elicited may fail to make sense under the adaptivity assumption:
it may be behaviour that harms, or at least does not contribute, to the survival of the
organism. Or else, it may be behaviour that is elicited by a content pattern that, were
the factors all there, would have led to adaptive behaviour.
As an example of the ﬁrst case, a frog may be lured into snapping its tongue when
placed in a hostile environment, such as a lab in which humans throw around dark pellets
of non-edible material. In this case, there is no answer to the question of what the frog
is representing: cases such as these cause a breakdown of the adaptivity assumption.
Given onto- and phylogenetic considerations, there is no reason to believe that frogs
are adapted to environments other than the historical ones for that species. Of course,
in the lab a robust pattern of behaviour reveals itself: frogs snap their tongues at dark
pellets of inedible material. However, that pattern of behaviour is not to be explained
52See Dennett (1991).
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representationally: it is to be explained by a purely computational story, given the
impossibility of taking the adaptivity stance in such a case53.
Second, there is misrepresentation when behaviour is unsuccessful, but the lack
of success stems from the instantiation of a pattern which, though underlain by the
rationale of adaptivity and thus made salient, is  for some reason or other  not the
one that is conducive to adaptivity in a particular context. Naturally-occurring optical
illusions are good illustrations of this kind of misrepresentation. In such cases, the
adaptivity assumption remains in place, but behaviour is produced that, given sensory
and processing limitations, is not adaptive to that situation, though it would have been
were the situation diﬀerent. Recall that the adaptivity assumption has it that organisms
are generally adapted to their environments, from which it does not follow that they will
always behave adaptively, for instance in conditions that go beyond the bounds of their
discriminatory capacities  which are themselves candidate internal elements for the
content abstracta. Here, the organism may be taken to be representing something else
 the content pattern instantiated would be adaptive to a diﬀerent situation, e.g. the
one which generates the types of sensory processing carried out by the cognitive system
in that instance. These cases are akin to ones in which there are random, blunt errors
in computational processing, provided the ensuing computational states and processes
are internal elements of some other content pattern. If not, then we are back to the
ﬁrst kind of misrepresentation: there will be no question of what the cognitive system
is representing.
Mild reductionism, in brief, is a deﬂationary view about representation and content
that preserves their objectivity, as well as their explanatory role in the cognitive sci-
ences. However, it suggests a substantial shift on what kind of things representations
and contents are. Instead of being relatively stable, determinate cognitive structures
primarily individuated by their contents, as for robust reductionism and primitivism,
representations are context-sensitive combinations of computational vehicles, primarily
individuated in terms of the latter. Representational content is not taken as a sci-
entiﬁc primitive, but neither is it taken as being reducible to a deﬁnite set of suﬃcient
naturalistic factors and relations. Contents are abstracta underlain by a rationale in
nature; they are real patterns that have as internal elements sundry combinations of
factors that may come to compose them in diﬀerent ways in diﬀerent circumstances.
Mild reductionism thereby sets itself apart from eliminativism, robust reductionism,
and primitivism about representation and content. It also features several dissimilar-
ities when compared to its deﬂationary sibling, content pragmatism. These diﬀerences
might lead to one view being more promising or satisfactory than the other.
8.3 Pragmatism and mild reductionism compared
As we have seen, both mildIS and pragIS have the tools to address the issues that any
theory of content should deal with, such as indeterminacy of content, and misrepres-
53See Dennett (1987a) for analogous points on cases of irrationality in behaviour, and the consequent
breakdown of the rationality assumption.
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entation. But it is worthwhile to assess their diﬀerences, their theoretical virtues, and
shortcomings.
A crucial diﬀerence between pragIS and mildIS is that the latter, in contrast to the
former, does not make representational content dependent on pragmatic considerations.
The content pattern  this complex jumble of contributing factors that leads to sig-
niﬁcant regularities in the way cognitively complex organisms behave  is out there,
in the world, even though it is not a single, bounded object or property somewhere in
the brain. Contents are objective features of the world. The content pragmatist, on
the other hand, argues that content is assigned to computational structures in light of
explanatory aims and interests, being part of an explanatory gloss  objectivism about
representation and content is thereby rejected.
The diﬀerence between `explanatory gloss' and `real pattern' is an interesting one, in
which the subtle diﬀerence between pragmatism and mild reductionism lies. The content
pragmatist recognises that there is a pattern, but denies it is a real pattern in nature, an
objective feature of the world. Rather, the pragmatist takes the pattern to arise from
our explanatory interests and interpretational capacities  stressing, with Haugeland
(1998), the importance of pattern recognition. The rationale or order that brings the
content pattern to the fore, says pragIS, is constituted by explanatory practices and
aims, not some objective, observer-independent order or rationale in the world. There
are real patterns relevant for cognition, but those are cashed out in purely computational
terms  to which a gloss in representational terms can be added in light of pragmatic
considerations.
By preserving the objectivity of content, mild reductionism may be seen as superior
to content pragmatism insofar as it is less revisionary, and more in line with mainstream
views in philosophy of mind. However, as we have seen throughout this work, such
advantage has questionable grounds, and questionable value. It is far from established
that content pragmatism is revisionary of the practices of cognitive science54. And
even if it were, it is not clear how important descriptive accuracy is for a theory of
content to be satisfactory. Other theoretical virtues may outweigh a degree of descriptive
inaccuracy.
But content pragmatism has two more central shortcomings. First, the grounds
for upholding the fracture between explanation and ontology that lies at the basis of
the account are shaky, based on the perhaps ill-founded suspicion that representation
and content cannot be naturalised. Since this is a possibility, content pragmatism is
conceptually coherent, contra the critic. But coherence says little about plausibility.
Views that do not have to justify such a fracture, such as objectivist views, may have
the upper hand if they are independently plausible as theories of content. At any
rate, it is comforting to have a back-up plan, a strategy for saving, and justifying the
explanatory role of representation in the cognitive sciences even on the oﬀ chance that
the naturalisation project should fail.
Second, content pragmatism makes representational content parasitic on the inten-
54See section 8.1.4.
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tional states of human beings, which ground their explanatory interests and practices.
But pragIS does not oﬀer an account of intentional content, and it arguably cannot
do it using the same tools it uses for explaining representational content. Content
pragmatism has an explanatory lacuna at its core: it employs an obscure notion on
which it is silent  intentional content  to make sense of representational content. It
thereby makes a heterodox, and arguably dubious move: to explain simpler phenomena
by means of more complex ones.
These are not decisive defects of the view. But they suggest that theories of content
that avoid the explanatory fracture, and the explanatory lacuna that mark content
pragmatism may be preferable  provided they are satisfactory in their own right.
MildIS may be one such theory. It is objectivist throughout, and therefore needs to eﬀect
no fracture between explanation and ontology. Its account of representational content,
moreover, does not appeal to more obscure or complex notions, such as intentional
content. I believe that it should be preferred to pragIS.
It may be argued that mild reductionism is too unconstrained and epistemically
opaque. Content, being a complex and variegated aﬀair, becomes diﬃcult to ascribe
with certainty, given all the factors that have to be taken into account in each case,
which may moreover not be generalisable to other cases and contexts. This might be
taken as jeopardising the explanatory usefulness of the notion in cognitive science.
I do not think that the epistemic opacity that follows from mildIS is damaging. It
is to be expected that a notion so complex as representational content should lead to
diﬃculties pinpointing with conﬁdence what contents are at play in each case. Choices
in terms of explanatory power and aims may be made in order to help content ascription,
but these factors do not constitute the content pattern itself. And there may be cases in
which there is no determinate content to start with, so that attempts to ascribe deﬁnite
contents would only approximate the real pattern.
Compare with the political state abstractum: it is often diﬃcult to determine
whether some states are democracies. But we can reach good enough judgements on
the basis of non-exhaustive knowledge of the internal elements that compose the ab-
stractum. Something similar is true of representational content. Though we may expect
considerable epistemic opacity, the notion is nonetheless useful and explanatory. For
we can have access to several elements of the pattern, and therefore make informed
hypotheses about its nature. And investigation may reveal further elements, changing
or reﬁning our understanding of what contents are at play in speciﬁc cases.
A further worry regards the capacity of mildIS to allow useful generalisations. If
content is strongly context-sensitive, and constituted by an indeﬁnite disjunction of sets
of suﬃcient factors, it might seem that any explanation in terms of content will not gen-
eralise beyond single instances of behaviour, hurting the explanatory value of resorting
to representation. I do not think it follows from mildIS that generalisations are im-
possible. For most explanatory purposes, relatively coarse-grained content ascriptions
suﬃce, so that the subtle diﬀerences in content that might derive from slightly diﬀer-
ent contexts can be ignored. Moreover, given that content patterns involve diachronic
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considerations, diﬀerent instances of behaviour will fall under the same pattern, allow-
ing explanations that extrapolate from current instances, to past, and perhaps future
ones. The explanatory purchase of representational content is preserved, despite the
complexity, and consequent epistemic opacity that ensues.
In sum, I believe that there are reasons to prefer mild reductionism to pragmatism,
though these reasons are not decisive, based on some theoretical virtues that the former
has, when compared to the latter.
8.4 Coda  Workings and roles: neural reuse and deﬂated
representation
The two deﬂationary paths that I have put forward above, and especially the mild
reductionist version, entail some empirical claims about the nature of the internal rep-
resentational vehicles  that is to say, the internal computational states to which rep-
resentational contents are ascribed, be it for pragmatic reasons, in pragIS, or by means
of being part of the relevant real pattern, in mildIS. These views entail that represent-
ational vehicles, and perhaps the realisers of cognitive states and processes in general,
are in complex, dynamic, and context-sensitive mapping relations with their functional
and representational characterisations. The deﬂationary account I propose has it that
the relationship between contents and computational vehicles is many-to-many: there
may be cases in which one computational vehicle has or is ascribed several diﬀerent
contents, depending on context; and there may be cases in which several computational
vehicles, in similar or diﬀerent contexts, have or are ascribed the same content. These
apparently heterodox claims might appear too big a bullet to bite, unless some further
motivation is provided to back them up.
In this section, I will use recent work in the ﬁeld of cognitive ontology to argue that
the empirical claims that follow from my deﬂationary view are not only conceptually
possible, but also scientiﬁcally plausible. My view has good scientiﬁc credentials insofar
as it dovetails nicely with current discussions on how best to understand and describe
the functional structure of the brain, and how it relates to its physical structure. These
discussions aim at providing an adequate `cognitive ontology' to the cognitive sciences.
Ontologies55 are `systematic descriptions' of structure-function relations whereby
structures predict functions and functions predict structures56. Cognitive ontologies
are in the business of ﬁguring out how a) to carve cognitive systems both functionally
and structurally, and b) to map functionally-individuated states and processes at the
cognitive level (e.g. face recognition, verbal articulation) into structurally-individuated
states and processes at the physiological level (e.g. brain areas, networks, neural cir-
cuits)57. Such mapping relations, as many in the debate have pointed out, are likely
not one-to-one, contra the still in many respects dominant localist paradigm58. There
55Note that the term `ontology' is not used here in its traditional philosophical sense.
56Price & Friston (2005, p. 263.)
57Anderson (2015) provides a brief introduction to the debate about cognitive ontologies.
58See, for illustration and discussion, Noppeney et al. (2004), McIntosh (2004), Price & Friston
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are reasons to believe that complex cognitive systems such as the human one feature
brain areas that are pluripotential  one area subserves many cognitive functions 
and degenerate  many areas are suﬃcient for the same cognitive function  which
make implausible the one-to-one mappings the localist paradigm would have wanted59.
In contrast, we should expect and look for many-to-many mappings between cognitive
functions and brain structures.
The issues and questions that exercise theorists in cognitive ontology are related,
but not equivalent, to the issues and questions that arise from a treatment of cognitive
representation. But the former bear on the latter. Cognitive ontologies concern cog-
nitive functions posited in light of functional decompositions of cognitive tasks. These
cognitive subprocesses, e.g. facial recognition, are at a level of grain considerably coarser
than the one that would individuate speciﬁc representational vehicles, and their con-
tents. Nevertheless, pluripotentiality and degeneracy at this level of description of
cognitive systems bear on questions relating to representational vehicles. For if one and
the same area, in the same cognitive system, and over a timeframe that bars signiﬁcant
structural change, is able to participate in cognitive functions of very diﬀerent kinds,
as the empirical evidence suggests, there is reason to believe that the representational
vehicles that it realises or contributes to realising vary in their contents, if not even in
their functional individuation. Analogously, if one and the same cognitive function can
be implemented in structurally diﬀerent areas, in which the structure of local neural
circuits diﬀer, then there is reason to believe that the representations relevant for that
function will be realised in those structurally diﬀerent areas, perhaps in diﬀerent ways60.
The debate on how to go about in looking for the right cognitive ontologies for hu-
man cognition is quite recent, and there is as yet much work to be done, both conceptual
and empirical. Diﬀerent positions can be delineated in the contemporary debate61. A
conservative attitude has it that the psychological categories that we apply in our study
of cognition will be revised in light of empirical work in neuropsychology, but most of
our psychological constructs will be preserved, and more general functional character-
isations will lead to one-to-one function-structure mappings. A moderate take accepts
that work in neuropsychology may lead to a more marked revision of our psychological
constructs than that predicted by the conservative: our current constructs may be in
some cases merged with each other, in other cases split up, and in others still eliminated
 nonetheless, one-to-one structure-function mappings will typically be possible. More
radical positions claim that we will eventually end up with constructs that are sub-
(2005), Anderson (2010), Figdor (2010), Klein (2012), Rathkopf (2013), McCraﬀrey (2015), Bergeron
(2016), Burnston (2016b).
59For reviews of the empirical evidence, see Price & Friston (2005), Anderson (2010), Figdor (2010).
60As Noppeney et al. (2004), Price & Friston (2005), Figdor (2010) point out, function-structure
mappings, as well as issues relating to pluripotentiality and degeneracy, vary according to level of
description. Two diﬀerent areas may be suﬃcient for the task `reading out loud', and thus be considered
degenerate. However, they may be implementing diﬀerent strategies, i.e. spelling-to-sound vs. lexico-
semantic memory, that lead to the same behavioural outcome. So at a lower level of description, those
areas are not degenerate relative to one another, since each is not able to perform the speciﬁc function
the other performs. For our purposes, degeneracy at a rather low level of description is the most
relevant case.
61Anderson (2015, pp. 70ﬀ.).
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stantially diﬀerent from the ones we have now, and that one-to-one structure-function
mappings, far from the normal case, will be atypical. They hold that neuroscientiﬁc
evidence motivates (and will motivate) a fundamental revision of the ontology of cogni-
tion62  one in which functional characterisations of brain regions will involve functions
that have little to do with the psychological constructs we posit in neuropsychological
research nowadays.
One of the most well-argued positions in the radical end of the spectrum has been
put forward by Michael L. Anderson in a series of papers (2007a, 2007b, 2010, 2016), and
in a recent book (2014). According to this view, the Massive Redeployment Hypothesis,
the brain employs neural circuits in a variety of diﬀerent cognitive tasks, such that areas
of the brain come to play sundry cognitive roles. Neural reuse theories, of which the
Massive Redeployment Thesis is a version, have it that low-level neural circuits are
used and reused for various purposes in diﬀerent cognitive and task domains63. The
basic idea is that cognitive functions are realised by diﬀerent combinations of many
neural circuits, each of which has ﬁxed properties. Anderson (2010, 2014, 2016) sees his
version of the neural reuse hypothesis as incorporating, and expanding on the project of
4E cognition  i.e. cognition as embedded, embodied, enacted, and extended. Though
this application of the view is interesting, there are more moderate and less revisionary
possibilities as to how to develop the idea that neural reuse is a widespread property
of the brain64. On a relatively moderate understanding of neural reuse, a more precise
revision of our cognitive ontology will focus on the computational proﬁle of neural
circuits at the lowest, context-insensitive level of description of the cognitive system.
Neural circuits have deﬁnite computational capacities, and diﬀerent cognitive functions
can be realised by diﬀerent combinations of neural circuits in light of those capacities.
A crucial distinction is in order to make sense of the proposal: that between the
`working' of a neural circuit, and its `use' (or `role') in a speciﬁc neural and cognitive
context65. As Anderson (2010, p. 252) nicely summarises, neural reuse models
make a strong distinction between a working  whatever speciﬁc compu-
tational contribution local anatomical circuits make to overall function 
and a use, the cognitive purpose to which the working is put in any indi-
vidual case. For neural reuse theories, anatomical sites have a ﬁxed working,
but many diﬀerent uses.
The workings of a neural circuit are the low-level computational operations it per-
forms, and which can be exploited in the bringing about of diﬀerent higher-level cog-
nitive uses66. Workings are context-insensitive; they are the intrinsic computations
that a neural circuit performs. The cognitive uses to which they are put depend on
62For criticism of the putative evidence so far available to substantiate radical views, see Kaplan &
Craver (2016), Shine et al. (2016).
63Anderson (2010, p. 246.)
64See Bergeron (2007, 2016), Shine et al. (2016).
65Bergeron (2007, 2016), Anderson (2010). Anderson (2016) downsizes the importance of the distinc-
tion, embracing a more radical view according to which there will be cases in which workings cannot
be determined independently of uses. See also Burnston (2016a).
66Bergeron (2016, p. 819.)
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the neural context in which they are inserted from case to case. Their computational
contribution to each cognitive use remains invariant, but due to the diﬀerent combin-
ations of computations recruited by diﬀerent cognitive functions, the cognitive roles
those neural circuits play, and thereby the overall computations performed, depend on
which other connected neural circuits are at work in each case  i.e. which subset of
the computational structures of the cognitive system is activated in a speciﬁc context
 as well as on the source of the inputs received and processed67. A similar position
on neural reuse is championed by Carandini & Heeger (2012, p. 51), who claim that
physiological and behavioural evidence suggests that canonical neural com-
putations exist  standard computational modules that apply the same
fundamental operations in a variety of contexts. A canonical neural com-
putation can rely on diverse circuits and mechanisms, and diﬀerent brain
regions or diﬀerent species may implement it with diﬀerent available com-
ponents.
Candidate fundamental, or `canonical' neural computations, include: exponentiation,
linear ﬁltering, and normalisation68. But there may be many others. These are com-
putations implemented in diﬀerent neural structures and areas of the brain, which play
a role in bringing about diﬀerent cognitive functions. There is evidence that neural
circuits computing normalisation play a role in cognitive functions such as olfactory,
auditory, and visual sensory processing  making contributions at diﬀerent stages of
processing in the visual system, from the retina, to V1 and MT, supporting diﬀerent
cognitive functions in each case (e.g. object recognition)  and attention modulation69.
The relevance of these considerations to the deﬂationary view of representation
should be clear. If a version of the neural reuse hypothesis on these lines is correct,
then the basic and primary way of individuating internal states relevant for cogni-
tion is in terms of their computational structure, formed by various combinations of
computationally-specialised neural circuits. Representation comes on top of that com-
putational description, when the aim is to explain higher-level cognitive uses  the
cognitive functions to which those networks of circuits are contributing. Given that,
according to neural reuse theories, the same neural circuits, with their ﬁxed workings,
are at play in many diﬀerent types of cognitive functions, the representational roles they
67Burnston (2016a) has put into doubt the thesis that workings are context-insensitive, thesis that he
dubs `computational absolutism', on the grounds that current computational models ascribe diﬀerent
computational proﬁles to brain area MT depending on which cognitive function is being performed.
He argues that workings vary according to context, as the case study of area MT would suggest.
Though this strong contextualist view is not incompatible with the position I am defending here 
since mechanistic explanation, and thereby mechanistically-individuated computational structure hinge
on what the explanandum cognitive function is  Burnston's arguments do not justify the rejection of
computational absolutism. His reliance on current computational models weakens his claims, for there
is no reason to believe that our current and rather coarse computational models, even though predictive,
actually mirror the computations being performed by speciﬁc neural circuits. Moreover, often those
computational models are meant to capture diﬀerent levels of description of the system, using diﬀerent
computational paradigms. Diversity in models is to be expected, given their diﬀerent aims. Moreover,
even sticking to the basic level of workings, it may be that diﬀerent cognitive tasks recruit diﬀerent
neural circuits, and combinations thereof, in MT, thus giving rise to diﬀerent computational proﬁles.
68See also Shine et al. (2016).
69See Carandini & Heeger (2012) for a review of the evidence.
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play, as well as their computational junctures themselves, vary in a context-sensitive
way in light of neural, bodily, and environmental context  as my deﬂationary view
would have it.
If a relatively moderate neural reuse theory is true, there is little motivation to see
representation as the robust reductionist would want it: as deﬁnable, repeatable cog-
nitive structures that essentially bear their contents, which they get by standing in spe-
ciﬁable naturalistic sets of relations to entities in the body and the world. That picture
would rather suggest that representation may be a much more ﬂexible, context-sensitive,
and variable aﬀair  something more in the lines of the deﬂationary, computation-based
theory I am oﬀering, regardless of whether one opts for its pragmatic or mild reductionist
ﬂavour.
Whether this sort of hypothesis will pan out is a largely empirical matter. My aim
was just to put at least some empirical ﬂesh around my philosophical bones. That a
philosophical thesis should make empirical predictions, and its interest depend at least
in part on their coming out true, is, I take, as it should be  at least when it comes to
the philosophy of cognitive science.
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Concluding remarks
We have reached the core of my project. I examined extant versions of interpretational
semantics, their advantages and shortcomings, and argued that they should be supple-
mented with the robust notion of concrete computation oﬀered by the mechanistic view
defended in Part II. That move allowed me to put forward a theory of representation
that draws from both interpretational semantics and structural representation. Second-
order resemblance plays an important role in at least one type of representation, while
the notion of content is deﬂated, and with it many philosophical worries.
As a ﬁnal, and somewhat tangential, remark, the theory I am here advocating, in its
two guises, is nicely wedded to pluralism about representation. Second-order resemb-
lance might be one of the ways in which computational structures lead to successful
behaviour. The possibility is open that there may be other relations between internal
states and the world that are equally explanatorily useful. My focus on theories of
representation based on second-order resemblance is motivated by the importance and
fruitfulness of the notion of structural representation, of the representation-as-model
model70, in the cognitive sciences. There might be other models of representation that
are explanatorily fruitful, and compatible with the foregoing account.
In the picture I oﬀer, no uniﬁed account should be sought. Representational content
captures a variety of diﬀerent, ﬂuid cognitive states and processes that mediate complex
behaviour. How this mediation is eﬀected may vary wildly in diﬀerent situations and
tasks. One of them, I believe, is based on second-order resemblance relations between
computational structures, and target domains in the world. Ascription of representa-
tional content to such internal states and processes is a way of generalising over the
diversity of physical and computational processes in the cognitive system that lead to
behavioural success in speciﬁc situations. This deﬂated understanding of representation
becomes possible once we have a robust notion of concrete computation. The account,
in its two ﬂavours, is not merely instrumentalist, given the reliance on computational
structures and computational mechanisms. For the same reason, neither is it eliminat-
ivist. Representational content, even in the pragmatist ﬂavour, keeps its explanatory
importance, and cannot be eliminated from scientiﬁc discourse. The place of represent-
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